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 ABSTRACT 
 
Political Reunification With Taiwan: Perspectives from the Leadership,  
Intellectuals and the General Public in Mainland China 
 
 
by 
 
 
Yu Peji 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
This thesis studies Mainland China’s standpoint of political reunification with 
Taiwan in the contemporary era (2008-2014). The exploration examines the 
perspectives of leadership, intellectuals and the general public under the analytical 
framework of state nationalism and popular nationalism.  
In general, the standpoints that “Taiwan as an integral part of China” and a 
“political reunification with Taiwan should be realized” are still the mainstream 
views in Mainland China. However, detailed reunification views vary among the 
different perspectives. In terms of the state nationalism composed by leadership and 
establishment intellectuals, the settlement of the Taiwan issue and the realization of 
the complete reunification of China represent the fundamental interests of the 
Chinese nation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). State nationalism regards 
a political reunification by “One Country, Two Systems” under the sovereignty of the 
PRC through peaceful negotiation as the best proposal. Meanwhile, it also reserves 
the possibility of executing military resolution to prevent the independence of 
Taiwan as the bottom line. However, considering the contemporary political reality 
across the Strait, state nationalism is also willing to make pragmatic explorations 
such as authorizing more autonomy to Taiwan and even initiating political reforms in 
Mainland to facilitate reunification in the special political circumstances that the 
country has not yet been reunified. As for the popular nationalism made up by the 
general public and public intellectuals, majority opinions are in favor of a political 
reunification though there is a clear division between the conservatives and the 
liberals. The most prominent views among the conservatives are that they believe 
Mainland should be dominant in the reunification process and mainland government 
is justified to use military force under any circumstance. In contrast, the most popular 
views among the liberals are that they believe the prospect of reunification cannot be 
realized without the political reforms in Mainland China. 
It should be noted that mainlanders no longer think as a monolithic bloc with the 
government as they used to do. While state nationalism mainly present as relatively 
conservative, popular nationalism shows a polarization. Popular nationalism is either 
more conservative or more liberal. Among the general public, some make objections 
to reunify with Taiwan and some openly show preference to the independence of 
Taiwan. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
Introduction 
The major function of this chapter is to justify the topic selection and introduces 
the analytical framework. To accomplish this, this chapter first discusses the 
importance of political reunification with Taiwan to mainland China. Second, it 
justifies the research of political reunification issue should touch on both the 
government and people in the new era. After that it gives out the analytical 
framework of the research. Finally, it lists research questions and chapter outlines for 
the whole thesis.   
1. The Importance of Political Reunification with Taiwan to 
Mainland China  
It is quite difficult for many, at least for the average foreigners to understand “why 
a small place like Taiwan would be so important to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)”1and similarly, why Chinese government will try all the efforts to prevent the 
independence of Taiwan even at cost of its economic development.
2
 There have 
been numerous explanations to understand the PRC’s special standpoint towards 
Taiwan on political reunification issue and here I summarize them in the following 
points: 
                                                          
1
 Thompson, F. (2001). Interview: Dangerous Strait. Retrieved 10/25, 2014, 
from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/interviews/thompson.html 
2
  Yu, K. (2007). Fang du fa li tai du jing jian ting bai ye zai suo bu xi [Prevent Taiwan Independence 
even at the cost of economic development]. Retrieved 10/25, 2014, from 
http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1002/9/7/0/100297015.html 
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First, the political unification with Taiwan is associated with the legitimacy of 
the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its power. According to the CCP’s 
own interpretation, it was the CCP that led the Chinese people to win the great 
victory of the new democratic revolution and founded the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC)
3
.  Meanwhile, “after replacing the government of the Republic of 
China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of 
China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including 
Taiwan.”4 Moreover, the settlement of Taiwan issue has always been the persistent 
goal of the ruling CCP and the realization of the reunification with the Island is 
believed to represent the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation
5
. In 1982, when 
the Chinese government negotiated with the British government about the 
sovereignty of another unreclaimed territory, Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping (1982) 
clearly stated that “If in 1997 China does not take back Hong Kong - and that is to 
say, the People's Republic of China, forty-eight years after its founding - there will 
be no Chinese leader or government that will be able to explain the situation to the 
people; nor even will there be anyone to explain it to the citizens of the world. If we 
do not take it back this will be an indication that the Chinese government is like the 
government of the late Qing. Our country's leaders will be Li Hongzhang!” and Deng 
also indicated that “If we still do not take back Hong Kong in fifteen years' time, the 
people will have no reason to trust us; the Chinese government at that point shall be 
forced to retire from the political arena, and voluntarily leave politics with no other 
                                                          
3
 See Constitution of  the People’s Republic of China （1982） 
 
4
 Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. (2000). The One-China Principle and the Taiwan issue. 
Retrieved 8/5, 2014, from 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789217.htm 
 
5
 Ibid 
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choice.” To some extent, Taiwan’s eventual return to mainland China is the same in 
significance of Hong Kong’s return to mainland China. As a result, if Taiwan authority 
forever separates itself apart from China, CCP’s legitimacy and authority will be severely 
ruined. 
Second, Taiwan is an important part of Chinese nationalistic sentiment. Political 
reunification with Taiwan is not only a simple problem that the government cares 
about, but also deeply concerned by the people in mainland China. When referring to 
Taiwan, it often reminds the mainland people of the “century of humiliation” in 
terms of Japanese occupation and foreign intervention to block China from realizing 
the national reunification. In other words, the realization of the reunification with 
Taiwan is believed by many Chinese people as signifying “China’s recovery from a 
century of national weakness, vulnerability, and humiliation, and to its emergence as 
a respected great power”. (Swaine, 2004, p.39) 
Third, the importance of political reunification with Taiwan is largely the 
consideration of the domino effect of Taiwan independence on other parts of China. 
In recent years, pro-independence movements in Xinjiang and Tibet weakened the 
regional stability and even threatened the central government’s authority in the 
region. If Taiwan can be independent, then no doubt it will stimulate 
pro-independence movements in other areas of China, which may finally lead to the 
whole country’s falling apart. In addition, independence of Taiwan may also weaken 
central’s control over the local governments in mainland China, further intensifying 
the problem of “orders cannot go beyond Zhongnanhai”. (政令不出中南海)  
Fourth, the political reunification with Taiwan involves the prospect of social and 
political reforms in mainland China. Taiwan is the first Chinese society to realize a 
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western style full democracy. The successful implementation of democracy in 
Taiwan and its flourished civil society stand for invisible competition on ideas and 
values for Beijing. To realize the peaceful reunification across the Strait, an 
inevitable problem is the co-existence between two different political systems which 
is far more complicated than the Mainland-Hong Kong issue. In fact, the Taiwan 
experience provides many mainland dissidents and liberal intellectuals with a model 
to reflect and stimulates their appeal to the authorities to initiate further political and 
social reforms in China. 
Last but not least, political reunification is also largely the concern of the 
economic and strategic values of Taiwan itself. Given that Taiwan is the 26th largest 
economy globally and a significant regional trader
6
, political reunification can 
produce not only practical interests for China but in addition learning Taiwan’s 
advanced technology and its managerial and production skills. In terms of 
geopolitical strategy, Taiwan also has a particular meaning for China’s military 
strength in terms of access to resource and deterrence in the Southeast China Sea. As 
Foreign affairs argued: “If Taiwan returned to the bosom of mainland China, the 
Chinese navy not only would suddenly be in an advantageous strategic position 
vis-à-vis the first island chain but also would be freed up to project power beyond in 
an unprecedented degree”(Kaplan,2010). 
2. The Importance of Double Track Study 
Political reunification is the cornerstone of the making of Beijing’s Taiwan policy 
and it is the most essential clue in the development of the past seven decades’ Cross 
Strait relations. The unprecedented economic integration and other exchanges in the 
                                                          
6
 Global GDP rank. (2014). Retrieved 10/20, 2014, from http://www.stockq.org/economy/gdp.php 
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past few years have greatly reconstructed the situation across the Strait. Such new 
situation is very likely to promote mainland China’s high expectation for the political 
reunification. Meanwhile, another consequence of frequent exchanges is that 
mainland people understand more about Taiwan and are becoming increasingly 
concerned with the possibility of the practicality of permanent severance with 
Taiwan.  Thus to understand the development of the Cross Strait relations after 
2008, it is necessary and imperative to have a particular examination on the latest 
mainland China’s standpoint on political reunification across the Strait. 
Previously, when we refer to research of the Cross Strait relations, the first 
impression was that the writings were based on the frameworks such as governance, 
international relations, military, trade and investment. However, it is worth noticing 
that directions of the scholarly works are changing and they shifted focus from the 
government to the civil society, for instance, the bottom up approach to study the 
people to people to interactions across the Strait. Research on Taiwanese business 
people (台商) showed the earliest significance in this aspect as they were the earliest 
major non official individuals engaged in Cross Strait relations. Meanwhile, with the 
increasing academic exchanges and marriages between China and Taiwan, 
researches were also made on specific social groups such as mainland students in 
Taiwan’s universities and mainland brides. Moreover, there were even some 
refreshing angles, from the aspects of religion and culture to explore Cross Strait 
civic interactions. For example, Andre Laliberté (2012) studied how the Tsz Chi (慈
濟) Buddhist foundation, a non-profit Buddhism charity organization from Taiwan, 
influenced Chinese society in terms of volunteers works, social service and even the 
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religion. Consequently, the Cross Strait scholarly works started to study the people, 
not only official figures or government policy papers.  
Based on my observation of those research trends, I acknowledge that the strategic 
analysis in macro intergovernmental levels will continue to play a key role in Cross 
Strait relations studies. However, attention should also be given to the study of non- 
government aspect so that a more comprehensive picture can be constructed. When it 
refers to the issue of political reunification, there is no doubt that the studies of 
official interactions and government decision makings are essential. Meanwhile, 
political reunification is also an issue that demands the participation of the general 
public across the Strait. It is a process that people from both sides communicate, 
understand and accept each other. The increasing civic interactions indicate the 
likelihood that people across the Strait understand each other more directly and 
comprehensively. They will not just shaped by government propaganda. In academic 
area, there were plenty of research (some with statistics) conducted on Taiwan 
people’s attitude towards political reunification with mainland China. According to 
the latest public opinion poll on “changes in the unification-independence stance of 
Taiwanese” made by the Taiwan’s Election Study Centre of National Chengchi 
University, only 9.2% of the respondents prefer for unification while 23.9% are 
inclined to independence. The majority of the people, as much as 59.5% still support 
the status quo.
 7
 There is an obvious growing sentiment for seeking independence in 
the past two decades in Taiwan. But on the side of mainland people, no systematical 
research has ever been done yet. As a result, when studying mainland China’s 
concern of the political reunification with Taiwan in the new era, I feel the study 
                                                          
7
 Election Study Centre of National Chengchi University. (2015). Changes in the 
unification-independence stance of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by Election study centre,NCCU 
(1994-2014.12). Retrieved 2/16, 2015, from http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=167# 
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should be a double track through the investigation of both the government policies 
and opinions from its people.   
3. Analytical Framework 
3.1.Definition of Nationalism  
Nationalism has been one of the most important social and political phenomena in 
the past two centuries and its influence is still believed to remain as a strong force in 
the predictable future. (Berlin, 1979) Conceptualizing nationalism is complicated as 
it can be categorized into various forms based on different countries and cultures 
across the globe, but most definitions include the followings: the consciousness of 
belonging to a specific group, national identification based on exclusiveness, 
geographical identification, patriotism, and potential contribution to well-beings of 
the group.  
First, the word nationalism is connected to concepts such as “kinship”, 
“community” or “national interests”, which signifies “an ethnic group rooted in real 
or putative common descent”. (Wang, 2003) The recognition of the nation as a unit 
presupposes some sorts of acknowledgement of groups of people forming 
“something that is more persistent than the individuals composing it.” (Sargent, 1999, 
pp.24-25) National consciousness or awareness, as an inclusive mentality, is 
intensified, usually subliminally through a unique set of characteristics deriving from 
constitutional, historical, cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic and genetic realities. 
The sentiment aroused by the sense of being a part of a group may be confined to a 
keen sense of being proud in national culture and traditions. (Griffin, 1999, p.154)  
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Second, nationalism is also one way in which individuals distinguish themselves 
from outer groups. According to Greenfeld (1992), national identity under the notion 
of nationalism, which also known as a form of psychological attachment, is 
“fundamentally a matter of dignity”, the status of people’s identity to the nation is 
based on to what extent that the nation provides its citizens and their future 
generations with “security and safety as well as status and prestige.” (Druckman, 
1994) National pride based on political-economic hegemony, anxiety from 
international competition and humiliation originates from the historical foreign 
invasion are different psychological moods. Each of them nourishes the emotion and 
identity attached to the nation. Meanwhile, people’s attitude towards outer groups by 
establishing a boundary between internality and externality also enriches the 
connotation of national identification.  
Third, nationalism is also closely connected with geographical identification, a 
conception based on territorial and legal dimensions. A defined territorial political 
legal unit, viz the sovereign state that people live in also composes the nature of a 
geographical identification. As long as people live in the identical 
territorial-political-legal unit, they are considered to be the same nation even if they 
are heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, culture or language.
8
 In other words, 
geographical identification “seeks to construct a homogeneity that was not already 
there” through promotion fusion. (Spencer & Wollman, 2002, p.145)  
Fourth, when people say someone is being patriotic, it means that he or she is 
aware of being part of a country, identifies with the country and feels a positive love 
of the country. Exactly as the counterparts in Europe and the US, Chinese people 
                                                          
8
 Wang, 2003, op. cit. 
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often stick to the term “patriotism” in labeling their sentimental attachment to the 
nation, (Zhao, 2000) even though “being patriotic” is merely a part of nationalism. 
Last but not least, nationalism also includes demands for action intended to 
strengthen the country. This action not only refers to the loyalty to the nation, but 
also the readiness to serve it, to promote its well-being, and to defend the national 
integrity against foreign invasion. According to Wang Shaoguang
9
, such demanded 
action can be displayed as a demand of nation-centered loyalty at cost of primordial 
commitments to family, religion and ethnical group. The highest level of intensity 
indicates a supreme sacrifice to the nation by giving up all other public obligations.  
3.2.The development of Chinese nationalism             
When referring to Chinese nationalism, it needs to be noted that nationalism is a 
relative modern concept imported from the West. It emerged in the 16
th
 to 18
th
 
century as a way of expressing people’s psychological attachment to and mobilizing 
support for the nation states that were coming into being one after another in Europe. 
Ancient Chinese nationalism, by contrast, was a strong sense of attachment to the 
political and moral structure of the dynasty rather than the narrowly Chinese national 
identity as we refer to today. Chinese history is made up of the continuous struggle 
for political reunification through cycles of dynasties and cultural inheritance. 
Political reunification is a symbol of dynasty replacement as the traditional Chinese 
proverb says, “this world will seperate after long time united, also will do the 
opposite after long time splitting.”10 Meanwhile, the lifespan of a dynasty was 
measured by its adoption of the (Han) Chinese civilization as orthodoxy regardless 
                                                          
9
  Ibid. 
10
 In Chinese: 論天下合久必分分久必合 
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the territorial change or whether the rulers were Han, Manchu or other northern 
minorities. King Yeo-Chi (2013) defined this phenomenon as “State Confucianism”, 
which was also the standard to distinguish between Chinese (Hua) and barbarians. 
(Yi)
11
     
Modern Chinese nationalism emerged in late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century as 
Western states eroded the foundation of the Chinese civilization and its attached 
Sinocentrism by gunboats. China’s humiliating defeat in the First and the Second 
Opium Wars and the following Sino Japanese War evoked early nationalist’s anxiety 
for the country and their consciousness to make efforts to save the country in various 
forms. In practice, such sentiment was displayed through Self Strengthening 
Movement from 1861 to 1895 and Hundred Days' Reform in 1898 led by the Chinese 
political elites and intellectuals, and to some extent, the Boxer Rebellion initiated by 
the uneducated grassroots. After the downfall of Qing dynasty and the establishment 
of Republic of China in 1911, Chinese nationalism was gradually theorized into an 
inclusive concept of the Chinese nation, including all the people living within the 
boundary of Chinese territory regardless of their racial, religious and cultural 
background. (Townsend, 1992) The Chinese nationalism in the first half of the 20
th
 
century was highlighted through an effort to save Chinese nation from disintegration 
as well as a sense of phobia towards the West. It was also displayed in the 
exploration of building a country of freedom and democracy. The May 4
th
 
movements (1919), Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the struggle between the 
                                                          
11
 In Chinese, it is also called “華夷之分”. This refers to that any nation refuses to accept the Han 
Chinese civilization will be regarded as barbarians. Under the notion of State Confucianism, even if 
the western powers such as Britain and France, were also regarded as barbarians by Chinese.in the 
early and middle 1800s. 
11 
 
 
Nationalists and Communist (1921-1949) during this period could be regarded as 
Chinese nationalism in practice. 
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949, it 
downplayed the nationalism and favored adherence to the class struggle and the 
continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was not until 1978 
that China gradually reshaped a more critical and outward looking notion of 
nationalism. The 1980s has been the most liberal era in the history of the PRC. On 
one hand, politicians represented by Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang 
realized the necessity of implementing the Opening Up and Reform policy to save 
the nation from collapsing and to catch up with the trend of global development. On 
the other hand, the general public, especially the intellectuals, initiated heated 
discussions on liberty, democracy in addition to the essence of Chinese culture. A 
popular documentary in the late 1980s, River Elegy (河殇) reflected the negative 
aspects of the traditional Chinese culture (the yellow culture) and revealed strong 
will to learn from the Western civilization. (Chen & Jin, 1997) Meanwhile, students 
were also active during this period to strive for democracy and further political 
reforms. In this sense, the Chinese nationalism in the 1980s experienced a great 
spiritual emancipation and unprecedentedly concentrated on liberty and democracy. 
However, the crackdown of student movement by military in 4 June this year and the 
subsequent collapse of Communist regimes in former Soviet areas and Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s signified a turning point of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism. Nationalism in China was then intensified through extensive 
propaganda campaign of patriotism education, appealing to rejuvenate China’s 
national spirit, to strengthen the cohesion of the Chinese people of different 
12 
 
 
ethnicities, to eliminate the influence of western social-political values and to regain 
the public confidence by legitimizing the CPC as the core to promote the rise of 
China when Chinese people no longer believe the party to provide images of 
Communism ideology for moral edification but rather regard such idealization as a 
falsification of the truth. For the general public in China, unprecedented economic 
growth and its rising international prominence stimulated their national pride, 
represented by China’s host of the 2008 Olympic Games and the success of a series 
of manned space flights. At the same time, China’s conflicts with the West also 
directed to the upsurge of spontaneous nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese 
people and such sentiment is further magnified when people connected those 
conflicts with China’s national humiliation in the 19th and 20th century. American’s 
intervention of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, its bombardment of Chinese 
Embassy of Yogslavia in 1999 and its spy plane crash with Chinese fighter in 2001, 
Chinese protest against Japan in 2005 and the patriotic campaign of protecting the 
Beijing Olympic Games torch rally in 2008 were typical cases.  
In terms of the latest development of the Chinese nationalism, internally, it is 
highlighted through “the China Dream”, proposed by Xi Jinping as his hallmark of 
administration when he became the top leader. “The China Dream” involves the 
achievement of “two 100-year goals”: One is to build China into a “moderately 
prosperous society in all respects” by 2021, the CCP’s 100th anniversary. The other is 
to construct an “affluent, strong, civilized and harmonious socialist modern country” 
by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.12 Externally, 
                                                          
12
 Khun, R. L. (2013, 5 June). Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream. New York Times. 
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scholars suggest that Chinese nationalism took a “geopolitical turn” in 2008. (Huges, 
2011) China is becoming more assertive in defending its core national interests in 
various aspects even at the risk of confronting major powers. In addition, Beijing 
also implements more muscular actions in the territorial disputes in the South and 
East China Sea. (Zhao, 2013, pp.535-536) Therefore, based on the suspicion of the 
Western powers, the past memory of national humiliations, and the expectation of 
building a powerful country, the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation is the implication of the latest Chinese nationalism.  
In summary, different contents were added as the major theme of the Chinese 
nationalism in different historical eras, but in general, to build China into a state of 
prosperity, wealth, democracy and great unification is a persist goal.   
3.3.Defining State nationalism and popular nationalism in China 
Actually, since the Reform and Opening up era, especially after the 1989, the 
nationalistic sentiment released from the authority and the general public can no 
longer be regarded as a monolithic block. For instance, in the 1990s, while the 
government tried to avoid conflicts with major powers for securing China’s domestic 
economic development, nationalists among the general public were very critical of 
the then authority, accusing the leaders of being too soft. Similarly, in terms of the 
contemporary domestic political system, while the government faithfully upholds the 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics proposed by Deng Xiaoping, the general 
public either show preference in pro-Western political reform or request to return to 
Mao’s “orthodox socialism”. In this sense, to study the contemporary Chinese 
nationalism, a typical method is to divide it into the dichotomy of two forces from 
two opposite directions: state nationalism and popular nationalism.  
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Contemporary Chinese nationalism can be directed by two approaches, top-down 
and bottom-up. The former is known as the state- nationalism, defined as nation as “a 
territorial-political unit and an organizational system to gather citizens of a given 
territory—voluntarily or not— to produce public goods for its members and make 
sovereign collective decisions.” State nationalism is also promoted by “demanding 
that citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate their individual 
interests to those of the state.” (Zhao, 2004, p.26) In contemporary China, state 
nationalism is believed to have the characteristics of both idealism and pragmatism. 
The former refers to the legitimacy and the greatness of the CCP, viz it is the CCP 
who realizes the embodiment and object of patriotic sentiment by making China 
strong and reoccupying a significant place among the global powers. (Seckington, 
2005, p.25) It also includes the promise from the Party State of reclaiming the lost 
territories and to wash away the previous national humiliations. Pragmatism, 
however, is the detailed practice in reality, defined as “behavior disciplined by 
neither a set of values nor established principles.”13Under this guideline, Chinese 
state nationalism “does not have fixed, objectified and eternally defined content, nor 
is it driven by any ideology, religious beliefs or other abstract ideas.” It tries to 
maintain political stability and economic prosperity in domestic governance and to 
strive for national interests in foreign policies. In other words, except for the issues 
that involved China’s vital interests or attached with historical sensitivity such as the 
Taiwan issue, Chinese state nationalism is flexible and even accommodative in the 
policy making. 
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Relatively speaking, the bottom-up driven nationalism is popular nationalism, 
which is led by the citizens. Popular nationalism contains two elements, one is a 
more critical debate and the second is the spontaneous sentiment and actions from 
public. According to Zhao Suisheng, critical debate “has a tendency to include liberal 
ideas and be led by liberal nationalists.” 14 Liberal nationalists believe a nation is 
understood as a “composition of citizens who not only have a duty to support their 
state in defending national rights in the world of nation-states, but also to pursue 
greater individual rights of participation in the government.”15 In terms of the 
spontaneous sentiment and actions from public, they come from public through 
perceived national glories or insults. They also deeply rooted in the suspicion of 
Western conspiracy and hidden agenda to contain China to be a powerful country.
16
  
The relationship between the Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism 
acts in the following ways: in the past two decades, a “positive interaction” has been 
reached between state nationalism and popular nationalism. Both are determined to 
build China into a prosperous, strong country and to have a prominent role in the 
international competition. During the course, popular nationalism is satisfied with the 
national achievement made by the party state and it is willing to cooperate with the 
authority for defending national interests. Meanwhile, state nationalism well utilizes 
popular nationalism as a tool for social management and party control in addition to 
eliminate the pressures from Western powers. However, the divergence between the 
Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism is also obvious. While state 
nationalism takes pragmatic position to make sure China’s domestic and foreign 
policies are not directed by emotional rhetoric or decayed ideologies when there are 
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various crisis at home and abroad, emotional nationalistic sentiment revealed from 
popular nationalism may not acknowledge that. In recent years, despite Beijing’s 
effort to maintain the control over popular nationalism in China, popular nationalism 
is growing to be an uneasy popular feeling of pride and disappointment. It displays 
and protests have focused increasingly on not only the foreign policy makings but 
also the domestic social and political problems with implication that the Chinese true 
concern can be both the West and the party itself. In other words, it indicates that 
“the increasing assertiveness of popular nationalism has thus posed a daunting 
challenge to a communist government clinging to its monopoly on 
power.”17Therefore, popular nationalism in China no longer sticks as a monolithic 
bloc with state nationalism as they assumed to do and their views diverge in a broad 
range. 
The aforementioned analysis offers two implications for this thesis. One is that the 
issue of political reunification with Taiwan, is largely a matter of nationalism and the 
other is that, to evaluate the contemporary political reunification with Taiwan 
considered by mainland China from both the government and people, it requires a 
comprehensive study by taking account of both “top-down” and “bottom-up” tracks. 
As a result, it is most appropriate to use state nationalism and popular nationalism to 
construct of the analytical framework of this thesis. 
3.4.Application of State nationalism and popular nationalism in this thesis 
  In this thesis, state nationalism refers to the standpoints from the party state, which 
places itself as the central director in the Cross-Strait Relations. Standpoints of state 
nationalism could be investigated from first, the leadership, which is made up of all 
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the existing Taiwan related policy papers issued by the organs of the state and the 
party as well as speeches from the Chinese political leaders. Second, state 
nationalism is also reflected from articles written by establishment intellectuals
18
. 
The two sources of state nationalism have different focus: leadership gives a clear 
and formal diplomatic rhetoric while those establishment intellectuals provide these 
points with theoretical evidence, interpretations and sometimes, even advice and 
suggestions.   
Popular nationalism, in contrast, is the sentiment from the general public. It comes 
from a spontaneous sentiment through people’s perception of national identity, views 
on the interaction between Beijing and Taiwan, attitudes of the different 
social-political systems across the Strait, and it is reflected oftentimes in open 
debates. In this thesis, I divide popular nationalism into the categories of “views of 
the general public” and “public intellectuals’ contribution”. The first category 
represents the views of mass population from different social classes. The common 
expression of such views is realized through social networking platforms such as 
personal blogs or internet forums. The second category refers to views of 
reunification from independent intellectuals without official affiliations who are well 
educated and with a good social awareness such as popular writers, lawyers and 
scholars from higher institutions. However, there is also no absolute limitation of 
their educational level or occupation because the views on Taiwan with great social 
influence can be either made by Kong Qingdong, a professor from Peking University 
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or Hanhan, another influential self-employed writer without a university diploma. 
The expression of intellectual’s view is usually made through formal publication 
with authorities’ screening mechanism such as newspapers, journals and formal 
social commentary websites. A fundamental difference between the first and the 
second category is that views of general public are normally unable to influence or to 
shape public thoughts by individual but when thousands of people collectively 
express the same view; they can be a strong force. In comparison, intellectuals can 
influence and direct public thoughts individually through a popular article.      
  The following figure summarizes the aforementioned context and highlights the 
analytical framework: 
*Figure 1. Analytical Framework of the Thesis  
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4. Research Questions  
To accomplish this thesis, one main question and several sub questions attached 
with several hypotheses need to be answered.  
 Main Question:  
What is mainland China’s contemporary (2008-now) standpoint of political 
reunification with Taiwan? 
 Sub Questions : 
1. In China, what is the relationship between state nationalism and popular 
nationalism on the reunification issue? 
2. What is the relationship between the contributions of public intellectuals and 
the views of the general public under the notion of popular nationalism? 
3. What informs the mainlander’s contemporary standpoints of political 
reunification with Taiwan? 
4. What is the policy implication of the study 
  According to the main and sub questions, some falsifiable hypotheses will also be 
tested during the investigation:  
1. As for Chinese state nationalism, whether “to apply One Country, Two 
Systems through peaceful reunification while continues to assert the right to 
use military force” still serves as Beijing’s Taiwan policy in the contemporary 
era.  
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2. As for Chinese popular nationalism, whether the traditional assumption that 
“all mainland people are looking forward a reunification with Taiwan” is still 
correct in contemporary era. 
3. As for Chinese popular nationalism, whether “establishment intellectuals are 
merely the mouthpiece of the government while public intellectuals are 
generally more liberal on the reunification issue” is correct in the 
contemporary era. 
5. Chapter Outlines 
 Chpater1. Introduction: this chapter justifies the topic selection and introduces 
the analytical framework of the whole thesis.  
 Chapter2. Internet situation in China & Methodology: This chapter gives a 
systematic introduction on the methodological design of the study. To make it more 
comprehensive and progressive, it will also systematically study the internet situation 
in China.  
 Chapter 3: State Nationalism I: Leadership: This chapter explores a part of state 
nationalism, leadership, by investigating Taiwan related policy papers and the 
political leader’s speeches. The evolution of Cross Strait relations will also be 
studied in this chapter as facilitation.   
 Chapter 4: Poplar nationalism I: the general public: This chapter studies the 
views of general public from four selected online forums through systemic analysis.  
  Chapter 5: State Nationalism and Popular nationalism II: Establishment 
Intellectuals and Public Intellectuals:  This chapter studies both the state 
nationalism and popular nationalism through the investigations of intellectuals with 
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different attributions, the establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals 
respectively.  
 Chapter 6. Conclusion: Based on previous chapters, this chapter gives out the 
summary of the previous chapters by answering mainland China’s reunification 
standpoint in general, the difference between state nationalism and popular 
nationalism on the reunification issue, the relationship between the contributions of 
public intellectuals and the views of the general public under the notion of popular 
nationalism and the causes contributing to mainlander’s contemporary standpoint of 
political reunification with Taiwan. 
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Chapter 2 Internet Situation in China & 
Methodology 
Introduction 
  This chapter mainly introduces methodology of the research. Since the information 
collected for the thesis is largely relied on the online content, this chapter will also 
systematically study the internet situation in China. To accomplish this, it will 
include the following parts: 1. Internet users in China; 2. The power of online 
political discussions in China; 3. Online opinion and public opinion on political 
issues; 4. Political orientations on Chinese internet; 5. Public opinions online: Laws 
and Hidden Rules and 6. Characteristics of online forums. Through this chapter, it is 
expected that readers can understand how the internet plays an irreplaceable role in 
facilitating the free expression in contemporary China and the commonly 
acknowledged censorship on Chinese Internet is not that serious as people imagined. 
Moreover, this chapter also tries to show that online forums serve as one of the most 
effective channels to obtain the original political opinions from the general public 
and the methodology is reliable and practicable.   
1. Internet Situation in China 
1.1. Internet users in China  
According to the annual Statistical Report on Internet Development in China 
issued by the China Internet Network Information Center, the general situation and 
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the trend of development of internet in China by the end of June 2014 can be 
illustrated as follows
19
: 
 Basic figures: There are 632 million internet users in China, an increase of 334 
million compared with that by the end of 2008.20 The contemporary penetration rate 
of Internet in China is 46.9%. It clearly shows that the current scale of the Chinese 
netizen is large and its increasing rate was considerable in the past few years. 
 Rural situation: The internet coverage in rural areas in China is 28.2% of the whole 
Internet populations, reaching 178 million. While in 2008, this figure was 84.6 
million. The report indicates an increased growth of rural internet users.  
 Sex ratio: The male/female ratio of Internet users is 55.6: 44.4, which basically 
follows the traditional characteristic that male were slightly more than female.    
 Age: The internet users aged between 20 to 29 account for 30.7%, the largest 
proportion of the total. Followings are 23.4 % for age between 30 to 39, 12% for 
age between 40 to 49 and 5.2% for age between 50 to 59. It can be observed that 
those who aged between 20 to 59 constitute the majority of the Chinese netizen. 
Such age distribution pattern was similar in the past few years.  
 Education: Among the whole internet users, the population with middle and 
high school education accounts 36.1% and 31.1% respectively of the total, which 
constitutes major force of Chinese netizens. The population with the education 
level of primary school (or below), junior college and university are 32.1%, 9.9%  
and 10.7% respectively. Compared these figures with the past few years, more 
Chinese people with lower education levels are becoming internet users. The 
most significant increase is the people with the middle school educations.  
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 Career: Students have always been the largest population among the internet 
users in China, accounting for 25.1%. Self-employed persons/freelances are the 
second largest population among the internet users with the percentage of 21.4%. 
The other two major groups are enterprise staffs and unemployed people, which 
account for 12.2% and 7.6% respectively. 
 Users of Online Forum: the latest number of users of online forum is 124 
million and it is the 17
th
 most commonly used networking applications. However, 
one should realize that the majority of the high ranking networking applications 
are private oriented such as instant message, online shopping and payment. The 
only more popular networking application designed for public discussion is 
Microblog (Weibo), with the number of users around 275 million.   
From aforementioned figures, we can observe the extensive and deep influence of 
internet in China, hundreds of millions of Chinese people’s life are becoming 
“networked”.  
1.2. The power of online political discussions in China 
  While the rapid growth of internet in China has changed social life in terms of 
commercial behaviors, ways of communications and entertainments, an unexpected 
and unparalleled effect of it is to stimulate the political discussion in China. 
According to Yang Guobing (2009), the application of internet in contemporary 
China is much more than entertainment and play, it is a potential to empower people 
through transferring their anger and frustration to a common channel and to change 
the social structure “from below”. He further argued that contemporary social 
changes in China cannot be properly understood without perceiving the spontaneous 
sentiment from ordinary people on China’s internet. Indeed, in authoritarian states 
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like China, politics at high level and other sensitive information are normally 
inaccessible to citizens. Therefore, internet turns out to be a sole platform for 
non-official discourse to be circulated and reconstructed in China in a bottom up 
manner. (Shen & Breslin, 2010) In the past few years, the online political discussion 
in China has not only effectively altered the results of public events but also has 
changed the political direction of the whole country to some extent. Based on my 
observation and analysis, I categorize the online political discussion in China into 
four types, namely opposition to the perceived injustice, nationalization of the 
regional cases, intervention into the opacity and formation of dissident thoughts.  
In terms of the opposition to the perceived injustice, it is typically illustrated in the 
anti-corruption campaign and the attitudes toward official decisions. Since the 18
th
 
CCP’s Party Congress, the new top leadership has launched an unprecedented 
anti-corruption movement. In addition to the actions from the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection, online reports and exposure on the platform of Weibo and 
online forums by the general public turned out to be an effective method to facilitate 
the campaign, which directly led to the fall of many officials. Media from home and 
abroad acknowledge that internet has become a tool of public’s political participation 
and supervising the government. They also believed that internet can bring the 
positive energy to the campaign of anti-corruption.
21
Another consequence of this 
type is sympathy for the weak, which commonly shows that public anger forces the 
authority to amend original decisions that harm interests of disadvantaged groups. 
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One significant case was the incident of Deng Yujiao in 2009, a female pedicure 
worker, killed one of the three directors of local township business promotions with 
fruit knife in a defence when they attempted to seek sexual service and made the 
harassment. Initially the police arrested Deng and charged her with homicide. But 
soon the case came to national focus through online discussion where netizens 
showed great sympathy for Deng and praised her bravery. Meanwhile netizens 
resonated with public anger over the power abuse and moral corruption of the 
involved officials. Following the nationwide fury and the subsequent online petitions, 
the murder charges was removed and two other surviving officials involved in the 
incident were dismissed from office. From aforementioned cases, we can observe 
that this type of online political discussion plays a positive and effective role when 
there were flaws of judiciary, supervision mechanism and insufficient channels for 
civil appeals. However, one should also notice the negative aspect of such online 
discussion as it brings erode of the rule of law and of accountability. While we see 
the outstanding performance of online anti-corruption, we may also notice the 
potential danger of making groundless accusations based on personal grievance and 
full scale invasion of citizen’s private life. Similarly, while we are encouraged by the 
victory of public opinion, we may also further consider the independence of judiciary 
and the problem of tyranny of majority. In contemporary Chinese society, it is very 
likely to form a dichotomous model of “poor people are good” and “rich people are 
bad” or “citizens are good” and “officials are bad”. In other words, the realization of 
justice through online political discussion this time cannot guarantee the justice next 
time. That’s why I define the term as “opposition to the perceived injustice” rather 
than “opposition to injustice.”  
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The second type of online political discussion is the nationalization of the regional 
cases which characterized by online focus turning a regional case to a state level or 
even international level, and eventually influenced the direction of the event. In 2012, 
the government of Ningbo, Zhejiang Province planned to establish a $8.9 billion PX 
project, a controversial petrochemical facility which was suspected to damage 
people’s health and the surrounding environment in one of the districts in the city. 
The plan led to the large scale protest from local people who were annoyed by the 
government’s administration and feared the consequence of pollution. Massive 
instant report and pictures were uploaded online by protesters and soon the event 
turned out to be a heated discussion online nationally. The protest won a widespread 
support and created big pressures for the Ningbo government. Notably, the online 
discussion was so heated that some posts and key words of the event were even 
blocked on Weibo.
22
 Eventually, the protest and online support forced the officials 
to suspend the project. Through this event, the consciousness of defending individual 
rights and environmental protection were strengthened. Even the authorities 
acknowledged that in the future there should be an increase in public participation 
during decision making process based on more detailed assessment and mutual 
communication.
23
  
The third type of online political discussion is the unravelling of the political 
opacity. It displays as people’s paying great attention on an issue and increase the 
difficulty of its political operation in a black box. On 7 February 2012, Weibo in 
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China became a national focus when there were massive instant messages and 
reposts of the incident of American embassy in Chengdu, surrounding by a large 
number of alerted police force and with unconfirmed report that Wang Lijun, former 
police head of Chongqing, secretly entered the American embassy and tried to seek 
asylum.
24
 Influenced by the online rumors and the subsequent online discussions in 
the next few weeks, Wang Lijun incident quickly showed a blowout effect, triggering 
one of the most serious political crises in the PRC history mainly involving Bo Xilai, 
the then party secretary of Chongqing and a heated candidate of the 18
th
 CCP Central 
Standing Committee of the Politburo. Bo was forced to respond to the online rumors 
during the press conference of Lianghui on March, condemning them as “dirty water 
poured on Chonqing, himself and his family.”25 Several days later, the then Primer 
Wen Jiabao criticized Chongqing’s leadership in his annual press conference on the 
last day of the NPC session, announcing the end of Bo’s political life. It was not until 
August 2013 when Bo was sentenced to life imprisonment that this political crisis 
came to an end. Some scholars
26
compared the Bo’s scandal to the case of Lin Biao, 
who used to be the second political figure and assumed successor of Mao Zedong 
during the Cultural Revolution, but died in a plane crush after the classified political 
struggles. Lin’s death, together with Bo’s case, was a political crisis that endangered 
legitimacy of the authority and confidence of the general public. Though with similar 
characteristics, a fundamental difference of the two cases was that the solution to the 
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Lin’s death could be made by a few senior political leaders within the party 
confidentially while the Bo’s scandal could not.  As indicated by Western editorial, 
“In some senses, the Bo affair has blown the lid off party secrecy. But in another, it 
has highlighted just what an arcane outfit it remains. In the internet age, the party has 
lost its ability to settle internal affairs behind closed doors”27  
The last type of online political discussion is the formation of dissident thoughts. 
It generally illustrated as two models. One is that netizens form a consensus which 
was in contrast with the official interpretations. According to recent online study, 
when it comes to the attitude towards North Korea, while the Chinese government 
still officially acknowledged the close historical ties and its good relations with 
North Korea, surprisingly, there was a consensus among the Chinese nationalists and 
liberals that Beijing should amend its North Korea policy and to walk away from it 
as they all perceived North Korea as an untrustworthy and unreliable country and 
they were irritated by North Korea’s disrespect of the contribution made by China 
during the Korean War. (Shen, 2012) The other model is that netizens form the 
opposing views on a specific issue and at least one side deviates from the official 
interpretations. This can be very commonly observed on the Chinese internet when it 
comes to the domestic politics, diplomatic relations with the United States, Japan and 
Russia. In recent years, there have also been more antagonistic views on issues 
related with Hong Kong and Taiwan. For instances, while some netizen believe the 
close Sino-Russian relationship is good for China’s development, as the official 
interpreted. Opposite consensus is also reached from historical review through online 
discussions. Similarly, while plenty of netizens endorse the glorification of the “One 
country Two Systems” and believe it is the bedrock of Hong Kong’s prosperity and 
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stability, quite a number of netizens can realize the social problems brought by the 
system and reflect the Mainland-Hong Kong conflicts in a critical way. Through this 
type of political discussion, people downplay the government’s monopoly in 
propaganda and learn to think independently.   
1.3.Online opinion and public opinion on political issues 
   There has always been a dilemma that whether online opinion can represent the 
public opinion in reality. As discussed above, the contemporary number of internet 
users in China is 632 million, which only constitutes around half of the whole 
population in China. Even if we exclude 335 million people, viz 25.11% of the whole 
population who aged below 10 and above 80, there is still a gap of hundreds of 
millions people between internet users and population in reality. In the strict sense of 
demography, it is true that internet opinion cannot fully represent the public opinion 
in reality. Even though, in terms of the issue of political reunification with Taiwan, 
online opinion can be regarded as equivalent to the public opinions. This is because: 
first, under the current social-political system in China, it is very unlikely to 
implement surveys or interviews, a commonly acknowledged scientific method, to 
study the public opinion of sensitive political issues like the Taiwan problems. As a 
result, internet becomes the sole and the most effective platform in China that people 
can present their opinions and exchange ideas on this issue. Second, whether Taiwan 
should reunify with mainland China, this is a problem that considerable people are 
indifferent about but more considered by intellectuals or people with relatively 
stronger nationalistic sentiment. In this light, to study mainland people’s opinion of 
political reunification with Taiwan, the emphasis should be made on those who care 
about this issue instead of the whole population. Consequently, in the thesis, the 
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study of online opinion is the only and the best method to reflect the public opinion 
in reality. 
1.4.Political orientations on Chinese internet 
When it comes to the political issues on Chinese internet, there is never short of 
discussions and arguments between “left” and “right”. It is believed that a 
fundamental cause of this phenomenon is people’s different beliefs in political 
ideologies.  
   In political ideologies, left and right are often presented as opposition on the 
political spectrum. Theoretically speaking, leftist represents “change” while the 
rightist calls for “order”. In practice, the leftist camp usually stresses the protection 
of the interests of the working class and the poor and it advocates more government 
intervention into the economy. In contrast, the rightist camp prefers to maintain 
vested interest in a conservative way and it advocates value free competition and 
economic efficiency through “small government and big market”. (Baradat, 1984) 
However, in actual global governance and social thoughts, the difference between 
left and right is not a black-and-white issue. Most of the arguments are focused 
between moderate left and moderate right instead of the radical ones. An individual 
or a party may take a left wing stance on one issue while taking the opposition on 
another and in addition, the left–right political spectrum displays in different forms 
with special characters in different countries.  
  In PRC, the ideological spectrum, as scholars argue, “derives from an overlapping 
mixture of diverse ideas from multiple intellectual sources, representing competing 
intellectual traditions ranging from Confucianism and Chinese Legalism, to 
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anarchism, Marxist-Leninism, and classical liberalism.” And it is because of “China's 
legacies of imperial autocracy, Confucianism, Communism, and a tradition of using 
ideology to legitimize the rule of the dominant political power”, (Pan & Xu, 2015, 
p5.) Conceptions of left-right dichotomy fundamentally deviate from their usage in 
the North American and Western Europe context. Instead of liberals on the left and 
conservatives on the right side, contemporary Chinese political discourse places 
conservatives on the left and liberals on the right side. 
Leftist camp in China commonly refers to the orthodox socialism, a political 
faction that influenced by Maoism characterized by seeking social equality, 
protection of the poor and democratic centralism under the leadership of the CCP. 
Leftism has established its dominance in China since the establishment of the PRC 
and its influence reached peak during the Cultural Revolution. Leftism in the post 
Mao era can be also categorized into old leftism and neo-leftism. (Ma, 2012) The old 
leftists are the defenders of the Maoism, mostly made up by the grass-roots, 
including some scholars. They deeply cherish the Mao Zedong era and disparage the 
Reform and opening up policy. In their opinion, Mao’s China was a perfect society 
based on equality and the leadership of the workers and peasants without any 
corruption while the post 1978 China is a corrupted and decayed state polluted by 
capitalism from the West. The thoughts of old leftism flourished in China in recent 
years under the circumstance of growing inequality and corruption. The popularity of 
“Sing Red and Strike Black” campaign and “Chongqing model” launched by Bo 
Xilai also reflected the masses base of this ideology. Relatively, the ideology of neo 
left thought, emerged in China in the 1990s as to evaluate the essence of reform after 
experiencing the disillusionment and confusion from the reform in the1980s by many 
intellectuals. Neo leftists show the distrust and hostility to the West. They hold the 
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negative view about globalization and they believe that developing states, including 
China, are exploited and positioned in a disadvantage in this course. They even 
believe that China has already become a capitalist state and the western capitalism is 
the source of a serious of social problems in China today.
28
 It needs to be 
emphasized that there are two differences between old leftism and neo leftism in 
China. The first is the source of thoughts: old leftism believes the orthodox of 
Marxism Leninism, Stalinism and Mao’s thoughts while neo leftism also borrows the 
idea from the western leftism and post-modern theory in their objection to the 
capitalism and market economy. The second difference is the way of expression: old 
leftism prefers to use of radical critique while neo leftism is more logical, more 
theoretical and more persuasive based on supporting evidence.
29
 
In contrast, in terms of rightism in China, it is commonly equated with liberalism.  
The rightist social thoughts revived after 1978 and it supports the ideological 
emancipation, the reform to break up the “big-pot system” during the planned 
economy in the 1980s.The characters of rightism after 1992 is highlighted through 
supporting the socialist market economy, the acknowledgement of private ownership 
of property, global participation and access to the WTO. (Chen, 2004) Politically, 
rightism embraces universal values and asks for more political freedoms. Active 
rightists in China also strive for human rights and individualism, the rule of law and 
balance of government powers.   
Some scholars describe the character of political reform in China as cyclical 
process marked by “the alternating phases of authoritarian control and liberalization, 
and they are characterized by the fang (loosening) and shou (tightening) of the 
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policies on the part of the CCP.” (Wong, 2009) To a great extent, the opposition 
between the loosening and tightening is a de facto struggle between the left and right. 
The following table summarizes the difference between left and right in political 
ideology in China: 
*Table 1. The Difference between Left and Right in Political Ideologies in China 
(Self compiled) 
 Left Right 
Beliefs in politics  Social equality 
Collectivism 
Social control 
Universal values 
Individualism  
Political freedom 
Beliefs in governance 
model 
Democratic centralism  
Authoritarian intervention 
Representative democracy 
Market orientation  
Views of Maozedong era Positive Negative  
Representative 
politicians  
Deng Liqun 
Chen Yun 
Bo Xilai 
Hu Yaobang 
Zhao Ziyang 
Wang Yang 
Representative 
intellectuals 
Hu Angang 
Wang hui 
Kong Qingdong 
Si Ma’nan 
Qin Hui 
Xu Youyu 
Mao Yushi 
He Weifang 
 
35 
 
 
Online debate on Chinese internet is also closely attached to online nationalism. In 
broad strokes, scholars
30
 divide online Chinese nationalism into three identifiable 
stages and each is signified by a single or a serious of water-shed incidents. The first 
stage was dominated by Sino-US relations from 1999 to 2002. Initiated by 1999 US 
bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese nationalism went online 
and showed strong anti-US sentiment by the perception of reckless expansion of the 
American power and its insult of the Chinese sovereignty through containment 
strategy. Such anger was not blunted even after the September 11 incident, when the 
American government shifted its attention to the terrorism. The second stage was 
directed by the Sino-Japanese relations from 2003 to late 2008, triggered by Japanese 
then Prime Minister Junichi Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japan’s 
challenge of Chinese sovereignty on the Diaoyu Island issue. During this stage, 
another significance of the online nationalism is Chinese netizen’s growing national 
pride by seeing China’s significant progress in economy, global politics and science 
and technology. The third stage of online Chinese nationalism, gradually shaped after 
2008, was characterized by a transition from early antagonism towards a form of 
optimism and confidence over domestic and foreign affairs. Significant events during 
this period include the successful host of the Beijing Olympic Games and 
ice-breaking exchange across the Taiwan Strait. 
Online Chinese nationalism also enjoys the following features
31
First, it 
particularly fixes on territorial sovereignty such as the issues like Hong Kong, Macau, 
Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and South China Sea. Second, it has also been extremely 
reactive to China’s brushes with the major powers as well as potential adversaries. 
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Third, the discourse of online Chinese nationalism is commonly conducted through 
the understanding of Chinese history. China’s conflicts with foreign states in reality 
usually lead to xenophobic sentiment online through memorizing the China’s 
historical humiliations.       
Last but not least, the typologies of online Chinese nationalism can also be studied 
according to the difference of political ideologies in China. (Le & Yang, 2009) 
Through the standard of intensity of nationalism (xenophobia towards the foreign 
powers), attitude towards the government policy, attitude towards Chinese traditional 
culture and attitudes towards Western values, online Chinese nationalism can be also 
categorized into five types, namely radical left, moderate left, moderate, moderate 
right and radical right.  Details are illustrated in the following table.  
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*Table 2. Political Orientations of Online Chinese Nationalism (Source: Le, Y. & 
Yang, B.X (2009). Zhongguo wang min de yi shi xin tai yu zheng zhi pai bie 
[Ideology and political factions of Chinese netizens]. Twenty-First Century 
Review, April (112), 22-34.) 
Type Intensity of 
Nationalism 
(xenophobia  
towards the 
foreign 
powers) 
 
Attitude towards 
the government 
policy 
Attitude 
towards 
Chinese 
traditional 
culture 
Attitudes 
towards  
Western 
values  
Radical Left Very Strong Against Strongly 
Against 
Strongly 
Against 
Moderate  
Left 
Strong Support Support Against 
Moderate Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral 
Moderate 
Right 
Moderate Support Moderate Moderate 
Radical Right Weak Against Strongly 
Against 
Strongly 
Support 
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1.5.Public opinions online: Laws and Hidden Rules 
It seems that the attitude of internet operation from the Chinese government is 
ambiguous. It tries to eliminate the negative impact brought by the uncensored free 
expression on its administration and authority while it still expects to utilize the 
internet as a tool to facilitate the state development. Such ambiguity largely explains 
why surfing the internet in China is a unique experience. On one hand, people’s free 
access to the internet is with limitation: many foreign websites are inaccessible, 
articles of political sensitivity are unable to be published, some online activists are 
even arrested because of critical words. However, on the other hand, many 
meaningful, unexpected and even political sensitive opinions which cannot be 
obtained from other media platforms are heard and eventually those opinions are 
brought to social attentions. The following content explains how internet censorship 
works in China and to what extent the political expression can be made. 
First of all, a clarification must be made. Officially speaking, there is no so 
called “internet censorship” in China. The authority states that China’s internet is 
“free, open and orderly.”32 In terms of the question of censorship of foreign websites, 
as the Chinese government claims, “China has consistently had a welcoming and 
supportive attitude towards foreign investors doing legitimate business here,” the 
Chinese government will “as always, provide an open, transparent and good 
environment for foreign companies in China.”33 In this sense, all the investigations 
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and research on how the Chinese authority controls Internet are empirical studies 
without the confirmation from the actual manipulators of the Chinese internet. 
However, some researches by scholars and institutions still reveal the operation of 
Chinese internet to a great extent with reliable sources. According to a study from the 
OpenNet Initative, a collaborative partnership formed by University of Toronto, 
Harvard Law School and University of Cambridge, “China's internet filtering regime 
is the most sophisticated effort of its kind in the world. Compared to similar efforts 
in other states, China's filtering regime is pervasive, sophisticated, and effective. It 
comprises multiple levels of legal regulation and technical control. It involves 
numerous state agencies and thousands of public and private personnel. It censors 
content transmitted through multiple methods, including web pages, web logs, 
on-line discussion forums, university bulletin board systems, and e-mail messages.”34 
On China internet Network Information Center, there are fifteen different legal 
documents regulate the websites in terms of licensing requirement, registration and 
inspection, capitals for operation and restrictions on permissible types of content.
35
 
Among which, Article 19 of the Chapter I of the Provisions on the Administrations 
of internet News Information Services, promulgated by the State Council 
Information Office and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on 
September 25, 2005 clearly states that “neither the news information posted or 
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transmitted, nor the current event electronic bulletin service provided, by internet 
News Information Service Work Units may include any of the following content
36
: 
1. violating the basic principles as they are confirmed in the Constitution; 
2. jeopardizing the security of the nation, divulging state secrets, subverting of 
the national regime or jeopardizing the integrity of the nation's unity; 
3. harming the honor or the interests of the nation; 
4. inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the 
solidarity of peoples; 
5. disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and feudal 
superstitions; 
6. spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability; 
7. spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the 
commission of a crime; 
8. insulting or defaming third parties, infringing on the legal rights and interests 
of third parties; 
9. inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or 
gatherings that disturb social order; 
10. conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization; and 
11. any other content prohibited by law or rules. 
  Thus in general, under the supervision of legal documents and technological 
support of the Great Firewall, an instrument to block selected websites and to filter 
sensitive key words of subversive political issues on Chinese internet, contents such 
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 State Council Information Office, Ministry of Information Industry, (2005) Provisions for the 
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as Tiananmen incident, Falungong (法輪功 ), Chinese human right issue and 
criticism of China’s senior political leaders are blocked or seriously filtered. For 
example, by entering the website address of “Government of Republic of China” in 
Mainland China, the browser will show “Page Not Found”. If one search the key 
words like “Xi Jinping” or “Tiananmen Incident” in search engines in Mainland 
China, related contents are still showed but all censored, and the web page will 
indicates that  “pursuant to relevant laws, regulations and policies, some search 
results have not been shown." In addition to conventional restrictions, the 
government also launches particular campaigns periodically to maintain its control 
over the content on Chinese internet under the name of “cleaning online environment” 
as long as necessary or during sensitive times.
37
 In 2014, in a national campaign of 
clampdown on internet rumours, four people were arrested and eighty one others 
were either detained or warned.
38
 Likewise, in 2008, shortly after the release of 
Charter 08, the Chinese government started a campaign against the lewd content. It 
was estimated that around 1900 websites and 250 blogs were shut down. While 
plenty of which indeed contain pornographic materials, considerable sites are online 
forums, instant message groups where sensitive political issues are widely discussed. 
(Wines, 2009) 
   However, while acknowledge the truth that censorship restricts the free political 
expression on Chinese internet, it is still not a pool of dead water and it still relatively 
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enjoys a high degree of freedom. First, the standard of censorship is vague and the 
degree of implementation from different websites can be different in practice. For 
instance, when dealing with the movement of people’s protest against the 
government’s proposal of PX project, some websites censored the news as it could 
violate the law that “news information posted shall not spreading rumors, disturbing 
social order, or disrupting social stability.” However, other websites chose to openly 
report it because it regarded such protest as a negotiation between people and 
government instead of a subversive political action. Second, the filter of political 
sensitive words through automated programs is also difficult because many key 
words are specific terms which are irreplaceable in daily discourse and their 
appearance in sentence can represent different meanings through permutation and 
combination with other words. For instance, the key word “Taiwan independence” 
can be displayed in either subversive ways as “I support Taiwan independence” or in 
expressions like “Taiwan independence is intolerable”. Meanwhile, the creation of 
online language and sarcasms as replacement of political sensitive words can easily 
outwit censorship operated by automated programs. For instance, neitizens use 
“TG”39 to refer to the Chinese Communist Party, and use the term “Taizu”40to refer 
to Mao Zedong. Since T and G are merely two English characters and Taizu is a 
specific term in history, censorship may not work in this condition. Once pass the 
barriers of a vague censorship standard and key words filtration, considerable 
political expressions get posted on the internet. After that, censorship can only work 
in means of remedy instead of prevention. As nearly as researchers can tell from the 
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to refer to Mao indicates his establishment of the PRC and his absolute political authority like an 
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literature, observers, private conversations with those inside several governments, 
and an examination of the data, content filtering after posting is in large part a 
manual work in way of censors investigating post by hand. Automated programs 
only appear to be an auxiliary part of this effort. (King, Pan & Roberts, 2013) The 
weakness of manual work is obvious: the impact of a significant post will not 
disappear even if the post itself disappeared. The huge flow of updated information 
on the instant communication platforms like Weibo and online forums, especially in 
terms of the replies of enormous amount below the main posts, is “hard to guard 
against.” 
Actually, except for the extreme sensitive topics like 1989 Tiananmen Incident 
and Falungong, the authority is actually quite liberal in allowing political discussions, 
even for those very critical of government policies and actions.
41
In a research on how 
censorship in China allows criticism on government, scholars compared the 
substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in 85 different 
political topic areas by locating, downloading and analyzing the content of more than 
three million posts from nearly 1400 social communication platforms (majorities are 
blogs and online forums) in China with special devised system before the authority’s 
censorship took place. The conclusion is that the originality of the online political 
discussion on blogs and online forums is well kept. Though censorship effort varies, 
only approximately 13% of all social media posts are censored in average. Such 
censorship intensity is quite stable over time when aggregating over all posts in all 
areas.
42
The Chinese government allows both negative and positive comments on the 
state, policies and leaders as long as power is upheld and social stability is 
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maintained. Even if those expressions make government policies look bad and even 
embarrass the leaders, they are not more likely to be censored. Instead, censorship is 
targeted at contents associated with the potential of collective action regardless 
whether they represent, reinforce or spur mobilization. In this scenario, “Chinese 
people are individually free but collectively in chains” when they give political 
expressions online.
43
As for the expressions of Taiwan issue online, according to the 
Chinese digital times, it lists the major relevant sensitive words which are likely to be 
censored on the Chinese internet based on test from Google. Namely they are 
“Association for Taiwanese Independence”(獨立台灣會 ), “Association for 
Taiwanese Independence”(獨立台灣會 ), “Taiwan political Talk”(台灣政論
區),“League for Taiwan Independence （台灣自由聯盟)，Organization for the 
Establishment of the Country of Taiwan (台灣建國運動組織) and “Taiwan + 
Independence League” (台灣  + 獨立聯盟)44 . In this light, limitation on the 
expressions of Taiwan issue on Chinese internet mainly targets on those overseas 
organizations or institutions who radically and clearly pursue Taiwan independence. 
Relatively, no evidence can prove general discussions on Taiwan politics are 
restricted on Chinese internet. On the contrary, many Chinese online forum and 
social commentary websites have specific columns set up for discussing political 
issues in Taiwan. Even the occasional outburst of radical viewpoints, can be seen 
from time to time. Therefore, based on the discussed analysis, when we study the 
public’s expressions of Taiwan issue on Chinese internet, their originality are well 
preserved and unlikely to be censored.  
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1.6.Characteristics of online forums  
Public opinion online is usually expressed through social media platform, which is 
mainly made up of blog community and online forum.
45
Indeed, blog community and 
online forums are indeed the two most popular networking applications designed for 
public discussion among Chinese internet users.
46
Blog community operates through 
displaying the works of individuals, usually celebrities, to cover a single subject and 
then initiate relevant discussions. Relatively, online forum, which also known as the 
BBS (Bulletin Board System), works in the form that discussions are made through 
the interactions between the main post and replies in certain topic column. In 
comparison, online forum is considered as a better channel to study public opinions, 
especially in terms of political issues. This is because first, blog community is a 
semi-open platform for discussions. The topic is raised by blogger individually and 
reviewers have the discussion based on this topic. Sometimes, bloggers can even 
make the private settings to limit the participants in discussions. In this scenario, 
discussion on blog community is loose and scrappy. However, online forum is an 
absolute open platform for all netizens to have discussion. There are different 
columns designed for specific topics. All netizens can participate in a discussion they 
prefer and they can initiate a new discussion under that topic. Hence the discussion 
on online forum is targeted and concentrated. Second, data is private on blog 
community while it is public shared on online forum. Bloggers can edit all 
expressions under the topics they initiated while forum users cannot make any 
intervention to the expressions which are not made by themselves. Third, the social 
influence of blog is largely relied on celebrities while online forum has no such 
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limitation. For ordinary people, blog serves a function of open diary for experience 
sharing and its influence is usually limited within blogger’s personal network. For 
celebrities, it is a tool for personal promotion. The most seen content of celebrity’s 
blog is also their life clips, and as public figures, they also express their views on 
social issues. However, most of those views on social issues are believed to be 
non-controversial and positive for their public images such as environment 
protection, charity works and the promotion of the industry they engaged in. Except 
for some famous intellectuals, very few celebrities would like to initiate political 
discussions on their blogs. Therefore, to study public opinion on political issues, 
online forum should be the better choice.  
By June 2014, there have been 124 million BBS registered users 
47
and at least 
more than 1.3 million online forums in China.
48
 Basically speaking, online forums in 
China can be divided into three categories (Li, 2009): One is operated by government 
attached with official portals, the best known is Qiangguo Forum under the 
People.com. Another is run by the business websites, for example, Sohu Forum(搜狐) 
under Sohu.com and ifeng(鳳凰網) Forum under ifeng.com. The last category is the 
independent online forum without any attachment, which include Tianya Forum (天
涯論壇) and Kaidi Forum (凱迪論壇).  
To be more specific, online forum also has the following characteristics based 
on my observation:  
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First, in terms of the main post, online forum has a mechanism of hot posts (熱
帖). Sometimes it is also referred to as essence. (精華帖) Since all netizens can write 
posts on the forum as long as they register a forum account, the update on the forum 
is very quick and the quantity of the information is huge. In order to improve the 
efficiency of reading and to offer the high quality content, the mechanism of hot 
posts is constructed. The selection of the hot posts is either based on the 
acknowledgement of its prominence from moderator (Banzhu)
49
 or the clicking rate, 
indicating the degree of attention of the opinion of the main post and potential 
discussion rate  
Relative to the main post, another characteristic of the online forum is the 
mechanism of replies. The replies below a main post are not merely echos or 
criticisms. Sometimes, the contents of the replies can be even more meaningful and 
thoughtful than the main post itself, which makes them important to study as well. 
Another great value of the mechanism of replies on the forum is its uncensored 
originality. On some forums related to politics or forums that are likely to trigger 
political discussions, there can be a time lag between the submission of the main 
posts and the actual publishing time for administrator’s censorship. But as for the 
replies, because of their instantaneity and fast update rate, they can appear on the 
website immediately after submission. As discussed before, the huge flow of 
information and the mechanism of censorship make the content of reply best 
represents the originality of public voice. The replies may or may not be in resonance 
to the opinions of the main post. But in many cases, no consensus can be made 
among the replies when the main post’s viewpoint is considered controversial. 
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   The third characteristic of the online forum is its mechanism of repost. In general, 
it is a kind of information flow that an article from one forum can be reposted on 
another. Reposts on online forum can be also realized in forms of copying the 
existing articles from other websites or traditional media like the newspapers. The 
value of this mechanism is not merely a copy and paste. The same article on different 
forums can stimulate different thoughts and discussions, which enrich the 
understanding of a specific issue. In addition, the mechanism of repost also weakens 
the official supervision as the erase of some information on a certain website cannot 
totally eliminate the spread of it on the internet.   
  Therefore, based on previous discussion, online forum will be an essential 
platform to investigate how mainland people view the political reunification with 
Taiwan. 
2. Methodological Design 
2.1. The study of state nationalism 
As discussed in Chapter 1, state nationalism could be traced from leadership and 
articles written by establishment intellectuals respectively. In terms of leadership, it 
is made up by government policy papers and speeches from the political leaders. The 
access to relevant resource will be based on the investigation of the database of the 
official website of the Taiwan affairs Office of the State Council. As for government 
policy papers, major points will be summarized through the qualitative analysis of all 
the effective white papers and legal documents referring to Taiwan issues. In terms 
of speeches from political leaders, they refer to the formal speeches from the leaders 
49 
 
 
in the Standing Committee of the CCP Political Bureau
50
 from 20 May, 2008 to 31 
December, 2014. 
51
 
52
Those speeches should be with full text published by the 
authority. Casual talks during the meeting without script are excluded. After 
selection of the speeches, major points will be summarized through qualitative 
analysis   
In terms of the articles written by establishment intellectuals, the study will be based 
on the selected articles from a social commentary website. This is because, first, the 
number of government mouthpiece and related intellectuals are enormous. 
Reviewing all the articles in the past few years is unlikely. Second, many articles 
written by establishment intellectuals is merely a political task of repeating official 
rhetoric without further interpretation or giving theoretical meaning. Third, a good 
social commentary website plays the function of collecting influential articles from 
intellectuals regardless of political orientations. Studying influential articles written 
by establishment intellectuals in a social commentary website, as a sample for this 
study, is the most effective method.   
The social commentary website selected for reviewing establishment intellectuals 
under the framework of state nationalism is the Consensus Website. (共識網) 
Consensus Website is a daily updated opinion aggregator that operates through 
collecting influential articles written by intellectuals on magazines, journals, websites, 
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newspapers and blogs. It is a platform of exchanging different insights on art and 
social science in the Greater China area. There is a special column of Taiwan study, 
which collects the articles from officials, establishment intellectuals and independent 
scholars in Mainland, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
53
     
There are three criteria to select the articles for analysis from Taiwan column on 
the Consensus Website to study opinions from establishment intellectuals: 
1. Time frame: Articles written from 20 May, 2008 to 31 December 2014 
2. Topic: It must refer to the issue of political reunification with Taiwan. Articles 
such as analysis on democratic theory, civil society and governance model 
without expressing the reunification views are excluded. 
3. Authors: They must be establishment intellectuals in mainland China.  
2.2. The study of popular nationalism 
Popular nationalism is divided into the category of public intellectual’s 
contribution and views of general public.  
Similar to that of establishment intellectuals, the study of public intellectual’s 
contribution is based on selected articles from Taiwan Study column from the 
Consensus Website. There are also three criteria to select the articles for analysis:  
1. Time frame: Articles written from 20 May, 2008 to 31 December 2014 
2. Topic: It must refer to the issue of political reunification with Taiwan. Articles 
such as analysis on democratic theory, civil society and governance model 
without expressing the reunification views are excluded. 
3. Authors: They must be intellectuals without official affiliations in mainland China  
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In terms of the study of views of general public, it is based on netizen’s 
expressions from online forums. There are two major considerations for the forum 
selection, namely the political orientations and the technical availability. Selected 
forums should range from left to right in ideology so that they can represent as many 
views as possible. It should be especially noted that the population under study in 
this section is not all Chinese online forums but all netizens’ views expressed on the 
different forums. They cover a wider and comprehensive spectrum on online 
viewpoints towards the issue of reunification with Taiwan. Second, selected forums 
should at least have some advanced search function to filter the unwanted 
information among the tens of thousands of posts. In the end, four forums are 
selected.
 54
 
1. Utopia (烏有之鄉): Established in 2003, Utopia is considered as radical website 
which claims to represent the interests of workers and peasants, disadvantageous 
group and other grass roots. Utopia pays a great respect to Chairman Mao and treats 
Mao Zedong thoughts as the spiritual pillar. It also expects that China should return 
to the development model in Mao’s era. The influence of Utopia reached peak 
around 2010-2011, which was in accordance with the most popular era of Bo Xilai’s 
“Chongqing Model”. Because of its firm support of Bo Xilai and its radical leftism 
ideology, it was forced to shut down in April 2012
55, soon after Bo’s fall. The 
website was reopened in November 2012 and now operates under the name of Utopia 
                                                          
54
 Apparently, almost all websites in China do not openly declare their political stances but justify 
their standpoints as “objective” and “represent the voice of people”. The political orientations of the 
four selected forums are largely public assumed in China based on their major expressions. In addition, 
it needs to be noted that Political orientations of articles and comments posted on a website do not 
necessarily in accordance with the assumed political orientation held by that website.  
 
55
Guo, S. (2014). Talk about utopia. Retrieved 11/10, 2014, 
from http://www.refworks.com/refworks2/?r=references|MainLayout::init 
52 
 
 
Webzine.(烏有之鄉網刊 )Many people depreciate the Utopia because the 
expressions on this forum is radical and out of date. But I still select this forum 
because, even if the orientation of this forum is radical and outdated as assumed, it at 
least stands for a branch of representative and strong public opinion in China. 
2. Tieuxe Community (鐵血社區): Established in 2001, Tiexue Community is one 
of the most influential online communities in China run by amateurish military fans 
and political enthusiasts. It has special concentration on military, history, and 
political issues and it insists patriotism as the basic stance of the forum. Currently, it 
has ten million registrants and the daily visit is around five million.
56
 It is assumed 
that Tiexue Community also has a pro leftism orientation though it is more moderate 
than that of the Utopia. 
3. Tianya Community (天涯社區): Established in 1999, Tainya Community is the 
largest online forum in China and one of the most visited Chinese websites by both 
mainland people and overseas Chinese. Currently, there are 90 million registered 
users on this forum and its monthly number of access is around 200 million. The 
discussion on Tianya community contains almost all topics one can think of, 
including a specific Taiwan column to discuss the Taiwan issues. Tianya community 
also plays a central channel in terms of the information inflow and outflow in China. 
It is the main platform that many networking events occurred and political 
participation realized. Because of its huge scale and diversity of its netizen 
backgrounds, the political orientation of Tianya community is relative liberal and 
there is a high tolerance on different opinions 
57
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 See Tiexue.net. Retrieved 11/11, 2014, from http://www.tiexue.net/company/ 
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 See Tianya community. Retrieved 11/11, 2014, 
from http://help.tianya.cn/about/history/2011/06/02/166666.shtml 
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4. Kaidi Community (凱迪社區): Established in 2000 and based on the principle of 
objective, justice, rationality and tolerance, Kaidi Community is currently one of the 
most influential forums in China with more than 13 million registered users. One of 
its column of discussing the social events in China, Maoyankaren(貓眼看人), has 
been awarded the most two popular Chinese BBS columns six years in row. It is 
commonly acknowledged that Kaidi Community shows a relative pro-liberal and 
pro-western stance among the websites in China though the voice of conservative 
can also be heard in discussion. Moreover, it is also a community that produces a 
large amount of “opinion leaders.”58 
After confirming the four online forums, next step is to locate, identify and 
delineate general public’s view of political reunification with Taiwan by reviewing 
the posts related to topics on political reunification, the arguments of of Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (also known as the Sunflower movement) and Taiwan 
mayor elections of 2014.
 59
 The first topic is quite general while the last twos are 
specific cases in revealing the general public’s sentiment towards political reunification. 
The fundamental purpose of choosing these three key words is to include 
multidimensional discussions on reunification as much as possible. After all, the 
general discussion on the reunification may rooted in historical rhetoric or military 
analysis while the reunification related discussion inspired by the specific cases of 
Sunflower movement and mayor elections is more likely to base on the reflections on 
the aspects such as difference of political systems across the Strait or the gap of the 
generations. 
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 See Kaidi community.  Retrieved 11/11, 2014, from http://about.kdnet.net/brief.php 
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 It is also termed as 九合一 in Chinese 
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The procedure of screening these posts is, first, I will examine whether there is a 
specific Taiwan column, if yes, then I will search with the key words of “Taiwan 
unification”(台灣 Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism), “Fumao”(服貿) 
and “Jiuheyi” (九合一) respectively in that column through the function of advanced 
searching engine. If there is no such column, then I will directly search three key 
words through advanced searching engine. After selecting all main posts, I will 
summarize the major points in a qualitative way and to make a quantitative summary, 
for example, among the selected posts, what is the percentage of using military 
resolution, peaceful unification or remaining status quo. In addition, I will also 
investigate the replies under the main posts as their opinions may contradict with the 
main posts and some of which can be very thoughtful. Considering the amount of 
replies is enormous and some contents are irrelevant to the main posts, I will only 
summarize the major points in a qualitative way from the effective replies. There are 
three standards to choose both the main posts and effective replies after finishing the 
aforementioned procedure. For main posts: 
1. Time frame: Posts written from 20 May, 2008 to 31 December 2014 
2. Relevance: Those posts must express the personal opinion about political 
reunification with Taiwan. Posts such as the history of cross strait relations, news 
report, comments on democracy, analysis of governance model without referring to 
the attitude of political reunification are excluded.     
3. Content: selected posts must be written with a clear stand point, logic and 
supporting evidence. They should also have certain length, theoretically, no less than 
five sentences. Posts only contain slogans without argument are excluded.
60
 
                                                          
60
 This is mainly based on the consideration that political expressions on Chinese internet can be 
intervened by the government hired internet commentators, so called 50 cent party (五毛黨). In most 
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For the effective replies: 
1. Time frame: Replies posted from 20 May, 2008 to 31 December 2014 
2. Relevance: Those replies should base on the opinion in main posts. They can be 
either agreement or disagreement. 
3.  Content: The presentation of the effective replies must be written in a clear logic.    
Meaningless comments (e.g: just leave a few words without any clear meaning) and 
message with foul language or irrelevant discussions will be excluded.  
2.3. Assumption  
 Based on the earlier discussion of nationalism and political orientations, and to 
facilitate the investigation in the following chapters, I make the assumption of 
mainland China’s perspectives of political reunification with Taiwan through the 
following number line. As the number line shows, each number on the number line 
represents typical types of reunification standpoint with similar political orientations, 
and the range composed by two adjacent numbers form a certain political orientation. 
From number -4 to number 4, there are four orientations, namely radical left, 
moderate left, moderate right and radical right. The findings of both state nationalism 
and popular nationalism in later chapters can be categorized into different 
orientations.        
                                                                                                                                                                    
circumstances, expressions from 50 cent party are pro-establishment slogans and refutations (to the 
pro-liberal expressions) with limited paragraphs.  
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*Figure 2. Assumption of ideological variations of Mainland China in the issue of 
Political Reunification with Taiwan
 
According to this number line, the number 0 represents the status quo, viz 
mainland China and Taiwan are two de facto independent political entities.  
The negative number range represents the leftism or the orthodox thoughts of 
pro-reunification dominated by the mainland authority (the PRC). The smaller the 
number, the more radical the stance is, or in other words, the less space for 
negotiation and compromise on unification. Basically, the range from 0 to -2 means 
the moderate left stance demonstrated through peaceful unification. For instance, 
moderate left views can be realized through applying a more flexible version of One 
country, Two System model by authorizing more autonomy to Taiwan than that to 
Hong Kong and Macua (-1) or to apply One Country, Two Systems by establishing a 
Taiwan Special Administrative Region, which is equivalent to Hong Kong SAR and 
Macau SAR (-2). Relatively, radical left views are illustrated through proposing 
non-peaceful or other hawkish stances. For example, they can be to use the force 
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when peaceful resolution exhausted (-3) or to unilaterally apply military resolution 
without prior negotiation (-4). From number 0 to -4, there is no need for the mainland 
authority to make major reform of its contemporary social-political system or to 
make fundamental political compromises. 
The positive number range represents the rightism or the liberal thoughts on 
unification. The larger the number, the more liberal the stance is, or in other words, 
more space and tolerance for compromise on unification. Basically, the range from 0 
to 2 stands for the moderate right stance demonstrated by acknowledging the de facto 
political facts across the Strait. For instance, moderate right views can be to establish 
a joint community based on equal and peaceful co-existence (1) and to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the ROC (2). Relatively, radical right views are weak on unification, 
they can be highlighted such as to establish a loose Chinese confederation similar to 
an EU model (3) and to simply make objection to the reunification. (4) From number 
0 to 4, there requires the mainland authority to make major reform of its 
contemporary social-political system or to make fundamental political compromise.
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3. Conclusion 
Based on previously discussed content in this chapter, people can clearly realize 
the power of internet in facilitating the free political expressions in contemporary 
China and internet is one of the most effective channels that we can obtain original 
opinions from the general public and intellectuals. Consequently, by studying the 
government policy papers and speeches from Chinese political leaders, in addition to 
the investigation of opinions from intellectuals and the general public from internet, 
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 It needs to clarify that all the terms (attached with specific numbers) listed under the number line is 
supposed to give an illustrative purpose. Those terms show the readers how specific a political 
orientation can be, they are not necessarily used in the official policy documents.     
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mainland China’s standpoint of the political reunification with Taiwan can be 
objectively and comprehensively presented.  
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Chapter 3 State Nationalism I: Leadership 
Introduction 
This chapter studies a part of state nationalism, leadership, by investigating 
Taiwan related policy papers and the political leader’s speeches. To facilitate the 
study of leadership, the evolution of Cross Strait relations and Beijing’s policy 
agenda will also be reviewed at the beginning so that readers can better understand 
the source and background of the contemporary state nationalism on the reunification 
issue. Through this chapter, it is expected that mainland authority’s standpoint on 
reunification can be objectively and comprehensively evaluated. In addition, it is also 
expected that this chapter can testify whether “to apply One Country, Two Systems 
through peaceful reunification while continues to assert the right to use military force” 
still serves as Beijing’s Taiwan policy in the contemporary era.        
1. The Evolution of Cross Strait Relations and Beijing’s Policy 
Agenda  
The year 1949 is a watershed for both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
Kuomintang (KMT) across the Strait. The KMT’s retreat to Taiwan and the 
establishment of People’s Republic of China by CCP in Beijing signified the political 
separation of China into two different de facto independent political entities 
governed by two different authorities. 
It is difficult to precisely define the stages of development of the Cross Strait 
relations since 1949 as there can be different ways of demarcations. For example, 
Dennis Hickey (2007) summarizes the following periodzations: 1. Armed liberation 
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(1949-1979); 2. One Country, Two Systems (1979-1987); 3. Reconciliation and 
conflict (1987-2005) and 4. Carrots and sticks (2005-now). Another more 
comprehensive periodization is based on the changes of the major policies on 
political unification, defined by Wong Yiu Chung
1
. Accordingly, there are essentially 
two periods: 1. Armed Liberation (1949-1978) and 2. Peaceful Reunification 
(1978-now). Meanwhile the second period can be further expended into three phases: 
a. Reconciliation (One Country Two systems) from 1979-1999, b. Confrontation 
from 1999-2008 and c. Rapprochement (economics first, politics second) since 2008. 
I acknowledge both ways of periodization, the former basically shows a general 
schema in which Beijing’s policies operated under different constraints while the 
latter better illustrates the compartmentalization of the subtle changes in key policies 
on the reunification perspective. I would instead propose another periodization which 
better summarize the evolutions of the Cross Strait relations and Beijing’s 
reunification policies based on generations of leadership. Generally speaking, there 
have been four generations of leadership since the establishment of the PRC and each 
of them have their own policies towards Taiwan. Essentially, there are four periods: 
1. Military liberation of Taiwan (Mao Zedong’s era, 1949-1978); 2. Peaceful 
unification with Taiwan (Deng Xiaoping’s era, 1979-1988); 3.Opposition of Taiwan 
Independence (Jiang Zemin’s era, 1989-2005); 4. The peaceful development (Hu 
Jintao’s era, 2005-now ) 2 In details, they are illustrated as follows: 
                                                          
1
 Wong, Y. C. (2014). Independence or Reunification? the evolving PRC-Taiwan relations. (pp. 
1-125) 
 
2
 There are three points need to be clarified: 
a. The periodization of the specific year is defined comprehensively by how the leaders’ concepts 
were adopted and adhered to instead of the exact years they were in power. (e.g: I assume Mao 
Zedong’s Taiwan policy was still in operation during the two-year transition period after his death; 
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1.1. Military Liberation of Taiwan (Mao Zedong era ,1949-1978) 
  During Mao Zedong era, the situation across the Strait was basically highly intense 
and unstable by mutual hostilities. In 1949, The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
swept across the mainland towards south and was about to capture all the territory 
ruled by KMT. Blocked by the outbreak of the Korean War and the deployment of 
the US navy in the Taiwan Strait, PLA’s plan of liberating Taiwan was forced to be 
delayed but still on the agenda. In 1955, the PLA launched attack on the KMT held 
islands along the Chinese coast and seized YiJiangshan Island and Dachen Island, 
which triggered the first Taiwan Strait crisis. The second one, a more explosive crisis 
broke out in 1958 by PLA’s shelling of the Kinmen Island and the subsequent 
American intervention. After that, though rejected by Taiwan, the CCP attempted to 
realize the unification by “peaceful liberation” through granting KMT authority 
substantial autonomies in Taiwan’s social and political controls as long as diplomatic 
right was handed to Beijing. Nevertheless, the military liberation was still the pillar 
of the PRC’s policy to Taiwan throughout Mao’s era. “Liberating Taiwan and save 
the people in Taiwan from the oppressive KMT rule” was a commonly heard 
propaganda and such concept was largely embraced by the mainland citizen. During 
this period, in addition to the military confrontation, a main struggle between Beijing 
and Taipei was the competition for the legitimacy of representing China, as reflected 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Jiang Zemin’s strategy still dominated even if three years after his retirement from the CCP’s General 
Secretary and one year after retirement from the Central Military Committee Secretary )  
b. Though Xi Jinping has been in power for more than two years and many believe that he is about to 
bring some new thoughts of the makings of Taiwan policies. Xi’s administration is still in progress 
and no significant changes have been made so far in terms of the Taiwan policy. I assume the post 
2012 Taiwan policy implemented by Beijing so far still operates under Hu Jintao’s framework.  
c. The terminologies used for the periodization only highlight the most important characters of the 
eras. It should be noted that, even if in the era of peaceful unification or peaceful development, the 
possibility of military liberation, a non-peaceful mean, is never abolished.    
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in battle for the diplomatic recognition and for the Chinese representation in 
international organizations.    
1.2. Peaceful unification of Taiwan (Deng Xiaoping era, 1979-1988) 
  Mao’s strategic thoughts on Taiwan and its attached policies were not significantly 
altered until 1979, two years after his death while Deng Xiaoping gradually became 
the de facto top decision maker in China. On 1 January, 1979, the Standing 
Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPCSC) issued A Message 
to Compatriots in Taiwan
3, which formally stopped the PLA’s shelling to Kinmen 
and advocated for the termination of the military confrontation. It also proposed 
“Three Contacts and Four Exchanges” to promote the comprehensive exchange 
across the Strait. In September 1981, the then chairman of the NPC, Ye Jianying, 
proposed Nine points
4
 to achieve the peaceful unification of China. The significance 
of this documentation was that it allowed Taiwan to enjoy a high degree of autonomy 
including to retain its armed force under a special administrative region, which 
basically constituted the framework of “One Country, Two Systems”. Throughout 
the 1980s, the PRC did not exclude possible military resolutions. However, with the 
Opening up and Reform policy implemented by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC’s policy to 
Taiwan showed a sharp contrast with that in Mao’s era. The peaceful resolution 
based on Chinese national identity through proposing flexible and pragmatic 
approaches replaced aggressive and hawkish stance characterized by strictly 
following the political ideology. Across the Strait, Taiwan also experienced great 
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 NPC Standing Committee. (1979). A message to compatriots in taiwan. Retrieved 10/1, 2014, from 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/tytj_611312/zcwj_611316/t10733.shtml 
 
4
Ye, JianYing. (1981). The nine points. Retrieved 10/1, 2014, from 
http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/chn/topic/dtzc/zfdtzc/t45123.htm  
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changes under the presidency of Chiang Ching Kuo in the 1980s. The policy of 
legalizing indirect trade and transportation links with the mainland and allowing 
family visits to the mainland greatly improved the Cross Strait relations and created a 
solid foundation for bilateral links in the next two decades.    
1.3. Opposition of Taiwan Independence (Jiang Zemin era, 1989-2005) 
  If Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan during Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras 
was characterized as proactive and maybe sometimes dominant, then it turned out to 
be relatively passive and reactive after the 1990s. Both the PRC and Taiwan 
experienced unprecedented social-political transformations at the end of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s. The turmoil of 1989 Tiananmen incident in Beijing eroded the 
legitimacy and confidence of the socialist regime and forced China to implement a 
more comprehensive market economic reform from 1992. In Taiwan, Lee Teng Hui 
succeeded Chiang Ching Kuo as the president in 1988 and began to carry out a series 
of political reforms domestically and to practice flexible diplomacy internationally. 
Under the presidency of Lee, Taiwan strode towards democracy from authoritarian 
system and its native consciousness of advocating for independence started to 
flourish.             
In 1992, Beijing set up the Association for Relations across the Strait (ARATS) 
in a parallel to the Taiwan Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in providing Beijing 
and Taipei a platform for non-official interactions. It should be admitted that the 
mutual contacts through ARATS and SEF were meaningful and constructive to Cross 
Strait relations, especially in terms of the output of the 1992 Consensus, which were 
accepted by both sides through recognizing “One China, respective interpretations.” 
Later there was the historic talk between Wang Daohan, then head of ARATS and 
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Koo Chen Fu, then head of SEF. 
5
 The main reason to set up the ARATS was 
Beijing’s defensive reaction to avoid direct interactions at the two governments, 
which would be an apparently violation of the one country principle insisted by 
Beijing.
6
 Beijing’s policy of opposing Taiwan independence was further intensified 
in the second half of the 1990s and went through the early 2000s when the new 
political dynamics in Taiwan under democracy evoked the rise of Taiwan 
independence consciousness, promoted its active purist of international space and 
accelerated the desinicization(去中國化) in the island. In 1995, Jiang Zemin issued 
“Continuing to Strive Toward the Reunification of China”, known as “Jiang’s Eight 
Points”.7 The core idea of it was the clarification of “One China Principle” and the 
opposition of any form of separation. Between 1995 and 1996, the PLA conducted a 
series of military exercise and missile firing along the South Eastern Coast as a 
response to Lee Teng Hui’s high profile visit to the United States and his re-election 
for president in Taiwan through universal suffrage. The confrontational Cross Strait 
relations kept deteriorating in 1999 when Lee Teng Hui announced the “Two States 
Theory” and the pro-independence DPP won the presidential election in Taiwan two 
terms in row from 2000 to 2008. In 2000, Beijing published the white paper The One 
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue to indicate its attitude towards the changing 
Taiwan. It marked the red line for using military force for the first time, which were: 
1. the separation of Taiwan from Chinese territories in any form; 2. foreign invasion 
                                                          
5
  In Chinese, 一中各表. Strictly speaking, while Beijing is willing to accept the 1992 Consensus 
and interprets China as PRC, there is a debate on this issue in Taiwan. The KMT acknowledges the 
legal status of this consensus while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), still denies the existence 
of this consensus today. See: Wang, C. (2011). Tsai details DPP’s Cross-Strait policies. Retrieved 
10/20, 2014, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/08/24/2003511508    
 
6
 Wong, Y. C. (2014), op. cit. 
 
7
 Jiang, Z. (1995). Continuing to strive toward the reunification of China. Retrieved September 1, 
2014, from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Jiang/201103/t20110316_1789198.htm 
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of Taiwan and; 3. Indefinite delay of peaceful unification talks
8
. In October 2002, Hu 
Jintao became the supreme leader of China by replacing Jiang Zemin as the General 
Secretary of the CCP in the Sixteenth Party Congress. Jiang still remained as the 
military head for two more years after the party congress and he maintained 
considerable political authority. In March 2005, Hu Jintao, raised the “Four Nevers”, 
which was also known as “Hu’s Four-Point Guidelines”: 1. never sway in adherence 
to the One China principle; 2. never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification; 3. 
never change the principle of placing hope on the Taiwan People; and 4. never 
compromise and always in opposition to the "Taiwan independence" secessionist 
activities.
9
 Hu’s programmatic talk had no fundamental difference compared with 
the earlier Taiwan policies. The operation of Beijing’s Taiwan policy was still 
largely based on the cornerstone of “opposition of independence”. Perhaps the most 
sensational and integrated policy under Jiang’s framework was the Anti-Session Law 
approved by the NPC in March 2005, which further consolidated the “One China 
Principle” and authorized the justification of military resolution to Taiwan in legal 
terms.  
Throughout Jiang’s presidency and the year he served as military head, Beijing 
released a series of documents and implemented several hardline actions to Taiwan. 
On the one hand, these policies highlighted the Beijing’s consistent firm will on the 
reunification issue. On the other hand, the policies with the characteristics of 
“reactive aggression” during this period revealed that Beijing was unprepared and 
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 Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council. (2000). The One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue. Retrieved 8/5, 2014, 
fromhttp://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789217.htm 
 
9
 Third Session 10th National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference.(2005). Four-point guidelines on Cross Strait relations set forth by president 
Hu. Retrieved 10/13, 2014, fromhttp://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/121825.htm 
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inexperienced in facing the drastic change that the core conflicts across the Strait had 
switched from a battle of struggling for the legitimacy of representing China to the 
crisis of reunification-independence.     
1.4. The peaceful development (Hu Jintao era, 2005-now ) 
  The Cross Strait Relations kept deteriorating during Chen Shui Bian 
administration (2000-2008) when he implemented of a series of pro-independence 
policies and movements. These moves included Chen Shui Bian’s claim of “One 
Country on each side of the Strait”(一邊一國), cease of applying ROC’s National 
Unification Council and the Guidelines for National Unification, desinicization 
through changing the name of state corporations
10
and various campaigns for seeking 
to join the UN and other international institutions in the name of Taiwan. On the 
other side of the Strait, Hu Jintao gradually consolidated his power and revised 
Taiwan policy according to his vision. Perhaps realized the negative effect of 
promoting unification radically, Beijing’s Taiwan policy modified from the 
concentration of anti-independence to the promotion of the peaceful development in 
terms of economic integration and civil exchange. It also made attempts to apply 
more flexible practices and called for a “peace agreement” (Hickey, 2009). In 2005, 
a series of groundbreaking visits by the then Taiwan Pan-Blue opposition parties 
greatly improved the long strained Cross Strait relations and set a solid foundation 
for future development. The landmark was the meeting between Lien Chan, the then 
KMT Chairman and Hu Jintao, hailed as the highest level of exchange between the 
KMT and the CCP after six decades since the previous one between Chiang Kai 
Shek and Mao Zedong in Chongqing in 1945. After the icebreaking contacts between 
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 In Common practice , it changed the title name like China (中國 or中華) into Taiwan. 
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party to party levels, the people to people exchanges and economic integrations 
flourished. In 2008, the second ruling party transition in Taiwan from DPP to KMT 
signified a new era of rapprochement across the Strait. In the next following years, 
integrations in various aspects flourished, which made people have a perception that 
the relation between the two sides had stabilized. In accordance with Hu Jintao’s 
domestic governing philosophy of “harmonious society” and “buzheteng”, (不折騰) 
the Cross Strait relations during Hu’s period, especially his later period, showed the 
characters of peaceful development and non-confrontations. Meanwhile, we may also 
acknowledge that boost of China’s comprehensive state power during Hu’s era was 
also essential in shaping the Cross Strait Relations. China’s economy kept rocketing 
with an average annual growth of more than 10% and it replaced Japan as the second 
largest economy in the world.
11
Meanwhile, China’s military strength also kept 
expanding, its equipment quality and capability of regional projection experienced 
great progress. China’s first aircraft carrier also came into service by the end of Hu’s 
administration. These significant achievements increased Beijing’s confidence and 
leverage of its Taiwan policy making and enabled the leadership to afford a more 
leisurely approach in responding to the changes across the Strait.          
2. Leadership I: Taiwan Related Policy Papers 
According to the investigation of the database of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council, there are five effective Taiwan related policy papers and they are 
listed in chronological order as follows: A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan (1979), 
Constitution of the PRC (1982), The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China 
(1993) and The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000) and Anti-Secession 
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 CCTV. (2012). China's economic achievements in past decade. Retrieved 1/20, 2015, 
from http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20121108/107655.shtml 
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Law (2005). Among which, A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan (1979), 
Constitution of the PRC (1982) and Anti-Secession Law (2005) are constitutional 
documents ratified by the National People’s Congress. The Taiwan Question and 
Reunification of China (1993) and The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue 
(2000) are the white papers issued by the State Council. Despite the different 
category and issuing agencies, they are all legally binding and represent the 
fundamental standpoint of the Chinese government on reunification issue. The 
following contents give more elaborations of these policy papers.  
On January 1, 1979 the NPCSC released A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, 
which solemnly proclaimed the new principles adopted by the CCP and mainland 
government to resolve the Taiwan issue in a new historical situation of reform and 
opening up.
12
It places hopes on both the Taiwan people and the then KMT Taiwan 
authority to realize the reunification of China, which is a sacred mission in history. 
The document proposes to end the military confrontation so as to “create the 
necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts 
and exchanges in whatever area.” It also promises that mainland leaders will take 
present realities into account and to respect the status quo on Taiwan and the 
opinions of people in all walks of life and to “adopt reasonable policies and measures 
in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any 
losses.”  
The revised Constitution in 1982 stresses the Taiwan issue in its preamble: 
“Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. It is the 
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 NPC Standing Committee. (1979). Op,cit. 
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inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to 
accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.” More importantly, it points 
out that the “state may establish special administrative regions when necessary” for 
the first time, an article which is mainly revised for the settlement of Taiwan issue.
13
 
After entering the 1990s, the Chinese government issued the white paper of The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China in 1993.
14
In this paper, five major 
points were made. First, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. For the 157 countries 
established diplomatic relations with China, all recognized that there is only one 
China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government of China and 
Taiwan is a part of China. Secondly, the origin of the Taiwan question comes from 
the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War and the intervention of the foreign states, 
especially the US. Meanwhile, the existence of Republic of China (ROC) terminated 
in 1949 when RPC replaced its legitimacy. Thirdly, Chinese government’s basic 
position on the Taiwan question is: Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two 
Systems. Fourthly, the stumbling blocks of the Cross Strait are certain foreign forces 
and a handful of Taiwan independence protagonists colluding with foreign patronage. 
Last, when dealing with questions involving Taiwan in international relations, the 
Chinese government requests foreign governments to refrain from undermining 
China’s interests or interfering in China’s internal affairs and to handle their relations 
with Taiwan correctly in diplomatic ties, participation of international organizations, 
aviation service and arm sales, etc. 
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 China, C. (1982). Constitution of the People's Republic of China. 
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 Taiwan Affairs Office of the state Council. (1993). The Taiwan question and reunification of 
China. Retrieved March 23, 2013, 
from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789216.htm 
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In 2000, the Chinese government further explained its Cross-Strait policy and 
re-emphasized the One China Principle through the white paper entitled The 
One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.
15
It claims the basis of the One China 
Principle, both de facto and de jure, is unshakable. The Chinese government regards 
the One China Principle as the basis and a prerequsite for achieving peaceful 
reunification and will “staunch champion for it”. Particularly, in this white paper, the 
Chinese government strongly condemns Lee Teng Hui and his pro-independence 
theories and related policies. The Chinese government firmly opposes unilateral 
change of Taiwan’s status as a part of Chinese sovereignty through referendum and 
using an excuse of so called “controversy about democracy and (political) system” 
for obstructing the reunification of China. It also declares the “Two German states 
formula” is not applicable to the settlement of the Taiwan issue. Moreover, this white 
paper also marks the redline for using all drastic measures possible, including the 
military force to realize the reunification as long as any of the following 
circumstance occurred:1. The separation of Taiwan from China in any name; or 
2.Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or 3. If the Taiwan 
authorities refuse, sine die, the negotiations of peaceful settlement of Cross Strait 
reunification. While the whole content of this white paper is filled with warning and 
tough statement, it still provides flexibility that under the framework of One China 
Principle, any question can be discussed. It should also be noted that this white paper 
has the following contents: “In November 1992 the Mainland's Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation 
                                                          
15
 Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council. (2000). The One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue. Retrieved 8/5, 2014, from 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789217.htm  
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reached the common understanding during talks on routine affairs that each of the 
two organizations should express verbally that ‘both sides of the Taiwan Straits 
adhere to the One-China Principle.’” This obviously referred to the well-known 1992 
Consensus. But as a verbal consensus, the term 1992 Consensus does not appear in 
this white paper. Actually, nor does it appear in any other formal legal document.   
In 2005, the Chinese government passed the Anti-Secession Law.
16
 Although 
the content of the law is relatively short, it is clear and is introduced by a warning 
and threatening rhetoric. It clearly states that “Taiwan is part of China. The state 
shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make Taiwan 
secede from China under any name or by any means.”(Article 2) and Article 8 
further states that a war could be triggered when any of the following condition is 
met: First, the fact that Taiwan is split from China under any name or by any means. 
Second, major incidents lead to Taiwan’s secession from China and third, when the 
possibilities for a peaceful reunification is completely exhausted. The promulgation 
of the Anti-Session Law is momentous. It formally legalizes Beijing’s long standing 
stance of using “non-peaceful means” to against the pro-independence movement in 
Taiwan. As the last policy papers issued by mainland authority so far, the 
Anti-Secession Law not only clarifies the bottom line of Beijing’s standpoint, but 
also set a red line for Taiwan by restricting its political actions on the Cross Strait 
issues. Under the legal protection of the Anti-Secession in addition to the growing 
state power of mainland China, the Cross Strait relations will be operated under a 
controllable framework. Even if the political reunification is difficult to be realized in 
a short time, the outbreak of a crisis which is similar to the ones occurred during Lee 
                                                          
16
 National People's Congress of the PRC. (2005). Anti session law. Retrieved March 24, 2015, 
from http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384099.htm 
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Teng Hui or Chen Shui Bian’s era is very unlikely. As a result, the Anti-Secession 
Law lays a solid foundation for the contemporary state nationalism of the 
reunification issue.              
The following table summarizes the commonality and the distinction of the 
discussed legal documents:   
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*Table 3. Highlights of the Policy Papers (Self-complied) 
      
Time 
Document  Distinction (if 
first introduced or 
any distinction 
from the others)  
 Commonality 
1979 A Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan 
Hope to establish a 
dialogue with the 
Taiwan authority  
1. To achieve the 
political reunification 
under One China 
Principle in peaceful 
means 
2. No recognition of the 
legitimacy of Republic 
of China under One 
China Principle 
3. No tolerance on 
“Taiwan 
independence” in any 
form or name 
 
 
 
1982 Constitution of the 
PRC 
Taiwan is part of 
the territory of the 
PRC;  
The State may 
establish special 
administrative 
regions when 
necessary 
1993 The Taiwan Question 
and Reunification of 
China 
Emphasize on 
Peaceful 
Reunification, One 
Country Two 
Systems; On the 
premise of one 
China, both sides 
can discuss any 
subject 
2000 The One China 
Principle and the 
Taiwan Issue 
Continue the stance 
on peaceful 
reunification and 
set the redline for 
using military force 
under three 
conditions  
2005 Anti-Secession Law Legalize the use of 
military force to 
defend sovereignty  
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  From above content, the effective Taiwan related policy papers have the following 
characteristics: 
  First, for different policy papers issued in the past three decades, the Chinese 
government’s stance of “trying best to realize political reunification under One China 
Principle” and “no tolerance of Taiwan independence in any form or name” remains 
unchanged.  
Second, the rhetoric of those policy papers shows a change from soft to tough and 
from active to passive. While the first three policy papers are positively “create 
conditions to direct towards a political unification”, the last twos are passively 
“establishing the bottom line for preventing separation”.  
Third, Taiwan people and the Taiwan authority are treated differently. For those 
policy papers, the overall rhetoric towards people in Taiwan is friendly. Beijing 
regards them as compatriots who share the same flesh and blood with mainland 
people, it also places hope on Taiwan people to realize the political reunification. In 
contrast, “placing hopes on Taiwan authority” only appeared in A Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan in 1979, when Taiwan was under the authoritarian regime of 
KMT. With the further development of Cross Strait relations, especially in terms of 
democratization and the change of ruling parties in Taiwan, such rhetoric 
disappeared. Beijing’s attitude towards Taiwan authority turned out to be highly 
hostile.  
Last but not least, through the investigation of those policy papers, the term “One 
China” represents the PRC only. This term does not implicitly or explicitly stand for 
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any other form of China. Nor this term contain any possibility to recognize the 
legitimacy of the Republic of China in the post 1949 era.       
3. Leadership II: Political Leader’ Speeches 
From the official website of Taiwan Affairs of State Council, from 20 May, 2008 
to 31 December 2014, there were six written statements of the speeches made by 
party and state leaders at the level of Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, 
namely the Speech at the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the 
Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by Hu Jintao (2008), the address to the First 
(2009) and Fourth (2012) Straits Forum, the address to the Eighth Cross-Strait 
Economic, Trade and Culture Forum by Jia Qinglin (2012), the address to the Fifth 
Straits Forum by Yu Zhensheng (2013) and the speech of “To Realize the China 
Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” by Xi Jinping (2014). 
Among all of those speeches, two were made by the supreme leaders while the other 
three were made by the chairman of the CPPCC. The following contents give major 
points of these speeches. 
On 31 December, 2008, the then President Hu Jintao gave a speech of Let Us Join 
Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive 
with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation to mark the 
30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. This 
speech acknowledges that flourished economic cooperation and the Cross-Strait 
consultation has been able to resume and achieve significant fruits on the basis of the 
1992 Consensus since Ma Ying Jeou’s presidency. Known as “Hu’s Six points”, this 
speech also systematically constructs guidance of mainland authority’ Taiwan policy 
in the new era. Major points are: 1. firmly abide by the One-China principle and 
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enhance political mutual trust; 2. advance economic cooperation and promote 
common development; 3. promote Chinese culture and strengthen spiritual bonds; 4. 
strengthen two-way visits of people and expand exchanges in various circles and as 
long as the DPP changes its “Taiwan independence” secessionist position, mainland 
authority is willing to make a positive response; 5. safeguard national sovereignty 
and hold consultations on external affairs. 6. end the state of hostility and reach a 
peace agreement. Mainland and Taiwan “may make pragmatic explorations in their 
political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been 
reunified.”17 
In the past six years, as former and current chairman of the CPPCC, Jia Qinglin 
and Yu Zhengshen, successively gave four speeches on the Strait Forum, a channel 
of civil exchange between Mainland and Taiwan. In terms of the speeches on the 
Strait Forum,
18
though they were non-political directed and concentrated on the 
promotion of civil exchange and the value of one nation based on flesh and blood, 
their emphasis of “One China Principle” was clear. Two of the three aforementioned 
addresses clearly restated importance of adherence to the 1992 Consensus as the 
                                                          
17
 Hu, J.T. (2008). Xie shou tui dong liang an guan xi he ping fa zhan tong xin shi xian zhong hua min zu 
we da fu xing [Let us join hands to promote the peaceful development of Cross-Straits relations and 
strive with a united resolve for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation]. Retrieved March 25, 2015, 
from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/hu/201101/t20110125_1732427.htm 
18
 Jia, Q.L. (2009). Jia Qin lin zai shou jie hai xia lun tan da hui shang de zhi ci [The address for the 
First Strait forum]. Retrieved March 20, 2015, from 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/speech/speech/201101/t20110123_1723986.htm 
Jia, Q.L. (2012). Jia Qing lin zai di si jie hai xia lun tan da hui shang de zhi ci [The address for the 
Fourth Straits Forum]. Retrieved March 20, 2015, from 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201206/t20120617_2746943.htm 
Yu, Z.S (2013). Yu Zheng shen zai di wu jie hai xia lun tan da hui shang de zhi ci [The address for 
the Fifth Straits Forum]. Retrieved March 20, 2015, from 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201306/t20130617_4327750.htm 
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basis of Cross Strait interactions.
19
 On the address for the Eighth Cross-Strait 
Economic, Trade and Culture Forum, a platform for dialogue and integration jointly 
organized by CCP and KMT in 2012, Jia Qinglin gave the following political 
standpoints.
 
First, peaceful development is an appropriate track that should be 
insisted. Second, Cross Strait relationship should develop on the basis of the political 
mutual trust, which seeks common ground while shelving differences. Third, 
consultation across the Strait should follow the principle of “from easy to difficult” 
based on step by step and from economy to politics.
20
   
On Feburary 28, 2014, Xi Jinping gave a speech of To Realize the China Dream of 
the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation when he met with Lien Chan, 
Honorary Chairman of the KMT. This was the first programmatic speech by the 
Chinese top leader after the power transition in 18
th
 CCP party congress in 2012. In 
this talk, Xi offered a four points proposal on Cross-Strait relations. First, both sides 
belong to one nation and no one can sever this blood line. Second, even though the 
political reunification has not yet been realized, the fact that both sides belong to one 
country and one nation has never changed and will not change. Third, both sides 
should promote with one mind the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, 
and consolidate the common basis of insisting on “the 1992 Consensus” and of 
opposing “Taiwan independence.” Fourth, compatriots across Strait should work 
                                                          
19
 The Fourth (2012) and Fifth (2013) Strait Talks  
20
 Jia, Q.L. (2012). Jia Qing lin zai di ba jie liang an jing mao wen hua lun tan kai mu shi shang de zhi 
ci [The address on the 8
th
 Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum]. Retrieved March 20, 
2015, from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/speech/speech/201207/t20120729_2862602.htm 
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together for the realization of the Chinese dream and the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese Nation.
21
 
The following table summarizes the commonality and the distinctions of the 
previously discussed speeches from party state leaders: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Xi, J.P. (2014). Gong yuan zhong hua min zu wei da fu xing de zhong guo meng [To realize the China 
Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation]. Retrieved March 20, 2015, 
from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201402/t20140219_5697134.htm 
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*Table 4. Highlights of the Political Leader’s Speeches (Self-complied) 
Time Talk  Distinction (if first introduced 
or any distinction from the 
others)  
Commonality 
2008 Hu Jintao’s six 
points 
Attempt to negotiate with DPP 
To end the state of hostility and 
reach a peace agreement 
To make pragmatic explorations 
in political relations under the 
special circumstances when the 
country has not yet been 
reunified 
Adherence to “One 
China Principle” under 
“1992 Consensus” 
2009 Jia Qinglin’s 
address on the 1
st
 
Straits Forum 
/ 
 
2012 Jia Qinglin’s 
address on 4
th
 
Straits Forum 
/ 
2012 Jia Qinglin’s 
address on the 8
th
 
Cross-Strait 
Economic, Trade 
and Culture 
Forum 
/ 
2013 Yu Zhengshen’s 
address on the 5
th
 
Straits Forum 
/ 
2014 Xi Jinping’s 
speech of To 
Realize the China 
Dream of the 
Great 
Rejuvenation of 
the Chinese 
Nation 
The injection of Xi’s governing 
philosophy of realization of the 
Chinese dream 
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   From the discussed analysis, the followings are characteristics of the party and 
state leaders’ speeches: 
First, theoretically speaking, the speeches from party leaders are not legally 
binding, but they practically direct the Taiwan policy making in the future based on 
the latest domestic situation and the evaluation of the political-economic situations in 
Taiwan.  
Second, while the policy papers are made through strict articles with precise and 
accurate use of terms, speeches from party state leaders are relative flexible. 
Rhetorically, they provide much space for negotiation. A significance of this 
characteristic is that the term “1992 consensus” never appears in any policy paper but 
it is frequently quoted in different speeches as a cornerstone concept. The other 
significance is while policy papers clearly justify “One China” as the People’s 
Republic of China, it is not deliberately stressed in leader’s speeches even if it is 
assumed to be so.           
Third, only the supreme leaders (Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping) give out programmatic 
speeches with complete and rigorous theoretic systems and to raise new concepts. 
For example, Hu Jintao raised “to end the state of hostility and reach a peace 
agreement” and Xi Jinping proposed compatriots across Strait to work together for 
the realization of the Chinese dream and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. 
Relatively, speeches from the two Chairmen of CPPCC are auxiliary in nature, 
targeting at promotion of the latest policy from the central government and the civil 
exchange across the Strait.         
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4. Conclusion 
As previously discussed, the contemporary state nationalism of leadership on 
reunification has two implications.  
First, contemporary state nationalism is relatively fixed and stable: though all the 
Taiwan related policy papers were issued before 2008, they are still the major 
components of the contemporary state nationalism. Even if Beijing makes adjustment 
of its Taiwan policy in the post 2008 era, its guiding principle does not go beyond the 
points from those policy papers. Second, state nationalism is also flexible. It keeps 
up with the times through adjusting its priorities during the specific period. Through 
the analysis of the speeches from political leaders, the contemporary state 
nationalism is concentrated on proposing more flexible and pragmatic approaches 
with different circles in Taiwan based on Chinese national identity. In other words, 
the priority of the state nationalism at the contemporary stage is to eliminate the 
negative influence of “independence of Taiwan” and to strengthen the mutual 
exchange and national identity instead of establishing a clear political framework 
such as “One Country Two Systems” in a hurry or using military as threatening.   
 In this sense, the assumption in the introduction can be answered. The stance of 
“One Country, Two Systems through peaceful reunification while continues to assert 
the right to use military force” still serves as main component of the contemporary 
state nationalism, but it is not the whole part of it. Instead, the complete 
contemporary state nationalism on reunification in terms of leadership can be 
summarized as follows: 
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First, the settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete 
reunification of China represents the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
Second, the mainland government’s definition of One China is the PRC. In this 
sense, Taiwan’s reunification is a reunification with the PRC. The mainland 
government does not recognize the legitimacy or the legal existence of the Republic 
of China (ROC).  
Third, the mainland government strives for the peaceful reunification with Taiwan 
in the form of “One Country, Two Systems” with the greatest sincerity and utmost 
effort. “One Country, Two Systems” through peaceful negotiation is the ideal 
proposal for mainland government. 
Fourth, the mainland government remains the possibility of executing the 
non-peaceful means to achieve political reunification, if necessary. The execution of 
non-peaceful means represents for the bottom line of mainland government’s 
standpoint on reunification issue. 
Fifth, as long as the premise “Taiwan is a part of China” is insisted, the space for 
peaceful negotiation is very much open. The mainland government is willing to 
discuss anything with the various circles in Taiwan including the DPP. It is also 
willing to make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special 
circumstances where the country has not yet been reunified. It is expected that by 
strengthening the mutual exchange across the Strait and concept that people across 
the Strait share the same Chinese national identity, the negative influence of 
“independence of Taiwan” can be eliminated and a relative stable situation can be 
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constructed across the Strait, setting a solid foundation for the prospect political 
reunification.  
 As a result, in terms of political orientation, the contemporary state nationalism 
of leadership on reunification mainly shows a moderate left stance, supplemented 
with radical left standpoint. See following scale: 
*Figure 3. Political Orientations of the State Nationalism (Leadership) 
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Chapter 4 Poplar Nationalism I: The General Public 
Introduction 
This chapter studies the Chinese general public’s views regarding political 
reunification with Taiwan as a part of the popular nationalism. By investigating the 
expressions from four online forums, namely Utopia (烏有之鄉), Tiexue (鐵血),  
Tianya (天涯) and Kaidi (凱迪), this chapter will be divided into the following three 
parts. First, the statistical summary of the main posts collected and their distribution 
in terms of political orientations. Second, the overall views from main posts from 
four selected forums. Third, representative arguments from the replies attached to the 
main posts. It is expected that through this chapter, the general public’s views of 
political reunification with Taiwan under the notion of popular nationalism can be 
objectively, truly and comprehensively presented. It may also testify whether the 
traditional assumption that “all mainland people are looking forward a reunification 
with Taiwan” is still correct in contemporary era.    
1. Statistical Summary 
According to the screening mechanism from the methods of investigation, the 
statistical findings are illustrated as follows.
 1
 
On Utopia, 30 posts are selected in total for the purpose of analysis. Among 
which, 27 posts are selected out of 85 posts by searching the key word “Taiwan 
(re)unification”(台灣 統一), 3 posts are selected out of 40 posts by “Service Trade 
                                                          
1
 For detailed methods of investigation, please refer to page 50-55, part of methodological design in 
Chapter 2. 
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Agreement” （服貿）and 0 post is selected out of 1 post by ”Mayor election”.（九
合一） 
On Tiexue, 85 posts are selected in total. Among which, 78 posts are selected 
out of 759 posts by searching the key word “Taiwan (re)unification”, 4 posts are 
selected out of 760 posts by “Service Trade Agreement” and 3 posts are selected out 
of 760 posts by ”Mayor election”.  
On Tianya, 55 posts are selected in total. Among which, 43 posts are selected 
out of 2350 posts by searching the key word “Taiwan (re)unification”, 10 posts are 
selected out of 1250 posts by “Service Trade Agreement” and 2 posts are selected 
out of 100 posts by ”Mayor election”.  
On Kaidi, 26 posts are selected in total. Among which, 19 posts are selected out 
of 1344 posts by searching the key word “Taiwan (re)unification”, 4 posts are 
selected out of 1697 posts by “Service Trade Agreement” and 3 posts are selected 
out of 766 posts by ”Mayor election”. 
The following table summarizes the aforementioned information and it further 
illustrates its distribution in terms of political orientations by forums: 
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*Table 5. The Distribution of Political Orientations of Total Selected Main Posts by 
Forums  
      Percentage.&     
Posts  
number 
Forums 
Radical Left Moderate Left Moderate Right Radical Right 
Utopia 73% (22) 27% (8) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Tiexue 48% (41) 44% (37) 8% (7) 0% (0) 
Tianya 22% (12) 36% (20) 29% (16) 13% (7) 
Kaidi 23% (6) 23% (6) 42% (11) 12% (3) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, since the four forums cover a wider and 
comprehensive political spectrum on the views of reunification with Taiwan from 
left to right and the population under the study of the general public is netizens’ 
views expressed on the different forums as a whole. In this sense, the following table 
gives out the overall distribution of political orientations of total selected main posts 
from the four forums:
2
  
 
 
                                                          
2
 A phenomenon needs notice here is that, for instance, on the assumed moderate right forum, Tianya, 
moderate left views are more popular. Likewise, on the assumed radical right forum, Kaidi, moderate 
right views are actually outnumbered. This is actually understandable. It proves the early statement 
that “almost all websites in China do not openly declare their political stances but justify their 
standpoints as ‘objective’ and ‘represent the voice of people’. The political orientations of the four 
selected forums are largely public assumed in China based on their major expressions. In addition, it 
needs to be noted that Political orientations of articles and comments posted on a website do not 
necessarily in accordance with the assumed political orientation held by that website.” (from p.50)     
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*Table 6. The Overall Distribution of Political Orientations of Total Selected Main 
Posts   
Political 
orientations 
Radical Left Moderate Left Moderate Right Radical Right 
Percentage 
and posts 
number 
41% (81) 37% (71) 17% (34) 5% (10) 
 
2. Overall Views of Main Posts from Four Selected Forums 
This part studies the overall views of the general public toward political 
reunification with Taiwan from the selected main posts of four forums and it will 
display from radical left to radical right in order.
3
   
2.1. Radical Left 
On the radical left side, the most popular and prominent view is to realize the 
political reunification with Taiwan by military resolution. Under this framework, 
detailed thoughts and their attached justifications can be listed as follows. First, a 
classical view is that while efforts of peaceful reunification are exhausted, or the 
Taiwan authority endlessly delays the peaceful negotiations, the mainland 
government should implement military resolution. This is almost identical with the 
official rhetoric. Second, netizens practically believe that the military resolution is 
the most effective and quickest method. One supportive argument is that nowadays 
the PLA is powerful enough to conquer Taiwan without much trouble. The other 
argument is that Beijing’s contemporary Taiwan policy seems produce nothing and 
                                                          
3
 For detailed source and its numerical distribution, please refer to the appendix A 
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walks into a deadlock. Even if an eventual reunification is reached, coping with the 
aftermath will be troublesome. For instance:     
 “Peaceful reunification will lead to many troubles such as the settlement of 
pro-independence activists and Taiwan’s military force…..Thus peaceful 
reunification will not work and even hopeless in the predictable future.
4” 
 “So far I have been totally disappointed of all political parties in Taiwan. It is 
nearly not possible for them to voluntarily return to motherland…and it is the 
same situation for people in Taiwan….I think our government should take 
measures to force Taiwan (into submission), perhaps the military unification is 
the only way.”5 
 “Perhaps there are only a few people of older generations in Taiwan who still 
support reunification. In terms of the younger generation, it seems that they are 
the major force of the anti-Service Trade Agreement… it is time to give up 
illusion”6  
Similar to the second point, some netizens’ belief in military resolution come from 
perceived offence by the Taiwan people. The hurt of feeling comes from their 
perception of the disrespect and contempt to mainlanders from the Taiwan people 
from time to time. It is also stimulated by the anti-mainland sentiment demonstrated 
in the Sunflower Movement and the crushing defeat of KMT in the mayor elections. 
                                                          
4
 Bukesiyideyouxi. (2009). Xian kan qian tan Taiwan he ping hui gui de ke neng xing [Discuss the 
possibility of peaceful reunification]. Retrieved April 23, 2015, from 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3738172_1.html 
5
 Chenwulor. (2010). Taiwan shen me shi hou cai ke yi hui gui [When Taiwan can return to 
motherland]. Retrieved April 25, 2015, from http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4258001_1.html 
6
 xiniqi1982. (2014). Qian xi Taiwan de tong yi [Analysis of the reunification of Taiwan]. Retrieved 
April 20, 2015, from http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8324051_1.html 
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In this light, netizens generally think that Taiwan people are brain washed and should 
be punished. For example:     
 “I know some Taiwan people, their impression of mainland is ‘no democracy’ and 
‘poverty’….and they use ‘China pig’ as mantra. I don’t even hate Japanese like 
that….we may as well use the military to demonstrate our power ”7 
 “Mainland’s Taiwan policy must change. (Our) consistent kindness does not 
obtain sincerity. Instead, media in Taiwan has sowed the seeds of independence in 
every Taiwanese’s heart.”8  
 “The (psychological) distance illustrated in the Cross Strait Service Trade 
Agreement protest deeply hurt my feelings. I don’t want to trust Taiwanese any 
more. Nor will I regard them as compatriots. Taiwanese’s sentiment deserves 
sympathy, how about mainlander’s sentiment? ”9 
 “The essence of the students campaign (against Service Trade Agreement) is 
against the exchange and integration with mainland, and to resist the reunification 
with motherland…if the internal riot keeps going worse, (Mainland) should send 
out troops to suppress the riot, according to the Anti-Secession Law”10 
 “KMT’s crash in the major elections signifies the policy of “No Unification, No 
Independence and No military” is severely challenged by people in Taiwan. But it 
                                                          
7
 Hanshuangdeyanlei314159. (2013). Lai ying guo liang nian chu guo qian dui Taiwan bao you yi si hao 
gan xian zai jue dui zhi chi wu li tong yi [Two years stay in the UK. Before that hold a positive 
impression of Taiwan. Now absolutely support military reunification]. Retrieved April 22, 2015, from 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-292518-1.shtml  
8
 Qingjiaorousi8. (2014). Jia ru da lu Taiwan tong yi [If mainland and Taiwan reunified]. Retrieved 
April 25, 2015, from http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-449047-1.shtml 
 
9
 abooky. (2014). The Cross Strait Trade Agreement splits the young generations across the 
Strait. Retrieved April 23, 2015, from http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-442342-1.shtml 
10
 Rujinwuzhangsang. (2014). Taiwan xue yun ben zhi shi kang ju tong yi da lu bi xu jing jue [The 
essence of Taiwan student campaign is to against reunification and mainland must be alert of it]. 
Retrieved April 24, 2015, from http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=9944168  
90 
 
 
is a good opportunity for Mainland….As long as Taiwan marches towards 
independence, it will be the time of the reunification of China, a quick and clear 
reunification.”11   
Fourth, many netizens show great passion and patriotic sentiment towards the 
reunification issue. They do not set any prerequisite for military resolution but highly 
glorify the greatness of the war, regarding military method as inspiring and 
magnificent. Meanwhile, they also condemn peaceful unification as weakness and 
compromise. For example: 
 “Decision-makers should have the determination and courage of having a great 
war, nuclear war and even world war.”12 
 “Mao’s Taiwan policy (liberating Taiwan) is correct and reunification was 
almost accomplished…. The slogan ‘we must liberate Taiwan’ best reflects the 
strong determination of the Chinese people.”13 
 “The reunification war will be a war that determinate the destiny of the Chinese 
nation. Under the firm support of patriotic Chinese people all over the world, the 
Chinese government and the PLA will win this great war. China and the Chinese 
national will completely end the status of secession and march toward a brilliant 
                                                          
11
 Neijukongziwaishukongzi. (2014). Cong jiu he yi da xuan jie guo kan Taiwan de zheng zhi sheng tai 
yu zou xiang [To see the political status and direction in Taiwan after mayor election]. Retrieved April 
25, 2015, from http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-588037-1.shtml  
12
 P eng, N. (2010). Zai xin qi dian shang de tai hang zhan lue tao lun [To discuss Taiwan Strait 
strategy at the new starting point]. Retrieved April 20, 2015, from 
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future”14 
 “If America makes intervention, dare we sink their air-craft carriers? This is 
questions frequently asked by those cowards. Of course we dare! ”15 
 “Peaceful reunification without specific schedule is a lazy and status quo 
thinking. This thought is well embraced in contemporary China. However, if we 
do not make a breakthrough of this thought, then Taiwan will never be back.”16 
Fifth, netizens try to borrow the experience from Chinese history, declaring that 
political reunification was always achieved by means of war and the contemporary 
mainland Taiwan relation cannot escape from this logic. For example:   
 “Looking back for the past 3000 years, peaceful reunification is nonsense. It 
never happened”17 
 “Only fools will imagine so called ‘peaceful reunification’…. peaceful 
reunification can be tried, but all reunifications in Chinese history were achieved 
by force,”18 
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2015, from http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-587439-1.shtml  
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Lastly, netizens also attempt to justify the military resolution in aspect that it is 
good for the rise of China. They believe that in world history, no state became 
hegemony through peaceful rise only. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 
cannot be realized without state reunification. Military reunification with Taiwan will 
be a new starting pointing of the rise of China. It will help China to obtain the 
strategic advantage in geopolitics. For example:  
 “To declare peace is a self-delusion in a world of the jungle law. Economic 
assistance to Taiwan cannot lead to unification but pure appeasement”19  
 “The Taiwan issue is a leverage of the West to intervene China’s rise. Military 
unification can crush this trouble. ….After reunification, China can have an 
access to the West Pacific”20 
 “Military reunification enables (Mainland) to obtain Taiwan military facilitates 
and its outstanding navy bases. After that, Mainland will have its initiative in 
Diaoyu Island and South China Sea. (Military reunification) is also good for 
developing China’s oceangoing navy”21 
  Another major opinion on the radical left stance is the economic war, which uses 
the economic leverage such as economic sanctions and trade isolations to bully the 
island into submission. Both categorized as economic aspect, this strategy is 
fundamentally different from the economic integration on the moderate left stance, 
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which will be illustrated later. While the economic integration is concentrated on 
mutual benefit, the economic war is more like a zero sum game with the 
characteristics of annihilation. For example: 
 “The contemporary economic power of mainland can make Taiwan totally 
marginalized and isolated. After that, reunification will be rather easy. ”22 
 “We offered too much (economic benefits) to Taiwan and it stimulated Taiwan’s 
greed….we are unable to let Taiwan people know the advantage of reunification, 
but we can let them know the harm of independence.”23 
  Last but not least, mainland netizens, while generally acknowledge DPP as a 
pro-independence force whom should be suppressed, some of them also show a 
negative attitude towards KMT and proposes that mainland authorities should 
abandon its close cooperation with it. For example: 
 “…..It is very horrible that many mainlanders still hold the unrealistic 
expectations on KMT, regarding they can be relied on. If (we) continue so, there 
must be a lot of compromise and appeasement and mediation with the sacrifice 
of principle”24      
In sum, military resolution, economic war and suppressing KMT construct the 
radical left stance among the netizens. Among which, military resolution is regarded 
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as the most popular method to solve the Taiwan issue. Though majority of the radical 
left stance are expressed in an emotional rhetoric while plenty of the views are 
apparently unrealistic in the current political situation, some views can still 
self-justify by giving supporting evidence.       
2.2. Moderate Left 
On the moderate left side, the most popular view is to realize the political 
reunification with Taiwan by converting Taiwan people through nationalistic 
sentiment or to evoke Taiwan people’s Chinese national consciousness. In general, 
netizen’s views under this framework can be summarized as firstly, those people in 
Taiwan who make contributions to the Chinese national reunification will go down 
in history as heroes. Otherwise, they will be condemned as traitors and regarded as 
the shame of history. Second, Taiwan’s reunification with mainland signifies the 
milestone of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Taiwan people will enjoy 
the glorification as a member of the Chinese nation and the great interest brought by 
the rise of China. Third, Taiwan people belong to the Chinese nation and national 
reunification is a general historical trend. Hence, internal friction is meaningless and 
harmful while mutual communication and heart to heart approach are encouraged. 
On the other hand, a characteristic of posts under this framework is that the most 
commonly used phrases are highly sentimental such as “treasure island”, “blood is 
thicker than water” and “compatriotship based on flesh and blood”. The followings 
are the highlighted expressions in the posts: 
 “The greatness of the realization of national unification is beyond measurement, 
if Ma Ying Jeou could abandon his old views and initiate reunification 
negotiations, he will be the hero of the Chinese nation and there is no worry for 
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him to be re-elected.” 25  
 “(During the Beijing Olympic Games), when people across the Strait stood up 
and sang the March of Volunteers together, it was as if we returned to the 1930s, 
an era of national catastrophe when all Chinese people united together and 
fought against the Japanese invaders. People across the Strait, only by uniting 
together can realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”26 
 “The realization of the reunification across the Strait is the last common 
aspiration of both KMT and CCP leaders. It is also the common aspiration of the 
Chinese people. To realize the truly rise of the Greater China, we sincerely call 
you, please come back, Taiwan, my compatriot and brother!”27 
 “It was a national sorrow to fight a civil war between us. Now we should have a 
thorough introspection. I hope Taiwan compatriot can think from the angle of 
national consciousness and abandon internal friction. Our real objective is to 
realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”28     
Another prominent view of the moderate left stance is the proposal of “Peaceful 
Reunification and One Country, Two Systems.” Under this proposal, detailed 
thoughts can be further divided into three types. First, considering military conflict 
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costs too much, the arrangement of “One Country, Two Systems” is relative 
appropriate. For example: 
 “Even if mainland owns overwhelming military supremacy, there is no need to 
have internal frictions within the Chinese nation again. Hence we may as well to 
sign a contract with KMT, Taiwan must return (to China) in name and essence, 
and to become a special administrative region under PRC 
29” 
Second, many netizens genuinely believe that the arrangement of “One Country, 
Two Systems” is perfectly designed. Through “One Country Two Systems”, people 
in Taiwan can not only enjoy high degree of autonomy, but also better develop its 
economy under the generous support from Mainland. For instance: 
 “One Country, Two Systems” has achieved great success so far. This system is 
designed for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. After its success practice, should 
we also realize it in Taiwan? Of course! Considering the difference between 
“Taiwan-Mainland” and “Hong Kong, Macau-Mainland”. Taiwan can even enjoy 
the higher degree of autonomy.”30 
 “Is reunification that horrible? ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is genuinely no harm 
at all. I don’t understand (why people in Taiwan refuse to accept)!”31    
Third, Netizens also attempt to persuade Taiwan people to accept “One Country 
Two Systems” as it shows the benevolence from mainland authorities and more 
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importantly, it is the rational option for Taiwan by reviewing the general prospect of 
Cross Strait relations and international political structure. The difference between 
this point and the former one is that this point is expressed in a condescending and 
threating tone while the former is conveyed in a friendly and kind attitude. For 
example: 
 “Do Taiwan people have a clear mind? ‘One Country Two Systems’ is asking 
Taiwan to capitulate. However, such capitulation still allows Taiwan to negotiate 
for its political name, flag, or even to keep its military. But there is no way if 
Taiwan request mainland China to change (such as political systems, state 
symbols)..……the maker of the game rules will never be the weak side. After a 
few years, you (Taiwan) will have no bargaining chip but to surrender 
unconditionally.”32 
   The last major view on the moderate left side is the beliefs in the effectiveness 
of economic integration. Netizens basically reach an agreement that economic 
integration is the most pragmatic reunification method and it requires the least 
cost. Directed by the objective economic law, political reunification will be an 
irresistible natural process. Additionally, netizen’s perception of the protest for the 
anti-Service Trade Agreement further intensifies their beliefs of the supremacy of 
the economic power. For instance: 
 “…In sum, when all the food, clothing, electronic devices and loans that Taiwan 
people enjoy come from motherland, when economists in Taiwan are proud to 
own certificates from mainland business school. There is no worry to recover 
Taiwan. The charm of globalization and EFCA are more useful than millions of 
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troops.”33 
 “(By perceiving the anti-Service Trade Agreement, I feel) the term called 
globalization, whether you like it or not, it is over there. Similarly, whether 
Taiwan wants to reunification or not, it is also over there.”34 
  Therefore, the emphasis on the Chinese national consciousness, the “One 
Country, Two Systems” model and economic integration compose the moderate 
left views among the netizens. Though interpreted in different ways, those views 
generally align with that of the mainland government.        
2.3. Moderate Right 
Along the spectrum of rightism, netizens are more liberal, tolerant and flexible in 
handling the political reunification issue in general. The most representative voice 
from the netizens on the moderate right side is that while they still have a firm belief 
in achieving the political reunification with Taiwan, they also have a conviction that 
the prospect reunification should be realized through political compromise from 
mainland authorities. Political compromise has two implications here: one is the 
political reform of mainland China itself. The other is a more accommodative 
arrangement for Taiwan after reunification. In terms of the political reform, 
according to the netizens, a great obstacle to the national reunification is the rivalry 
between two political systems and Taiwan people’s distrust of the authoritarian 
regime. To facilitate this conflict, Beijing should initiate some political changes to 
make mainland China into a society with more freedom and democracy in politics, 
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more liberalization in economy and more justice in judiciary. As for the more 
accommodative arrangement, it means that Taiwan should be given more autonomy 
and political power than that proposed in the “One Country, Two Systems” model. 
Compared with pro-left stance, this view requires mainland authorities to sacrifice 
some of its interests and make some liberal reforms. For example:                   
 “In my opinion, in considering the prolonged political stability for the Chinese 
nation, both sides across the Strait should make some amendments. Mainland 
should implement democracy to obtain the political trust from citizens in Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan.”35 
 “(After reunification), with the prerequisite of supporting constitution and 
maintaining national unification, all political parties and people in China shall be 
equal. They can develop their organizations and participate in state leader’s 
election freely……….the military shall not belong to any political party. ”36 
 “The condition of realizing Mainland’s aspiration of reunification with Taiwan is 
actually very simple: it is no more than implementing the democratic politics (in 
mainland), which has been commonly embraced by most countries. This means a 
great deal for mainland people as well…..Peaceful reunification is not only the 
interest of the Chinese nation, but also a common aspiration of the general public 
across the Strait.”37 
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Another moderate right view from the netizens is that while they still embrace a 
pro-reunification attitude in general, they prefer to delay the contemporary 
reunification plan on government agenda. The making of such attitude largely comes 
from their perception of the great disproportion of Taiwan affairs between the 
investment (Beijing's huge effort in united front work) and output (very limited 
progress of political agreement). Based on that, it also comes from the consideration 
of better economic and political profit for mainlanders if Beijing fully concentrates 
on its own development in recent years. Finally, Taiwan’s anti-mainland sentiment, 
especially demonstrated during the anti-Service Trade Agreement campaign 
perceived by mainland netizens further intensified such attitude. For instance: 
 “Thus, China is now at a crucial stage of national development. It will be no 
harm to China if the progress of reunification is suspended. When to resume (the 
process)? It will not be too late until Chinese people can afford (the cost to do 
the united front work). ”38 
 “We don’t have to recover Taiwan in a hurry and we should believe time is on our 
side….we should cooperate with Europe in service and trade, geopolitics requires 
strategy.”39 
  The last significant view on the moderate right side is that netizens still look 
forward for political reunification with Taiwan and regard this outcome as an ideal 
one. However, they also make a clarification that reunification is not a compulsory. 
The ultimate status of the Cross Strait relations should be based on the principle of 
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maximization of the happiness and benefit of the people across the Strait. For 
instance:  
 “To draw a conclusion, regardless of reunification or split, coalition or 
disintegration, state must be responsible for the security, freedom and dignity of 
each individual and the whole community.”40 
  In brief, on the moderate right stance, netizens still support political reunification 
with Taiwan. However, quite different from the leftism, the reunification proposed 
by moderate rightists are conditional, they require either to initiate political reform in 
mainland China or to grant Taiwan more autonomy. They also request the 
reunification should has no negative influence on either the development of mainland 
or the interest of the people on both sides. Clearly, moderate rightists are less 
emotional than the leftists and the care more about human right and individual 
interests. Their political stance on reunification issue has gone beyond mainland 
government’s contemporary Taiwan policy.    
2.4.Radical Right 
This political orientation represents the extreme liberal views on reunification 
issue. Though limited in number compared with other aforementioned orientations, 
they reflect fresh, unique and even representative views from the general public. On 
the radical right side, netizens are no longer in favor of the political reunification 
with Taiwan. By opposing reunification, they either acquiesce to the Taiwan 
independence or openly declare that they prefer Taiwan independence. However, 
according to investigation, an interesting phenomenon is that none of them object 
reunification due to the appreciation of Taiwan’s democratic system or civil society. 
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Their pro-independence stance comes from the rational calculation that the status of 
split may be favorable for the future development of mainland China and for the 
massive grass-root mainlanders. For example: 
 “My mother comes from the countryside. She asked whether we could collect 
tax from Taiwan after reunification when we watched Taiwan election on 
Television. I said no and she replied ‘then why we do we need reunification? 
There are so many earthquakes and we may need to give them money. That’s so 
bothered.’…I think my mother’s point represents many mainlander’s 
reunification view”41 
 “I want to say, if the son (Taiwan) has grown up, he wants to be independent and 
leaves his mother, let him go…..if he is an unfilial son, he will be a scourge if he 
stays at home. Taiwan, just let it go”42 
 “Taiwan and mainland China has been separated for more than six decades. 
Peaceful reunification is merely a wishful dream. This is as if you kicked your 
brother out of the house and he had his new home outside. It is impossible to 
reunify as the same family.”43 
From above expressions we observe that though those netizens’ views are 
politically radical, viz to abandon the reunification stance, their justification is 
non-emotional and very practical. Another significant implication here is that even if 
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radical rightists are small in number, their existence overthrow the assumption that 
“all mainland people are looking forward a reunification with Taiwan” in 
contemporary era.    
3. Effective Replies 
As proposed in the earlier section of methodological design, I will also investigate 
the effective replies under the main posts as their opinions may contradict with the 
main posts and some of which can be very insightful.  
3.1. Characteristics of effective replies 
In general, after investigation, effective replies under selected main posts have the 
characteristics of casualness, complementariness, diversification and polarization. In 
terms of casualness, it means plenty of effective replies are written in a colloquial 
way and extensively use the online language. For instance, against the idea that 
mainland has the right to send troops to Taiwan if the dispute of Service Trade 
Agreement evolves into chaos in Taiwan, a reply post says: “the floor host (樓主) is 
making nonsense. Do you think you can crush into a flat and to intervene when the 
couple
44are quarrelling among themselves?”45  As for complementariness, since 
relies are composed “floor by floor”, even if effective replies are still responding the 
main posts to some extent, they may be affected also by opinions from the other 
replies. In this sense, opinions expressed through replies are rich. Effective replies 
may not only give response to the ideas from main post but also to address the 
attitudes in other replies. However, when observing the views from tens of thousands 
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of replies attached to the 196 main posts as a whole, their coverage is nearly equal to 
that of the main posts.
46This implies, on the one hand, netizen’s wisdom of 
reunification issue is indeed covered by main posts already, on the other hand, 
netizens discuss the reunification issue either by initiating a new topic or 
participating in the existing ones. Third, effective replies have the characteristic of 
diversification. That is, across all selected online forums, no consensus can easily be 
made in terms of both replies to the main posts and among the replies themselves. In 
most circumstances, tied and fierce debates are implemented on the forum. Even if in 
some discussions that the ideas in main posts are widely accepted, there are still 
oppositional opinions. For instance, in a discussion on Utopia, while majority of the 
replies support the views of the main post, viz to realize the reunification by 
suppressing KMT. There are still replies expressing the oppositional view, saying 
that “we are all Chinese and it is a great fortune that we are brought together, why we 
must have a dominator during the reunification process?...all in all, we should no 
longer fight with each other and that is the win-win situation.”47 Last but not least, 
effective replies show a polarization trend. In my observation, the most common 
expressed views are either on the side of radical left or moderate right. For those on 
moderate left and radical right, they are relatively limited.  
3.2. Representative arguments from effective replies 
When observing the views from tens of thousands of replies attached to the main 
posts as a whole, their views basically overlap with that expressed in the main posts. 
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The following reviews the major points from the effective replies from four forums 
and makes quotations of some representative arguments.   
  According to investigations, replies with radical left stances mainly refer to 
military resolutions. It is either expressed through supporting the main posts with 
radical left ideas or making objections to the main posts that calls for more peaceful 
and more liberal stance to deal with the reunification issue. For example, as a 
response to a main post which advocates for military reunification, a netizen says 
with a supportive tone: “that (military resolution) makes sense. The reunification 
across the Strait is a certainty, but it cannot be resolved by negotiations only. The 
diehards within the Taiwan authority will not recognize failure. Thus we should not 
place any hope on the Taiwan authority. Nor should we wishfully regard them as 
Chinese or regard enemy as friend. We should abandon fantasy and prepare for the 
war”48In contrast, for instance, concise expressions such as “military is the only 
method to resolve Taiwan issue”49are commonly made as refutation to the peace 
proposals.  
  As for the replies on the moderate left side, its number is relatively small and they 
are commonly refutations to the ideas that reunification should be based on the 
political compromise from mainland China. For instance, as a response to a main 
post which proposes a reunification based on Beijing’s compromise on 
administrative powers. A netizen responds with a dissatisfactory tone that “‘One 
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 Xuexibenzhoudao. (2013). Reply to " guan yu liang an wu li tong yi de bi ran xing [about the 
certainty of military reunification across the strait] ". Retrieved April 30, 2015, from 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6764029_1.html  
49
 Jiaofengzhongzhiyiba. (2014). Reply to " zuo wei da lu ren, hen bu li jie wei shen me tai wan bu xiang 
tao tong yi [as a mainlander, I don't understand why Taiwan refuses reunification] ". Retrieved 1 May, 
2015, from http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-540979-1.shtml  
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Country Two Systems’ is there, why you Taiwan are still so hypocritical? You 
should not expect more as mainland has done everything in its heart and in the line of 
its duty. The ROC has no difference from Taiwan independence…..I hope Taiwan 
authority can clearly judge the situation and abandon any fantasy, the peaceful 
reunification (under PRC) is the only option you have.”50   
Moderate right replies are substantial in number across different forums. One 
typical way is to echo the pro-liberal expressions in the main posts. For instance, “I 
think the best solution to Taiwan issue is ‘One Country, One System’, the democratic 
system. If mainland does not make any change, then status quo is good enough”51 In 
addition, they commonly refute the conservative and hawkish opinions expressed in 
main posts and attached replies. They also condemn those opinions in an indirect or a 
satirical way. For instance, as retort to the general proposal of “One Country Two 
Systems” under the PRC, one netizen says that “under the grand global democratic 
trend in the 21
st
 century, it is an abnormal phenomenon that an authoritarian regime 
force a democratic government to surrender while regards it as a great justice.”52 
Similarly, commenting on the phenomenon that military resolution is widely 
advocated for, a netizen satirizes that “those wretches, on one hand, rent houses, eat 
pancakes, rush for public transportations and busy with nine to five jobs. On the 
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 Damohuyan1957. (2013). Reply to " Liang an he ping tong yi de gong shi hai cha zui hou yi ceng 
chuang zhi [the last window paper of the consensus on political reunification with Taiwan] ". Retrieved 
May 1, 2015, from http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_6589505_1.html  
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 laochenyouhuashuo. (2014). Reply to " bu fen min zhu pai wei gong Taiwan fan fu mao xue yun shi 
fen qing hou yi zheng [it is an angery youth sequel for some pan democractic force to attack anti 
Service Trade Agreement student campaign in Taiwan]". Retrieved May 1, 2015, from 
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 xqgy2010. (2010). Reply to "Bo chi Taiwan bu fen zheng ke de dui deng zhi shuo [refutation of the 
concept of equality proposed by some Taiwanese politicians]". Retrieved May 1, 2015, from 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4255761_1.html  
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other hand, they grasp Global Times and Reference News
53
every morning and 
desperately care about how to destroy the US and Japan.”54This obviously satirizes 
those nationalists are short sighted and brainwashed.       
Finally, there are also some replies show antipathies towards reunification with 
Taiwan, and similar to the views from radical right main posts, the making of such 
sentiment comes from the pragmatic interest concern rather than abstract 
appreciation of universal values. For instance, to echo with the point “manipulation 
of reunification issue has become a tool of Taiwan to request benefit from mainland” 
expressed in a main posts, one netizen says that “….we should change (the situation), 
otherwise we may forget about the contemporary reunification method (proposed by 
Beijing), our mainlanders will descend to the second, or even the third rate 
citizens…I strongly oppose the reunification like that.”55Likewise, there are also 
expressions such as “I support floor host (for his objection to reunification), Taiwan 
will be a burden if it is recovered….the importance of Taiwan is decreasing 
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 Both are famous news papers focus on diplomatic relations and national defen a strong 
pro-government stance and of attracting a strongly nationalistic readership. 
54
 Budehuan. (2010). Reply to " Zhongguo jiang di diao tong yi da lu taiwan jun shi rong he ti shang ri 
cheng [China will realize reunification in a low profile:Mainland-Taiwan military integration is on 
agenda]". Retrieved May 1, 2015, from http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4142007_1.html  
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 AS xinding. (2011). Reply to " Suo wei de tong yi yi jing chengwei Taiwan dui zhong guo yu qu yu qiu 
de gong ju [unification has become a tool of Taiwan to request benefit from mainland]". Retrieved May 
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anyway.”56or “My suggestion is ‘No reunification, no intervention, no attention paid 
(不統，不管，不理)’”57     
4. Conclusion 
After investigation of netizen’s expression on forums, the followings are the 
summary and characteristics of the reunification views from the general public under 
the notion of popular nationalism: 
First, military resolution is still the most popular stance embraced by the general 
public. Such stance clearly shows a tendency of anti-intellectualism based on strong 
nationalistic sentiment and it is especially serious among those who support war 
merely because of its glorification and it is good for China’s rise.    
Second, quite different from assumption that all mainland people should support a 
reunification with Taiwan, the general public in mainland China no longer entirely 
look forward a political reunification. On the radical right side, some netizens make 
objections to reunify with Taiwan; some even openly show preference to the 
independence of Taiwan. However, their major supporting reason is the practical 
interest concern instead of the acknowledgement of the issues such as the success of 
democratization, the mature of its civil society or the justification of its national 
self-determination. Though the “pro-independence force” is relatively limited in 
number during the investigation, it reflects a representative view and a new trend. It 
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 Buhuizaichongming. (2014). Reply to " Wo shi da lu ren wo qiang lie fan dui he Taiwan tong yi [as a 
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also reflects the negative perception of the current mainland’s Taiwan policy in the 
eyes of some mainlanders.  
Third, the reunification views from the general public shows a polarization and 
they have limited overlap with the contemporary Beijing’s Taiwan policy. Though 
mainland authorities still reserve the possibility of using military when all other 
peaceful efforts exhausted, for most general public who support military 
reunification, it is preferable. Moreover, judging from the prerequisite of using force 
and methods of fighting a war, the general public’s views are far more radical than 
that of the governments. As for the public views on the moderate right and radical 
right side, they are obviously beyond mainland government’s acceptance. In this 
sense, terms of reunification with Taiwan, mainland authorities and the general 
public only reach a consensus on aspects of “One Country Two Systems” and 
economic integrations. 
Fourth, the reunification views from the general public are highly emotional and it 
is universally presented in all political orientations. Emotion is the major driving 
force behind the views of advocating for military resolution and calling for Chinese 
national consciousness. Even for those who seem to rationally propose reunification 
by political reform or to abandon Taiwan, their emotion of dissatisfaction of the 
mainland itself can be clearly observed.   
Finally, while it is commonly perceived the post 2008 Cross Strait relations is 
unprecedentedly positive, it does not produce a positive reunification views from the 
mainlanders. On the contrary, it is because of the new Cross Strait situation, more 
mainlanders turn to be more negative to Taiwan and its people, and thus become 
more radical on the reunification issue. Meanwhile, many proposers of military 
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reunification, almost all the nationalistic enthusiasts and the supporters of “One 
Country, Two systems”, their views seem to be unaffected by the improvement of 
Cross Strait relations in the past few years.           
As a result, in terms of political orientation, the contemporary sentiments of the 
mainland general public on reunification spans from radical left to radical right. See 
following scale: 
*Figure 4. Political Orientations of the Popular Nationalism (General Public) 
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Chapter 5 
State Nationalism and Popular Nationalism II: 
Establishment Intellectuals and Public Intellectuals 
Introduction 
This chapter comparatively studies both the state nationalism and popular 
nationalism through the investigations of intellectuals with different attributions, the 
establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals respectively from the Consensus 
Website. The standpoint on reunification from the two kinds of intellectuals will be 
evaluated in this chapter. Moreover, it is also expected this chapter can testify 
whether the assumption that “establishment intellectuals are merely the mouthpiece 
of the government while public intellectuals are generally more liberal on the 
reunification issue” is correct in the contemporary era. Finally, the study of 
establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals in this chapter is expected to 
enable readers to have a more objective and comprehensive understanding of the 
contemporary state nationalism and popular nationalism on reunification issue.          
1. Statistical Summary 
On Taiwan Column, the Consensus Website, there are 1472 articles range by date 
from 20 May, 2008 to 31 December, 2014. After scrutiny according to the assigned 
article selection standards, 73 articles are finally selected.
 58
 
Next, further classification is made based on the standard of (1) the attributions of 
intellectuals
59
; (2) the typologies of the articles
60
 and (3) the political orientations.
61
 
                                                          
58
 For details about the selection criteria adopted to pick those articles for analysis, please refer to 
pp.49-50,the part of methodological design in Chapter 2. 
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In the end, 22 articles are selected as works from establishment intellectuals and 51 
articles are selected as contributions from public intellectuals. In terms of typologies, 
articles are divided into “legal principles”62, “views of Taiwan independence”63 and 
“proposals”64 for both establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals.65 As for 
the distribution of political orientations, the following two tables give out the 
illustration for articles from establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals 
respectively
66
: 
*Table 7. The Distribution of Political Orientations of Works from Establishment 
Intellectuals 
  Radical Left Moderate Left Moderate Right Radical Right 
No. of article 3 13 6 0 
Percentage 
(among the 
total selected 
articles) 
14% 59% 27% 0% 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
59
 It refers to whether they are establishment intellectuals or public intellectuals. 
 
60
 For example, some authors may justify their reunification views from legal principles while some 
may illustrate their views by giving reunification proposals. 
 
61
 It refers to whether the articles are radical left, moderate left, moderate right or radical right. 
  
62
 This typology refers to intellectuals justify their reunification views through the discussion on laws, 
international norms or other related legal documents  
 
63
 This typology refers to intellectuals justify their reunification views through the comments on 
pro-independence forces in Taiwan   
 
64
 This typology refers to intellectuals justify their reunification views through offering the proposals 
of how to manipulate the Cross Strait relations in the future. 
 
65
 For details, please refer to Appendix B and Appendix C 
 
113 
 
 
*Table 8. The Distribution of Political Orientations of Contributions from Public 
Intellectuals  
 Radical Left Moderate Left Moderate Right Radical Right 
No. of article 4 17 29 1 
Percentage 
(among the 
total selected 
articles) 
8% 33% 57% 2% 
 
2. Reunification Views from Establishment Intellectuals and Public 
Intellectuals 
2.1. Radical left 
2.1.1. Establishment Intellectuals 
On the radical left side, establishment intellectuals mainly elaborate their 
pro-reunification stance through the comments on the Taiwan independence force. 
According to Kuai Zheyuan, while it is commonly acknowledged that DPP is a party 
of seeking Taiwan independence and KMT is more friendly to the CCP and 
susceptible to the One China Principle, there also exists a view that Ma Ying-Jeou 
and his KMT colleagues are also pro-independence forces.
67
 Disguised by the 
promise of “No unification, No independence and No use of force” and a series of 
policies to lift the bans for Cross Strait exchanges, the fundamental political 
philosophy of Ma Ying Jeou’s administration is to resist the reunification in a soft 
way. To make things worse, in contrast to DPP’s pursue of independence in an open 
and high profile, the Taiwan independence directed by Ma Ying Jeou is in the dark 
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and difficult to defend. As a result, as long as the mainland government wants to 
realize the political reunification, it cannot place hope on both KMT and DPP.  
Similarly, Luoyuan, a well-known PLA general, argues that the forces of Taiwan 
independence are the largest threat to national reunification. The mainland 
government should make all efforts to contain its influence, especially in terms of the 
military deterrence. In this regard, Mainland’s military deployment cannot be 
compromised in exchange for political negotiation. According to Anti Session Law, 
it is illegal in not using the military resolution if Taiwan is walking towards 
independence.
68
 
2.1.2. Public Intellectuals 
On the radical left side, public intellectuals illustrate their pro-reunification stance 
through the comments on the Taiwan independence force and giving proposals. 
In terms of views of Taiwan independence, the contributions from public 
intellectual basically overlap with the works from establishment intellectuals, viz Ma 
Ying Jeou and his KMT colleagues are implicit pro-independence activists. The 
mainland decision makers should be alert of this fact and give appropriate response.
69
 
Moreover, as Chan Fushan
70
 argues, the independence forces in Taiwan cannot 
survive without the compromise from mainland China. Both the policies of “One 
China, Different Interpretations” and the “Economy First, Politics Second” are forms 
of acquiescence to Taiwan independence. To realize the political reunification across 
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 Article 21 from appendix B 
 
69
 Article 6 and 8 from appendix C 
 
70
 Article 7 from appendix C 
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the Strait and to maximize the interests for mainland, there must be some 
amendments to the current policies.    
Public intellectuals with radical left stance also offer the reunification proposals 
based on the judgement that the contemporary Taiwan policy of the mainland 
authorities was passive, weak and shortsighted. In order to realize the political 
reunification with Taiwan, as they suggest, first, the mainland government should 
replace the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council with a new Unification 
Department, which shows an uncompromising determination in resolving the Taiwan 
issue. Second, the authority may as well to borrow the ideas from history by learning 
how emperor Kangxi (康熙)realized unification with Taiwan through employment of 
both soft and hard approaches. Under this philosophy, on one hand, Beijing should 
offer economic interests to Taiwan people. On the other hand, Beijing should 
ruthlessly suppress the pro-independence force politically and economically within 
the Island. Third, the mainland government should further strengthen its military as 
deterrence. Fourth, Beijing should use high position and handsome salary to attract 
more people in Taiwan to promote the success of unification.
71
            
2.2. Moderate Left 
2.2.1. Establishment Intellectuals 
Mass majority of the establishment intellectuals’ reunification views are placed on 
the moderate left side and they cover the typologies of legal principles, views of 
Taiwan independence and proposals.    
                                                          
71
 Article 18 from appendix C 
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In terms of legal principles, the major standpoint is that the “One China Principle” 
serves as the legal basis of the Cross Strait relations and all negotiations should be 
carried out based on that. For instance, even if the mainland authority gives space for 
Taiwan’s participation in the international organizations, there is no way to accept 
“Two Chinas” or “One China, One Taiwan”72. In addition, while acknowledge using 
the “One China with different interpretations” to facilitate the Cross Strait exchanges 
at this stage, it needs to be noted that such flexibility is only for expediency and 
should be evolved into a more pragmatic political negotiation aiming for an eventual 
national reunification. Even if Beijing shows acquiesce in “One China with different 
interpretations”, there is no way for Beijing to recognize the legitimacy of the 
Republic of China. Nor should Beijing explicitly or implicitly give up the goal of 
reunification under the PRC
73
                               
When expressing the political reunification views by commenting on the forces of 
Taiwan independence, establishment intellectuals on the moderate left stance 
generally show an optimistic sentiment. They all firmly consider Taiwan’s 
reunification with mainland China directed by Beijing is a general trend and they all 
believe the influence of the pro-independence force on the Island is limited and futile. 
After 2008, by observing the loss of pro-independence DPP in the presidential 
election and the subsequent Cross Strait exchanges, some scholars made the 
judgement that only a part of confused Taiwan people believe statements from 
pro-independence activists while more people are gradually realizing that there is no 
future for Taiwan independence by witnessing the essence of Taiwan independence 
and acknowledging the risk of it. Those establishment intellectuals believe Taiwan 
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compatriots are patriotic and they are unwilling to see the Taiwan independence. 
Peaceful development through the cooperation from two sides is the only correct 
choice.
74
 Based on that, to accommodate the economic development of Taiwan and 
to facilitate the unstoppable Cross Strait exchanges, DPP has to amend its ideology 
of seeking Taiwan independence and to change its mainland policies.
75
 In addition, 
those establishment scholars also optimistically believe that the rise of Taiwan 
independence consciousness is merely a deliberate political propaganda such as 
exaggerating the tragedy of 2.28 Incident and downplaying the orthodoxy of the 
Chinese culture. They also judge that Taiwan independence consciousness is merely 
a tool for pro-independence activists to achieve political profit. Based on the 
optimistic evaluation on pro-independence phenomenon in Taiwan, establishment 
scholars believe that by sharing the same language and culture, together with the 
growing exchanges across the Strait, the Chinese consciousness can be reshaped, the 
One China identity can be rebuilt and consequently a national reunification can be 
realized.
76
       
  Many establishment intellectuals also give suggestions on the prospect of the 
Cross Strait relations and offer proposals to realize the political reunification. Major 
views in this political orientation concentrate on how to maximize Beijing’s profit 
and how to achieve a political reunification under the PRC.
77
 In general, they can be 
summarized as first, peaceful development should be the main theme for the Cross 
Strait interactions and the mainland government should show a great sincerity on it. 
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However, all negotiations should be based on “One China Principle” and no 
compromise can be made beyond this redline. Second, the mainland government 
should promote further economic exchange and integration across the Strait. Political 
negotiation driven by economic integration is expected to require minimum cost and 
it is the most pragmatic method at this stage. Meanwhile, the mainland 
decision-makers should bear in mind that the purpose of economic exchange is to 
prepare for an eventual political reunification. To develop the Cross Strait relations 
in a comprehensive, stable and sustainable way, “only economy and no politics” is 
unacceptable.
78
Third, Cross Strait cooperation should not be only limited to the 
economic aspect, but to expand to other strategic areas, especially in terms of the 
security and marine interests in the South China Sea. Fourth, other than material 
goods, Beijing should further enhance its soft power in its united front work through 
cultural exchanges. The major purpose is to promote psychological attachment of 
Taiwan people towards the Chinese nation, especially for the younger generations in 
Taiwan. Fifth, the central government should clearly aware that Taiwan issue is not 
merely a domestic problem as it claims. When dealing with the Taiwan issue, Beijing 
should try to avoid negative intervention from the foreign states while persuade the 
international community that the peaceful integration across the Strait is in line with 
interests of majority of counties. Last but not least, mainland’s political reunification 
with Taiwan cannot be realized without the strong state power. The basis of playing a 
leading role in the Cross Strait relation is still rooted in building China into a 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern country.  
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2.2.2. Public intellectuals 
Moderate left stance is also welcomed by the public intellectuals and their 
reunification views are illustrated through the views of Taiwan independence and 
proposals.    
In terms of views of Taiwan independence,
 
public intellectuals’ points are 
largely in resonance to that of the leadership.
79 
One point expressed by establishment 
intellectuals is also shared by public intellectuals. They also believe DPP should face 
the unstoppable integration between Taiwan and mainland China by amending its 
original anti-mainland policies. Another point is that as response to the voice of 
national self-determination proposed by pro-independence activists in Taiwan, Xin 
Qiang reemphasizes the concept of “a community with common destiny”(命運共同
體), which was first raised by Hu Jintao in his report during the 17th CCP Party 
Congress in 2007. Under this concept, the 1.3 billion people on the mainland and the 
23 million people in Taiwan are of the same blood and share a common destiny. 
Beijing will make all efforts to achieve anything that serves the interests of Taiwan 
compatriots, contributes to the maintenance of peace across the Strait, and facilitates 
peaceful national reunification.
80
 Xin Qiang argues that after the power transition in 
2008 in Taiwan, the developmental trend of the Cross Strait relations well proved 
this concept. The fate and the prospect of Taiwan are not only manipulated by 23 
million Taiwanese, but also the 1.3 billion mainlanders.
81
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 Hu, J.T. (2007). Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive for 
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In this political orientation, 14 articles also propose the blue print for the 
possible reunification methods. It should be noted that even if within the moderate 
leftists, there still exists difference in the degree of openness. From the stance of 
being conservative to that of being liberal, the major opinions from moderate left 
public intellectuals can be listed as follows. One classical proposal is still the “One 
Country Two Systems” model.82 By making statement such as “this model fully 
respects history and the reality”, “it is well designed for social stability and 
prosperity across the Strait” and “it has been successfully implemented in Hong 
Kong and Macau already”, the argument and supporting evidence in selected articles 
barely show any difference from the rhetoric of government and establishment 
intellectuals. Compared with “One Country, Two Systems” model, more liberal 
proposals under this orientation share a common characteristic: they do not offer an 
ultimate plan for the political reunification across the Strait. Instead, they suggest 
some transitional changes, which are, to make some improvements from the status 
quo so that the political reunification in the future can be realized more easily. First, 
Beijing should set up a Cross Strati Relations Laws of the PRC to legalize the cross 
Strait interactions.
83
 The existing legal documents of Taiwan affairs are mainly 
made for declaration of state sovereignty and for dealing with the emergency. 
However, through the issue of this law, Beijing can better construct the new pattern 
of Cross Strait relations, to provide the legal security for the compatriots across the 
Strait and to show a positive stance that Beijing will settle the reunification issue 
based on peaceful principle and rule of law. Second, many public intellectuals 
suggest that Beijing and Taipei should formally initiate political negotiations as soon 
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as possible to end the hostile status by signing peace agreement.
84
 On the basis of 
signing peace agreement, two authorities should also reach an agreement on military 
confidence building by switching the military confrontation across the Strait to 
defending the common economic and strategic interests threatened by foreign 
states.
85
 Third, after mainland and Taiwan reached relative positive interaction in 
terms of military and political trust, political parties across the Strait should be 
allowed to develop on the other side. By acknowledging “One China Principle” and 
CCP’s leadership in mainland, Taiwan’s political parties can participate in the 
political consultation, supervision and even the decision making in Mainland
86
. 
Fourth, considering the American intervention as the major obstacle in political 
reunification of China, there is also a proposal that Beijing and Washington should 
sign a diplomatic treaty. The core of this treaty is that the US should openly express 
its support of mainland China to accomplish the peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 
As exchange, mainland China promises to make more contributions to the 
international society and welcome the US to continue playing a constructive role in 
the Asia Pacific and the globe.
87
 Fifth, inspired by the establishment of the Pingtan 
Comprehensive Experimentation Zone in Fujian province
88
 and the “One Country, 
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 Pingtan comprehensive experimentation zone is located at the closest region on the Chinese 
Mainland to Taiwan Island. As an experimental zone, it enjoys more privileged and preferential 
policies than any Special Economic Zones. The Chinese government proposes to build this 
experimentation zone into a pilot zone for Cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, a demo zone for 
institutional innovations, a zone most liveable for compatriots on both sides of the Strait and a 
pioneering zone for scientifically developing the western side of the Taiwan Strait.   See :Foreign 
Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial People's Government. (2012). Profile of pingtan 
comprehensive experimental zone. Retrieved April 10, 2015, 
fromhttp://www.fjfao.gov.cn/english/fcwp/201204/t20120420_625144.htm 
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Two Areas” proposed by then KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung, Shen Yang suggested 
that by consistent positive interactions across the Strait and to bravely propose the 
new political deals, the ultimate reunification could be realized.
89
 Sixth, by 
perceiving the success of KMT’s cooperation with the CCP since 2008, and the 
challenge from the oppositional DPP, CCP and KMT may as well to implement its 
third historic cooperation to settle the reunification of China.
90
 The most liberal 
attitude expressed under moderate left stance is a proposal of a looser version of 
“One Country, Two Systems” by expanding the flexibility of “One Country, Two 
Systems” applied in Hong Kong and Macau while borrowing the administrative 
philosophy of federation. Under this system, instead of the model applied in the 
current two Special Administrative Regions, viz the source of power for the local 
level coming from the central’s authorization, the source of power in Taiwan and that 
in central will be based on “separation of power”. In this light, the relationship 
between the whole part of China (PRC) and its compositions (e.g: Taiwan) is not a 
hierarchy between central and local under the political structure of unitary system. It 
is a special central-to-central relationship based on the extent of competence. The 
extent of competence of the whole part of China and its compositions is defined by 
constitution. They enjoy the supreme power within their own boundaries and 
intervention to each other is forbidden. The proposer believes that this plan is a 
compromise between the “One Country, Two Systems” insisted by the mainland 
authority and the equal status, which is requested by Taiwan.
91
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2.3. Moderate Right 
2.3.1. Establishment Intellectuals 
Along the spectrum of rightist, those establishment intellectuals present their 
pro-reunification stance from legal principles and giving proposals. Quite different 
from most of other intellectuals with official affiliations, establishment intellectuals 
under this political orientation are more liberal, pragmatic and creative. They propose 
the opinions that go beyond the policies of the mainland government.          
In terms of legal principles, scholars try to justify the reunification by facing the de 
facto existence of the Republic of China and its attached legal foundation. Such 
justification is somewhat different from the government discourse that refuses to 
acknowledge the Republic of China and regards it ending by the year 1949. 
According to Liu Guoshen
92
, the post 1949 Cross Strait relations has performed as 
two rival regimes competing for the legitimacy of an “orthodox China.” If the 
international community is a galaxy composed of different “state sphere”, then China 
is a sphere that constructed by two sides: the PRC and the ROC, who represents 
China in different occasions. Even if Beijing is unwilling to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the ROC, the ROC still plays the political function of representing 
China in some international occasions. The author further proposes that as long as 
the contemporary constitutions of the PRC and that of the ROC are legally effective, 
neither the proposal of “Two Chinas” or “One China, One Taiwan” is legal in both 
mainland China and Taiwan. In current situation, instead of wasting huge resources 
in arguing about sovereignty and legitimacy, it is more practical to seek consensus on 
joint governance of certain affairs that can be cooperated by the two sides. Similarly, 
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as Zhu Jingtao
93
,Yang Lixin
94
 and Huang min
95
 argued, even though there has been 
a long-term confrontation across the Strait, the truth that “Taiwan is a part of China” 
never changes. The contemporary split of the administration power across the Strait 
does not indicate the split of the state sovereignty. The PRC constitution clearly 
articulates PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The ROC constitution also clearly states 
that “The territory of the Republic of China within its existing national boundaries” 
which includes mainland China and Outer Mongolia basing on its pre-1949 
territories “shall not be altered except by a resolution of the National Assembly.”96 
In terms of other legally binding documents across the Strait, both the mainland 
China’s Anti-Session Law and Taiwan’s Act Governing Relations between the 
People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area offer the legal bases for 
preventing state separation under the “One China Principle”. In this light, Taiwan’s 
political reunification with Mainland is justified by legal documents in both mainland 
China and Taiwan. Moreover, to prepare for the future negotiations, scholars like 
Chen Kongli
97
suggest that to break the current political deadlock, intellectuals across 
the Strait should be more pragmatic. While the intellectuals in Taiwan should not 
violate the “One China Principle”, mainland intellectuals should also face the de 
facto existence of the ROC. 
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As for proposals, Du Guang’s article98 suggests that harmony with uniformity is 
the best option for the Cross Strait Relations. While insisting the principle of political 
reunification, the cross Strait negotiation should be based on equality with interaction 
between ARATS and SEF. In addition, mainland people should acknowledge a fact 
that the sharp decline of pro-unification forces in Taiwan is largely the result of 
conflicts between authoritarian governance and democracy. It is unlikely to realize 
the political reunification merely by giving Taiwan economic benefit. Thus to 
promote the political reform, it is necessary for the mainland authority to win the 
heart of Taiwan people. The experience of Chiang Ching-kuo is worth imitation in 
mainland. Even reforms such as lifting the bans on political parties and giving way 
for free newspaper publication, and more civil right can be considered.   
2.3.2. Public Intellectuals 
Moderate right stance is the most popular political orientation embraced by public 
intellectuals. In this political orientation, scholars show more tolerance and 
understanding on the political reality across the Strait in general.   
In terms of the legal principles, similar to the views from some pro-liberal 
establishment intellectuals, public intellectuals also try to justify their 
pro-reunification argument from the approach of facing the de facto existence of the 
Republic of China and its attached legal foundation. A typical way to prove “Taiwan 
is a part of China” is still to make reference to the ROC constitution, which legally 
supports the One China Principe and denies the legitimacy of Taiwan 
independence.
99
 In this light, Deng Qingbo uses the term “One China, Two 
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Administrations” to identify the contemporary Cross Strait relations100 and Guan 
Weili
101
 further proposes the view that mainlanders may as well to acknowledge that 
there are two Chinas co-existed at present while also to make a clarification that such 
situation is not a normality. The provisional acknowledgement of Two Chinas is to 
facilitate an eventual reunification in the future.          
Another typical approach to justify the public intellectuals’ beliefs in 
reunification is to find supporting evidence from the international law. According to 
Wang Heting
102
 and Dai Xulin
103
, from the aspect of international legal theory, state 
and government are strictly distinguished. The state has four elements, namely the 
population, territory, government and sovereignty. Government is a relative narrow 
concept and it is an element of the state. It is rightly said the state is an organic 
concept in which the government is a part of it. In this sense, the current dispute of 
unification and independence is largely a myth of misunderstanding or a deliberate 
distortion of the concepts between state and government. The truth is that the regime 
change by means of the civil war in 1949 was merely a succession of the government 
in mainland China while the sovereignty of the state of China was not affected. Since 
1949, the authorities in Beijing and Taipei have been two governments who 
effectively impose their administrations within their de facto controlled territories 
and compete for the international diplomatic recognition. Thus, the perception that to 
equate China with the PRC, or to equate Taiwan with the ROC is legally incorrect. 
Actually, the reality today is that the government of the PRC and the ROC, both 
                                                          
100
 Article 3 from appendix C 
 
101
 Article 4 from appendix C 
 
102
 Article 1 from appendix C 
 
103
 Article 2 from appendix C 
127 
 
 
acting as the governments of the Chinese state, rule the different parts of China 
before reunification. Beijing merely enjoys the advantages in terms of legitimacy of 
representing the Chinese state over the government of the ROC. To some extent, 
while some parts of claimed Chinese territory is still under disputes (e.g: Diaoyu 
island, South China Sea), the combined territory controlled by the government of the 
PRC and the ROC is not the whole sovereignty of China.  
  As for the views of Taiwan independence, some public intellectuals’ attitude is 
quite distinctive. Though also embrace a reunification stance, they are more lenient 
in facing the so called pro-independence political phenomena in Taiwan perceived by 
the leftists and show greater tolerance of Taiwanese people’s pro-independence 
sentiment based on their good understanding of the history and political development 
in Taiwan of the past several decades. According to those public intellectuals, 
mainlanders should not simply label the local Taiwanese consciousness as 
independence of Taiwan. Two intellectuals argue this from the well-known case of 
Zhang Xuan, a popular Taiwanese singer. On November, 2013, Zhang performed at 
a concert at the University of Manchester that was attended by mostly Chinese and 
Taiwanese audience. During the concert, Zhang showed the ROC’s “Blue Sky, 
White Sun, a Wholly Red Earth” flag and said that “I have not felt so patriotic for a 
while….and I am from Taiwan”. After that, Zhang was immediately cut off by the 
shouting “no politics today”, which was apparently from a mainland student. 
Although the concert continued without further disturbance, the subsequent 
denouncement across the mainland social media was severe. The majority 
condemned her as pro-independence activists because of her display of the ROC flag. 
Many mainlanders suggested that she should be banned from entering mainland 
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China entirely or even retire from the entertainment industry.
104
 To evaluate this 
issue, Zhang Peng suggests that mainlanders should not be emotional or over 
politicized towards Taiwan compatriots. In fact, displaying the ROC flag can be 
merely interpreted as a specific local identity or even nostalgia. After all, the ROC 
flag is commonly displayed in different China Towns in foreign states, it is obviously 
inappropriate to express hostility or to equalize it as Taiwan independence. To 
promote the reconciliation and cooperation across the Strait, it is necessary for 
mainlanders to think differently and learn to be more respectful.
105
 Similarly, Zheng 
Dongyang also believes that it is ridiculous to regard “Blue Sky, White Sun, a 
Wholly Red Earth” flag as a symbol of Taiwan independence. Moreover, he suggests 
that the case of Zhuang Xuan implicates there still exists a psychological wall 
standing between the mainlanders and Taiwanese. However, with the growing 
diversity in the Chinese society, the wall can be pulled down. Political expressions 
with different orientations will also be treated with more tolerance.
106
 Another 
typical moderate right argument for the views of Taiwan independence is that 
mainlanders should not simply regard Cross Strait proposals raised by Taiwan as 
disguised independence of Taiwan. On May, 2014, a bipartisan group composed by 
both pan blue and pan green politicians suggested a “Greater One China 
Proposal”(大一中架構 ) based on five principles to replace the “One China 
Principle”. The most attractive part is the creation of “limited international legal 
entity” to handle Cross Strait affairs and under which both mainland China (PRC) 
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and Taiwan (ROC) will enjoy equal rights to participate in international institutions 
and to establish normal relations with other states. In addition, this proposal 
advocates that both sides across the Strait should commit to respect the status quo 
and to end hostilities against each other.
107
 Although the mainland authority rejected 
this proposal, public intellectuals still argue that it is not appropriate to regard 
“Greater One China Proposal” as a pro-independence proposition. Yang Haifeng 
further suggests that by making some amendment of this proposal, mainly to 
establish a Great One China parliament to coordinate the Cross Strait affairs
108
, the 
“Greater One China Proposal” is a valuable creation for mutual reconciliation and a 
stepping stone for future unification when the contemporary political negotiation of 
the two sides is in a deadlock. The moderate right public intellectuals argue that 
while mainlanders continuously require Taiwan to pragmatically respond to the 
political proposals from Beijing, they should also respect the de facto existence of 
the ROC as an independent political entity and proposals raised from Taiwan. Last 
but not least, when predicting the prospect of Cross Strait relations, a moderate right 
scholar also points out that the ideal ultimate outcome of the Cross Strait relation 
should be Taiwan’s political unification with mainland. However, it is entirely 
possible the scenario develops to the opposite way. After all, judging from the 
Chinese history, many border areas with relative weak political power finally split 
from the central regimes. For border areas, there is no regular pattern of the 
unification or independence.
109
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On the moderate right side, 19 articles explore the possible road to the political 
reunification by offering proposals. Broadly speaking, under this political orientation, 
public intellectuals are more critical of Beijing’s contemporary Taiwan policy and 
even its own political systems. Meanwhile, they are less confined by the “political 
correctness” but are more open and pragmatic to the different political forces in 
Taiwan. Moreover, the majority of them openly oppose to the military resolution. 
After classification and summary, there are the following major views. First, Beijing 
should eliminate the stereotype of perceiving DPP as a negative force and an obstacle 
to the reunification. Instead, the peaceful development and reconciliation between 
Mainland and Taiwan require not only the cooperation between CCP and KMT, but 
also the participation of DPP.
110
 
Second, by appreciating universal values and the success of democratization in 
Taiwan, many public intellectuals propose that the key to the ultimate reunification is 
the political reform in mainland. The decision maker in Beijing should bravely 
initiate the political democratization to narrow both the political and psychological 
gap between the two sides.
111
 
Third, mainland authority should enhance its soft power to attract people in 
Taiwan by developing China into a state that can provide its people with justice, 
peace and dignity. It should also tries to surpass Taiwan in fields such as rule of law, 
clean government, education and environmental protection.
112
 However, for those 
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who know the social and political situation in China, the aforementioned soft power 
cannot be easily realized without the political reform.  
Fourth, similar to the consideration of soft power, another popular proposal is 
that the political reunification may as well start from the cultural and value 
perspective among the general public. A major psychological gap across the Strait is 
that people across the Strait are biased in understanding the social systems on the 
other side. Consequently, there should be more channels provided for free 
communication in order to eliminate the political misperception and 
misunderstanding of each other.
113
 
Fifth, the form of prospective political negotiations and the political structure 
across the Strait after reunification must be based on the principle of equality. The 
contemporary Cross Strait relations reveal that neither the political parties nor the 
general public in Taiwan can accept Taiwan to be merely an autonomous region 
under the central government in Beijing. Thus mainland authority must recognize 
that “an equal and reasonable coalition” is the only proper arrangement for the 
reunification.
114
 Under the acknowledgement of equality, there are also proposals 
such as by acknowledging the bottom line of One China, both the PRC and the ROC 
can keep its own constitution and regard each side as a Special Political Zone.
115
 At 
the same time, mainland China and Taiwan may as well sign a contract that Beijing 
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can make intervention when there is a grave turn of events leading to the turmoil in 
Taiwan and vice versa.
116
  
Last but not least, the point is also based on the principle of equality. Many 
public intellectuals express the preference of building a new Chinese state. The 
common characteristics of these proposals are: this new Chinese state is neither the 
PRC nor the ROC. No political entity will be placed at a subordinate position during 
and after the reunification process and this unified Chinese state will be operated 
under a democratic system. In terms of the specific measures and arrangements, 
these intellectuals suggest that the establishment of the state can be realized from 
transitional separated administration to a common constitution.
117
 After the success 
of the establishment of the state, the official name may as well be called the Third 
Republic of China
118
and the name of its sovereignty may as well be called Zhonghua 
sovereignty (中華主權)119, which covers mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macau.      
2.4. Radical Right  
2.4.1. Establishment Intellectuals 
  There is no establishment intellectual expresses reunification standpoint on the 
radical right stance. 
2.4.2. Public Intellectuals 
  There is one radical right proposal from a public intellectual. Literally, its author 
states a pro-reunification attitude. However, the mode to achieve reunification, as the 
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author suggests, is called the “European Model with the Chinese Characteristics”. 
Under this model, mainland China and Taiwan initiate social and economic 
integrations similar to that of the European Union. The PRC may as well to change 
its state name back to ROC and amend other national symbols such as national day, 
flag and anthem. After the success of integration, mainland China and Taiwan 
acknowledge each other’s independent administrative power within its boundary. In 
foreign affairs, the embassies in foreign states are jointly established by two sides 
under the name of the ROC and the affairs refer to Taiwan itself will be dealt by 
Taiwan side independently. Obviously, the EU model is a confederation by 
acknowledging its member’s independent sovereignty and an EU resembled 
integration is not a unification. More importantly, this model fundamentally 
overthrows the foundation of the PRC and leads to the independence of Taiwan in 
reality. In this sense, I regard this proposal as consent of de facto Taiwan 
independence. 
3. Conclusion 
3.1. Establishment Intellectuals 
  Based on discussion in section two, views of political reunification with Taiwan 
from the establishment intellectuals can be summarized in the following table: 
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*Table 9. Highlights of the Views from the Establishment Intellectuals 
(Self-complied) 
 Radical Left Moderate Left Moderate 
Right 
Radical 
Right 
Legal 
Principles 
/ “One China 
Principe” under 
the PRC 
Face the de 
facto existence 
of the ROC;  
Acknowledge 
the legitimacy 
of the ROC   
/ 
Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
Suppress both 
KMT and DPP 
Condemn the 
pro-independence 
activists; Suggest 
DPP to amend its 
mainland policy 
 
/ / 
Proposals / Peaceful 
development: 
Economic 
integration; 
Cooperation 
beyond economy; 
Enhance soft 
power; More 
communication 
with international 
community; 
Enhance 
Mainland’s state 
power  
Political 
Reform of 
Mainland by 
learning from 
Taiwan 
/ 
 
In terms of political orientation, the contemporary state nationalism of 
establishment intellectuals on reunification mainly shows a moderate left stance, 
supplemented with radical left standpoints. See following scale: 
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*Figure 5. Political Orientations of the State Nationalism (Establishment 
Intellectuals) 
 
Based on content in section two, views of political reunification with Taiwan from 
the establishment intellectuals also have the following characteristics: 
First, many standpoints from establishment intellectuals overlap with that from the 
leadership under the notion of state nationalism. Statistically, 73% of the selected 
articles are in accordance with the political orientation from leadership.   
Second, plenty of the standpoints in the selected articles, though written by 
scholars, are merely gross generalization of the policies from the government. 
Especially in terms of articles about Taiwan independence and proposals, they are 
more like the mouthpiece of the government, playing the function of propaganda 
without criticism and new ideas. To some extent, this phenomenon reveals that the 
official academic institutions play a subordinate role under the government rather 
than acting as an independent research agency in mainland China.           
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Third, many views from the establishment intellectuals, though are in accordance 
with the leadership, play the function of providing theoretic justification and giving 
further interpretations. Under the typology of legal principles, those articles justify 
the government policies with great details.  
Fourth, many establishment intellectuals’ thinking is highly influenced by the 
official theoretical system, which is clearly shown in their use of term and way of 
expression. One characteristic of their articles is to highly glorify the greatness of 
reunification in a nationalistic and revolutionary sentiment. Meanwhile, they clearly 
apply the dichotomy between “friend and enemy”. For instance, forces of Taiwan 
independence and people in Taiwan are separately referred to. The former is bad and 
should be eliminated while the latter is good and can be relied on. Similarly, the DPP 
and KMT are also separately treated. The DPP is enemy of the people and should be 
contained while KMT is a friend and can be cooperated with. 
Fifth, based on the fourth point, many establishment intellectuals’ evaluation of 
the political situation in Taiwan and judgment of the prospect of the Cross Strait 
relations are ideal, subjective and filled with wishful thinking. They are mainly 
showed in views that the consciousness of Taiwan independence is merely 
manipulated by very few politicians and Taiwan people are bewitched by them. In 
addition, with the increasing exchanges across the Strait, the Taiwan independence 
orientation is bound to be unpopular and those who embrace the Taiwan 
independence will be “abandoned by the historical trend”. There is no evidence how 
such views are shaped. If they are merely promotion of the government’s propaganda, 
it is still reluctantly understandable. If they are the real judgment and evaluation of 
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the situations of Taiwan, then it is very problematic in assisting the CCP’s future 
Taiwan policy making.          
Last but not least, some establishment intellectuals give out the opinions beyond 
the content of leadership. One shows a more hawkish stance that mainland authority 
should not place hope to any political force in Taiwan. The other bravely suggests 
that peaceful reunification with Taiwan could not be achieved without mainland’s 
own political reform. Though those proposals are unlikely to be adopted as 
government policy at this stage, they may have some influence on Beijing’s Taiwan 
policy making in the future.   
3.2. Public Intellectuals 
Based on content in section two, views of political reunification with Taiwan from 
the public intellectuals can be summarized in the following table: 
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*Table 10. Highlights of the Contributions from Public Intellectuals (Self-complied) 
 Radical Left Moderate Left Moderate 
Right 
Radical 
Right 
Legal 
Principles 
/ / Support One 
China by the 
International 
Law; Face the 
de facto 
existence of 
the ROC; 
Acknowledge 
the legitimacy 
of the ROC  
/ 
Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
Condemn both 
KMT and DPP as 
pro-independence 
forces; 
 “Economy 
First” or “One 
China, Different 
Interpretations” 
is acquiescence 
to Taiwan 
independence 
DPP is 
pro-independence 
force and it 
should amend its 
mainland policy 
Should not 
equalize 
Taiwan local 
sentiment with 
the 
independence 
of Taiwan;  
Respect the de 
facto existence 
of the ROC 
and their 
proposals 
/ 
Proposals Establish 
Unification 
Department and 
impose further 
deterrence 
“One Country, 
Two Systems”; 
Looser version of 
“One Country, 
Two Systems”;  
Transitional 
proposals to 
promote the 
reunification 
Cooperation 
with DPP; 
Initiate 
political 
reform in 
mainland; 
Enhance soft 
power; Call 
for the 
principle of 
political 
equality 
An 
integration 
based on 
EU model 
 
In terms of political orientation, the contemporary popular nationalism of public 
intellectuals on reunification mainly shows a moderate right stance, supplemented 
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with some moderate left standpoints in addition to limited radical left and right 
stance. See following scale: 
*Figure 6. Political Orientations of the Popular Nationalism (Public Intellectuals) 
 
Based on content in section two, views of political reunification with Taiwan 
from the public intellectuals also have the following characteristics: 
Firs, all public intellectuals advocate for political reunification with Taiwan and 
they show a moderate stance over this issue in general. However, the pro-liberal 
views are more in numbers.  
 Even if being moderate in general, there still exist a few public intellectuals 
embrace the radical left orientation. Though serving “outside the bureaucratic system” 
as independent ones, their way of thinking and rhetoric system are highly identical 
with that of the establishment intellectuals or the government. More specifically, by 
observing the views of advocating to learn from emperor Kangxi and to adopt more 
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hawkish stance to bully the Island into submission, their ideas seem to be deeply 
affected by philosophy of court struggle and chauvinism.   
Third, on the moderate left side, public intellectual’s core idea basically overlap 
with that of the government and most establishment intellectuals, viz to realize the 
political reunification with Taiwan directed by PRC. However, in terms of the 
detailed approach to reach the purpose, they are more flexible and pragmatic. This is 
especially demonstrated in their proposals of making some transitional changes to 
promote the Cross Strait reconciliations.    
Fourth, on the pro-liberal side, the contribution from public intellectuals on the 
one hand, also shows pragmatism, which is mainly illustrated through their honesty 
to the unpleasant reality that the ROC de facto exists as an independent political 
entity and the ROC imposes effective administration in Taiwan. Meanwhile, people 
in Taiwan generally lack the sense of identity to the PRC and are reluctant to reunify 
with mainland China. On the other hand, they undisguisedly express their 
appreciation of the universal values and the success of democracy in Taiwan. Based 
on that, proposals from those public intellectuals require mainland authority to make 
political compromise in different extents. It should be noted that considerable 
opinions, though literally say they are in favor of political reunification, in the 
perspective of the mainland government, they acknowledge the de facto Two Chinas 
or the independence of Taiwan. Some opinions, such as EU model, even in the eyes 
of neutral observers, can hardly be convinced as a national reunification in a real 
sense.  
3.3. Similarities and differences between establishment intellectuals and public 
intellectuals 
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Through the analysis of this chapter, we can observe that though different in 
attributions, establishment and public intellectuals have the following similarities.  
First, both establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals regard Taiwan as a 
part of China and they are in favor of a political reunification with Taiwan.
120
 
Second, both establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals express their 
reunification views in a rigorous way with good supporting evidence. Even if some 
intellectual’s views are defined as radical, they can justify themselves in a persuasive 
way. 
Third, both establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals are influenced by 
official theoretical system, which is shown in their use of term and way of 
expression. 
Fourth, both establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals refer to use the 
military methods when necessary. But in general, military resolution is a 
marginalized proposal with limited advocators.  
There is one fundamental difference between theestabishment intellectuals and 
public intellectuals: the moderate left stance is generally embraced by establishment 
intellectuals while the moderate right stance is the most popular orientation among 
the public intellectuals. In this sense, public intellectuals are more liberal on the 
reunification issue.  
In this light, first, public intellectuals are more susceptible to the de facto existence 
of the ROC and the uncomfortable political reality across the Strait for reunification 
than that of the establishment intellectuals.  
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Second, public intellectuals are more tolerant in facing the “independence force in 
Taiwan” and their attached behaviors than that of the establishment intellectuals.  
Third, public intellectuals are more enthusiastic in changing the social political 
situations in mainland China than that of the establishment intellectuals.    
   All in all, the evaluation of the establishment intellectuals and public intellectuals 
present the mainland people’s attitude towards reunification with Taiwan in 
contemporary China more comprehensively. Composed as a part of state nationalism 
and popular nationalism respectively, they also enrich the content of the two types of 
nationalism in reunification issue. Moreover, the differences in standpoints of the 
two types of intellectuals refute that “establishment intellectuals are merely the 
mouthpiece of the government while public intellectuals are generally more liberal 
on the reunification issue” in contemporary China. 
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Chapter 6 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary based on previous chapters. In this chapter, the 
main question, sub questions and their attached hypotheses will be answered. The 
main question is: What is mainland China’s contemporary (2008-now) standpoint of 
political reunification with Taiwan? The sub questions are, first, in China, what is the 
relationship between state nationalism and popular nationalism on the reunification 
issue? Second, what is the relationship between the contributions of public 
intellectuals and the views of the general public under the notion of popular 
nationalism? Third, what informs the mainlander’s contemporary standpoints of 
political reunification with Taiwan? Fourth, what is the policy implication of the 
study? 
1. Answer to the Main Question 
The study finds out the standpoints that “Taiwan as a part of China” and “a 
political reunification with Taiwan should be realized sometime in the future” are the 
mainstream. However, investigation also disclaims that all mainland people support a 
reunification with Taiwan.  
In details, as for the state nationalism composed by leadership and works from 
establishment intellectuals, the settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the 
complete reunification of China represents the fundamental interests of the Chinese 
nation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). “To apply One Country, Two 
Systems through peaceful reunification while continues to assert the right to use 
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military force” still serves as Beijing’s basic Taiwan policy in the contemporary era. 
However, some new content is also added. Considering the political reality across the 
Strait, as long as the “One China Principle” is acknowledged by Taiwan, the 
mainland authority is willing to make pragmatic explorations such as granting more 
autonomy to Taiwan and even initiating political reforms in Mainland in the special 
political circumstances where the country has not yet been reunified.   
Relatively, popular nationalism is ambiguous on the reunification. On one hand, 
“to accomplish a national reunification” is largely accepted. However, even by 
reaching a consensus that Taiwan should be reunified, in detailed approach to 
accomplish this goal, there is a clear division between the conservative and the 
liberal. The former believes that PRC should be dominant in the reunification process 
and Taiwan will be a local administrative unit after the reunification. To realize the 
national unification, mainland government is justified to use military force. It can 
also apply the peaceful unification through “One Country, Two Systems” model 
mainly based on economic integration. Relatively, the liberals think that political 
reunification cannot be realized without the political compromise from mainland 
authority. To accommodate the prospect reunification, Beijing should either make 
political reforms of itself or to authorize Taiwan more autonomy and political powers 
than the contemporary proposals such as the “One Country, Two Systems”. On the 
other hand, some opinions from popular nationalism, though literally demonstrate a 
pro-unification stance, acknowledge the de facto Two Chinas or the independence of 
Taiwan, which can hardly be convinced as a national reunification in a real sense. 
Some standpoints even clearly make objections to reunify with Taiwan.  
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2. Answer to the Sub-Questions 
2.1.  State nationalism and popular nationalism on reunification  
In terms of political reunification with Taiwan in the contemporary era, state 
nationalism and popular nationalism share one common ground but have two major 
differences.  
For common ground, both consider this issue from the aspects of the interests of 
the Chinese nation. They believe Taiwan’s reunification with motherland should in 
line with the interests of the Chinese nation. For the government, the reunification 
advocators among the intellectuals and the general public, political reunification with 
Taiwan certainly represent the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. For the 
general public who show objections to the reunification, their major concern is 
whether the prospect reunification brings the wellbeings and benefits to the masses, 
not the great historic meaning of reunification itself. 
As for difference, first, popular nationalism shows a polarization in terms of its 
political orientations on reunification. While state nationalism mainly lays on the 
moderate left stance of the political orientation, popular nationalism is more 
prominent on the radical left and moderate right side. The overlap between the state 
nationalism and popular nationalism is limited. State nationalism regards military 
resolution as the bottom line to prevent the independence of Taiwan but still 
considers “One Country, Two systems” through peaceful reunification as an ideal 
and most acceptable plan. Moreover, there are limited proposals of making 
exploration of mainland’s political reforms. In this sense, state nationalism is 
relatively conservative. As for popular nationalism, the aggregation of advocators for 
military resolution (of which, the majority are asking a war without the attempt on 
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peaceful negotiations) and economic war, and the proposers of political compromise 
outnumber the conservative. In addition, there are some reunification opponents.          
The other difference is that popular nationalism is more susceptible to the rapid 
change of the Cross Strait relations since 2008 while state nationalism is relatively 
stable during such period. For popular nationalism, the perception of the great 
disproportion between mainland’s investment and limited political output pushes 
considerate people to embrace radical stances in opposite directions. They are either 
firmly convicted that military resolution is the only way to settle the Taiwan issue or 
abandon the traditional belief that Taiwan should be reunified with its motherland. 
Meanwhile, the unprecedented openness across the Strait enables mainlanders better 
observe the political and social differences between the two sides and makes quite 
many of them adopt the faith that only political reform of mainland can make the 
reunification possible. In contrast, state nationalism is consistent. Despite the good 
mutual interactions, there has been no Taiwan related legal document released since 
2008. Even if the supreme political leaders gave programmatic speeches to keep pace 
with the time, their proposals did not exceed the extent of the established Taiwan 
policy directed by those legal documents. The proposals of improving the 
contemporary political systems in mainland from establishment intellectuals are also 
very limited.      
Additionally, the study of two types of nationalism also overthrows the hypothesis 
that “establishment intellectuals are merely the mouthpiece of the government while 
public intellectuals are generally more liberal on the reunification issue.” The fact is 
that under the notion of state nationalism, there also exist scholars to suggest 
pro-liberal proposals beyond the government agenda. Likewise, under the notion of 
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popular nationalism, there are also some intellectuals play the function of 
mouthpiece of the government.       
Based on the previously discussed aspects, it can be concluded that even if under 
the authoritarian governance in mainland, popular nationalism is beyond the total 
control of state authorities and it can be developed in its own way independently. To 
a great extent, it also reveals that mainlanders no longer require the party and the 
state to provide paradigm for the national reunification but rather regard such 
paradigm as a falsification of the truth. 
2.2. The relationship between the views of the general public and the 
contributions of public intellectuals  
  In terms of popular nationalism of political reunification with Taiwan, views from 
the general public and public intellectual’s contribution are different in the following 
aspects: 
First, not all general public are in favor of reunification while radical stances are 
popular among them. By comparison, all public intellectuals at least literally 
advocate for political reunification with Taiwan and they show a moderate stance in 
general over this issue.  
Second, the general public is more emotional while the public intellectuals are 
more rational on the reunification issue. Based on this, majority of people within the 
general public fail to objectively evaluate the political reality in Taiwan and Cross 
Strait relations but only to give out wishful and unrealistic suggestions. This is 
especially illustrated in proposals of initiating wars involved with Japan and the US, 
or regarding the pro-independence consciousness in Taiwan as merely the trouble 
made by a few pro-independence activists, or suggesting Beijing to abandon Taiwan. 
In contrast, most of the public intellectuals, even among their diversified political 
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orientations, are able to make their argument justified and propose flexible and 
pragmatic approach to deal with the reunification issues. This is              
especially demonstrated in their proposals of making some transitional changes to 
promote the Cross Strait reconciliation.    
Third, in response to the democratic systems in Taiwan, public intellectuals show 
an appreciative attitude and it is an important driving force for them to give out 
proposals of political reforms. On the contrary, the general public seldom express 
such sentiment and they rather regard such democracy in negative as populism and 
anarchy. To a great extent, it is because of such misconception of the democracy in 
Taiwan that pushes plenty of people to adopt more radical stances on the 
reunification issues. This is particularly demonstrated in the negative expressions by 
perceiving the Sunflower Movement.  
2.3. What informs mainlander’s contemporary reunification views  
  According to the findings in the previous chapters and aforementioned summary, 
it is believed that the following four factors contribute to the making of mainlander’s 
contemporary views of political reunification with Taiwan. 
  First, a major factor is obviously the Chinese national identity. By sharing the 
same language, culture heritage and a part of common history, it is not surprising that 
mainlanders will regard Taiwanese as a part of their collective subject who enjoy a 
shared identity and destiny. And hence it is natural that majority of mainlanders 
believe that Taiwanese people are compatriots and a national reunification should be 
realized. 
  Second, another factor is obviously the unprecedented economic integration and 
personnel exchange across the Strait since 2008. As mainlanders can better perceive 
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Taiwan through mutual openness, their reunification views inevitably have changed 
and deviate from the stereotypes imposed by the government propaganda. For 
instance, the realization of the political difference across the Strait encouraged 
mainlander’s ideal of initiating political reforms in mainland. By perceiving the great 
disproportion between Mainland’s huge economic compromise and limited political 
progress, many mainlanders abandon beliefs in reunification scheme or to 
re-embracement of military resolution.  
  Third, though the post 2008 mutual exchange refreshed mainlander’s reunification 
views to some degree, the impact of government propaganda is still profound. This is 
easy to understand as the propaganda of reaching a glorious national reunification 
has been comprehensively applied in mainlander’s daily lives in textbooks, 
newspapers, radio and television broadcasts since the establishment of the PRC while 
in most of this period, mainland and Taiwan was in a state of confrontation without 
direct communication. In other words, even if the door of more free communication 
opened after 2008, the long lasting indoctrination in the past six decades cannot be 
easily erased. For instance, most of the military advocators, especially among those 
who argue the reunification war can be fought in the format of nuclear annihilation 
and by involving the US and Japan without fear, their way of thinking and rhetoric 
system are highly influenced by the official propaganda in the pre-reform and 
opening up period. In Mao’s era, revolutionary sentiment and the philosophy of 
struggle were highly admired. Meanwhile, western powers and even the nuclear war 
were depreciated as “paper tigers”. Mao Zedong used to say that “even if the nuclear 
war eliminated half of the whole population on Earth, there will still be half left…..if 
imperialism wants war, we will make a determination to fight before developing our 
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state”1 During the investigation of the reunification views from the general public, 
many radical leftists use the similar tone when they show the preference to war. 
Another popular pro-reunification view is based on strong nationalistic sentiment. 
Though such sentiment has some overlaps with the first point, Chinese national 
identity, it is also largely exaggerated by the propaganda. When observing the 
considerable opinions of calling Taiwanese people as “compatriot” and expect them 
to “go home” while seriously condemning the pro-independence consciousness, and 
to compare them with the universal anti-China sentiment and flourished local identity 
in Taiwan, so called “compatriotship” is rather to be unilateral and an imagined 
product from mainland’s propaganda.  
Last but not least, mainland’s contemporary reunification views cannot be formed 
without the impact of the social and economic development of mainland China itself. 
In the past decade, especially after Beijing’s success host of Olympic Games, the 
change of China was multidimensional. Internationally, China replaced Japan in 
2010 as the world’s second largest economy and it is widely predicted that China’s 
economy owns great potential for catching up the US sometime in the future. As its 
wealth increased, China has become more influential in international issues by 
directing the regional policy making and the global economic structure. Furthermore, 
China has also become more assertive regarding disputed territories through military 
expansion. In contrast, domestically, China has been experiencing a series of 
troublesome problems: while its economy advanced triumphantly, political reforms 
remain stagnant. The social inequality is also worsening between the poor and the 
                                                          
1
 S Shen, Z. (2007). Mao Zedong, He Lu Xiao Fu he 1957 nian mo si ke hui yi [Mao Zedong, 
Khrushchev and the 1957 Moscow Conference]. Li shi yan jiu, 6, 82-109. 
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rich, the urban and rural areas. In addition, mass incidents occurred frequently due to 
the lack of judicial justice and rivalries between the government and the general 
public. Since nationalistic sentiment is heavily linked to the social and economic 
conditions (Tang & Darr, 2012 ), then mainlander’s reunification views can be easily 
understood. On the one hand, China’s growing comprehensive power in the world 
obviously boosts the confidence of some mainlanders and makes them embrace the 
power politics. In this light, it is natural for someone to ask for a quick and clear 
military resolution or to take the opinion that Taiwan should accept the offers from 
mainland (e.g: “One Country Two Systems”) for granted. On the other hand, many 
pro-liberal mainlanders oppose the contemporary reunification scheme proposed by 
the government. In their opinion, the prospect of the reunification cannot be solved 
by the political reform of mainland. To a great extent, the making of liberalist’s 
reunification views is largely because of the dissatisfactory of the domestic situation 
in mainland and the expectation for a better future.                   
In conclusion, according to the analysis, the spontaneous sentiment from the 
Chinese nationalism, the unprecedented economic integration and personnel 
exchange across the Strait since 2008, the government propaganda and the social and 
economic development of mainland China comprehensively inform mainlander’s 
contemporary views of political reunification with Taiwan. 
2.4. Policy implication 
   According to the study of two types of nationalism on reunification, it is 
estimated that the prospect Taiwan policy officially declared by Beijing will not 
fundamentally deviate from the stance of “advocating for ‘One Country, Two 
Systems’ through peaceful reunification while continues to assert the right to use 
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military force”. However, in detailed practice, Beijing’s Taiwan policy making will 
be directed by two ways. One is that it focus will shift from “passively establishing 
the bottom line for preventing separation” to “actively create conditions for realizing 
the national reunification”. China’s political, economic and military rise 
accompanied by its outburst of pro-reunification nationalism obviously increases 
Beijing’s capability and confidence in handling Taiwan issue. Xi Jinping’s ambitions 
on the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the China Dream cannot be 
realized without the national reunification, either. On the other way, directed by the 
thoughts of making “pragmatic explorations under the special circumstances where 
the country has not yet been reunified”, relevant policies made in the future will be 
more flexible and pragmatic under the premise of “One China Principle”. While the 
Cross Strait cooperation has been largely manipulated under the framework of 
“CCP-KMT” cooperation and close ties with Taiwan business sectors in the past few 
years, such strategy may merely be a part of Beijing’s united front work in the future. 
Instead, Beijing is likely to strengthen its ties with the other political parties and the 
general public in Taiwan. Additionally, it is also entirely possible that mainland 
authority will adopt some proposals from the moderate rightists that more autonomy 
can be authorized to Taiwan in exchange of reunification. Still, though military 
resolution is largely supported by the mass population, mainland authority is 
believed to be rational on this issue and maintain its traditional stance of regarding 
the military as the very last resort.      
Another essential policy implication is that Beijing is unlikely to adopt policies 
that require itself to make fundamental compromise on its own social-political 
system to cater the reunification. Mainland authority clearly knows that the proposals 
of political reform raised by various sectors actually indicate not only the views on 
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the reunification, but also the undercurrent of pro-liberal resistance within the 
country. If Beijing’s Taiwan policies significantly “turn right” in the future, it may 
trigger the domino effect of pro-liberal campaigns within the country and therefore 
threaten the consolidation of the contemporary party state system.  
All in all, to understand the essence of Beijing’s Taiwan policy or the Chinese 
state nationalism on reunification, we should not have the order reversed: The 
ultimate decision maker comes from the state nationalism, not popular nationalism. 
The realization of the political reunification with Taiwan is to serve the purpose of 
promoting the legitimacy and the authority of the CCP in mainland and the PRC on 
international stage. In this light, some policies, even if they are useful in promoting 
the reunification itself while brings the possibility of political risk in governance in 
mainland China, they are unlikely to be adopted.  
Actually, this study may also provide some policy implications to the stakeholders 
such as Japan and the US. Consistently, the authorities of Japan and the US have 
been very cautious about the rise of China and they are reluctant to see mainland’s 
reunification with Taiwan. In this logic, most of their policies aimed at containing 
China’s rise and the implementation of its Taiwan policies. However, this study 
shows that if those stakeholders still stick to the tough stances, it may lead to the 
negative consequence to all parties. This is because Chinese nationalism on 
reunification issue is no longer the simple stance as assumed, many people and 
intellectuals, including those who serve the official affiliations, are proposing the 
new thoughts on Taiwan issue. A reunified China realized through legal and political 
reform does not necessarily lead to the long term regional instability and harm the 
interests of the major states in the Asia Pacific. On the contrary, if the tough Taiwan 
policies implemented by the Japan or the US touch upon the nerve of China on state 
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sovereignty or national dignity, it is easily to trigger the outburst of hardline Chinese 
nationalism and force many moderates in China to abandon their rational proposals, 
and therefore result in serious conflicts within the region. As result, to settle down 
the Taiwan issue through constructive, rational and heart to heart approach should be 
the best option of all sides.            
3. Limitation of the Study 
Though this thesis is believed to have objectively and comprehensively evaluated 
the mainland China’s contemporary standpoint of political reunification with Taiwan 
through the study of state nationalism and popular nationalism, there are inevitably 
some limitations of this study. 
First, a major limitation is the samples for investigation due to the resource 
constraints. In this thesis, investigating samples include the articles selected from the 
Consensus Website and posts selected from four forums. However, if the 
investigating samples are articles from several social commentary websites or posts 
from more than four online forums, then the researching findings will be more rich 
and comprehensive.    
Second, in terms of the investigation of online forums, though the political 
expressions on reunification issue on online forums enjoy very high degree of 
freedom, they are still not absolutely free. It is entirely possible some expressions 
cannot be posted or deleted after submission. Moreover, political expressions on 
Chinese internet can also intervened by the pro-establishment expressions from 
government hired internet commentators, so called 50 cent party (五毛黨). Even if I 
make the strict standards for posts selections which aim at filtering the expressions 
which are likely to be posted by 50 cent party, the rigorousness cannot be completely 
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guaranteed. Actually, there also exists an insoluble question regarding how to judge 
whether the pro-establishment views are posted by50 cent party or by the netizens 
who truly believe that.  
Third, interrelated with the previous point, according to the investigation, some 
netizens show acquiesce in Taiwan independence or even support its independence, 
which is a surprising finding. However, the driving force behind is merely the 
interest concern. None of them show anti-reunification sentiment because of the 
sympathy of Taiwan in terms of its limited international space or the appreciation of 
the Taiwan democracy, which are supposed to be popular views among Chinese 
dissident. In this sense, it is not clear whether there is indeed no netizen objects 
reunification because of sympathy to Taiwan or appreciating its democracy, or the 
aforementioned standpoint existed but censored by the authority. 
Finally, in terms of the study of intellectuals of both kinds, none releases 
anti-reunification sentiment. This finding can also lead to an uncertainty, whether 
they truly support the reunification or they just dare not to express anti-reunification 
views. After all, under authoritarian systems in contemporary China, even working 
as public intellectuals with some social awareness, the open declaration of opposing 
national reunification may lead to the destruction of their careers. Let alone the 
establishment intellectuals who serve the government.              
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Appendix A.  Information about Expressions from 
Online Forums (For Chapter 4) 
a. Classification of Selected Posts by Political Orientations 
 
I. Radical Left  (81 posts) 
Military Resolution （70 posts）  
1. Utopia (19 posts) 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/guoji/2009/09/38527.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/48619.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/guoji/2009/09/96401.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2010/01/120488.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2010/01/121891.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/guoji/2010/01/122185.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/03/132035.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2010/03/132638.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/03/134216.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shiping/2011/01/200753.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shiping/2012/01/279371.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shiping/2012/01/280716.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shiping/2014/01/312515.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2014/02/314351.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2014/12/334829.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/59097.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shiping/2014/03/316712.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2014/04/317427.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2014/04/317577.html 
2. Tiexue (34 posts) 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_2806527_1.html 
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http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2923662_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_2943575_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3738172_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3159890_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3160793_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3200558_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3579566_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3729680_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3798891_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3999573_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4097432_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8282497_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4153187_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4258001_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4567878_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4653943_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5269546_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5674060_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6727285_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6764029_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_6977510_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6999989_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7896815_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8204712_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8208286_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8324051_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8380850_1.html 
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http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8327044_1.html#replyTit 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8384829_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_8462234_1.html?s=data 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7121717_1.html?7146583 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8443122_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8444331_1.html 
3. Tianya (12 post) 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-27979-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-74296-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-292518-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-362332-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-449047-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-525507-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-571184-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-587439-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-398645-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-442342-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-430933-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-588037-1.shtml 
4. Kaidi(5 posts) 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=10558444 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=9935097 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?id=10556241&boardid=124&page=1&uid=&usern
ames=&userids=&action= 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=10586231 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=9944168 
Economic War (7 posts) 
159 
 
 
1. Utopia (1 post) 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2011/05/225161.html 
2. Tiexue (5 pots) 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2895257_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7789816_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_7120822_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8444056_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3931296_1.html 
3. Tianya (0 post) 
4. Kaidi (1 post) 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=10542587 
Suppress both KMT and DPP (4 posts) 
1. Utopia (2 post) 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/77740.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/12/164761.html 
2. Tiexue (2 posts) 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3941664_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7926081_1.html 
3. Tianya (0 post) 
4. Kaidi  (0 post) 
  
II. Moderate Left (71 posts) 
National righteousness (36 posts) 
1. Utopia  （5） 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/45659.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/46851.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/47340.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2009/09/36104.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2012/12/299130.html 
2. Tiexue (23) 
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http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_2974424_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3047730_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3082194_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3292475_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3311006_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3582877_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4013953_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4142007_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4151179_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4463916_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4666330_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5015027_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6584208_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6740135_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_6861971_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6936386_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7002397_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_7109673_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_7175549_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7175013_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4245242_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4255761_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_5552498_1.html 
3. Tianya (8)  
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-42324-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-97644-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-156877-1.shtml 
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http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-328848-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-404355-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-433386-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-500418-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-435208-1.shtml 
4. Kaidi (0) 
Peaceful Reunification, One Country Two Systems (26 posts) 
1. Utopia (0) 
2. Tiexue (12) 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2845237_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3543409_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3595733_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3970475_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_4438715_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5029080_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_5301019_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_5921120_1.html#replyTit 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_6764599_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_8222985_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_2951692_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4391655_1.html 
3. Tianya (12)  
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-47705-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-86169-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-262356-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-285000-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-487608-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-25739-1.shtml 
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http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-53398-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-236310-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-259513-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-401728-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-540979-1.shtml 
http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-38504-1.shtml 
4. Kaidi (2) 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=89&id=9764815 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=52&id=9083938 
Economic integration (9 posts) 
1. Utopia (3) 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/sichao/2009/09/41383.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/zatan/2010/04/141120.html 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shiping/2012/01/279512.html 
2. Tiexue (2) 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7116700_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_7139264_1.html 
3. Tianya (0) 
4. Kaidi (4) 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=10541420 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=9955257 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=10545343 
http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=9946629 
 
III. Moderate Right (34 posts) 
Political Compromise (23 posts) 
1. Utopia (0) 
2. Tiexue (7) 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3201650_1.html 
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http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3992799_1.html 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4852465_1.html 
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Moderate 
Right 
Legal 
principles 
6 2010-1-2 Zheng Hao Department 
director of Hong 
Kong Commercial 
Daily 
Ma Ying Jeou’s New 
Year’address implicitly 
declares Taiwan 
independence 
Ifeng.com Radical Left Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence  
7 2011-9-30 Chan Fushan Independent 
scholar 
Where is the Sticking 
Point of the Cross Strait 
Relations 
Personal 
Blog 
Radical Left Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
8 2009-8-27 Hong Zhiliang Independent 
scholar 
To Avoid the Growth of 
Taiwan Independence 
in Form of Both Blue 
and Green  
Lian He Zao 
Bao 
Radical Left Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
9 2009-4-9 
 
Xin Qiang Professor of Fudan 
University 
Construct A Joint 
Community: 
Reconstruction of 
Mainland’s Taiwan 
Strategy 
China 
Reviews 
Moderate Left Views of 
Taiwan 
independence 
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10 2012-1-23 Shi Zhe Department 
director of 
Southern Weekly 
Bless Taiwan, Wish the 
Consensus Across the 
Strait Goes Further 
Southern 
Weekly 
Moderate Left Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
11 2012-6-11 Yang Peichang Economic scholar There is No Need for 
DPP to Afraid 1992 
Consensus 
Personal 
Blog 
Moderate Left Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
12 2013-10-25 He Jiexia Reporter of 
Economic Herald 
DPP Faces the Edge of 
Cross Strait Crisis 
Economic 
Herald 
Moderate Left Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
13 2012-1-18 Zhou Nongjian Independent 
scholar 
Ten Possibilities of 
Unification and Session 
Across the Strait  
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
14 2013-11-7 Zhang Peng Independent 
scholar 
Do Not be Emotional 
and Pan-politicalization 
to Compatriot 
Xinhua Net Moderate 
Right 
Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
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15 2014-5-31 Yang Haifeng Independent 
scholar 
Three Regrets of the 
Framework of the 
“Greater One China 
Proposal” 
 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Views of 
Taiwan 
independence 
16 2014-7-14 Yang Haifeng Independent 
scholar 
The “Great One China 
Proposal” Is Not Equal 
to Taiwan 
Independence 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
17 2013-12-6 Zheng 
Dongyang 
Column author of 
Iread 
Push Off and Construct 
the Wall: Rediscussion 
on Zhang Xuan and 
ROC Flag 
Personal 
Blog 
Moderate 
Right 
Views of 
Taiwan 
Independence 
18 2009-9-4 Zhao Yishu Independent 
scholar 
The History and 
Reflectio of Taiwan 
Issue  
Lian He Zao 
Bao 
Radical Left Proposals 
19 2014-6-26 Liu Delin Lecturer at Inner 
Mongolia Normal 
University 
The Inspiration of 
Cross Strait Relations 
by Deng Xiaoping’s 
Thoughts of Solving the 
Taiwan Issue 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate Left Proposals 
184 
 
 
20 2009-2 Wang Yingjin Professor of 
Renmin University  
New idea of “One 
Country Two Systems” 
under Taiwan Model 
Taiwan 
Research 
Quarterly 
Moderate Left Proposals 
21 2009-8-19 Hu Rede Independent 
scholar 
Why There Should be 
An Urgent Political 
Negotiation Across the 
Strait 
Lian He Zao 
Bao 
Moderate Left Proposals 
22 2010-1-28 Hu Rude Independent 
Scholar 
Discussion on the 
Disputes of “Six 
Arguments” and “Six 
Answers” in Taiwan 
Lian He Zao 
Bao 
Moderate Left Proposals 
23 2010-5-20 Liu Yawei Independent 
scholar 
To Build the Military 
Trust Across the Strait 
and to Improve the Safe 
Environment in the 
West Pacific  
 
Air & Space 
Power 
Journal 
Moderate Left Proposals 
24 2011-9-22 Tang Shiping & 
(Shi Zhiyu) 
Professor at Fudan 
University 
Seize the Strategic 
Opportunity to Open 
Up A New Situation 
Across the Strait 
Lian He Zao 
Bao 
Moderate Left Proposals 
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25 2011-10-24 Ye Zheng Independent 
scholar 
Why the Peace Issue 
Across the Strait Raised 
So Many Questions 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate Left Proposals 
26 2012-4-28 Shen Yang Independent 
scholar 
Unification Proposition 
Across the Strait 
Time Weekly Moderate Left Proposals 
27 2013-3-18 Tian Feilong Lecturer at Beijing 
University of 
Aeronautics and 
Astronautics  
The Historical Review, 
Revision and Prospect 
of Act Governing 
Relations between the 
People of the Taiwan 
Area and the Mainland 
Area 
Taiwan 
Custom 
Moderate Left Proposals 
28 2013-3-21 Wang Dachao Lawyer Hypothesis for Peaceful 
Reunification Across 
the Strait 
China 
Reviews 
Moderate Left Proposals 
29 2013-8-15 Wang Shouwei Lecturer at Tianshi 
College, Tianjin 
Prediction of the 
Peaceful Reunification 
Across the Strait 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate Left Proposals 
30 2014-2-25 Zhang Wenyue Independent 
scholar 
It Is Time For the Third 
KMT-CCP Cooperation  
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate Left Proposals 
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31 2014-9-12 Chen Shiqing Independent 
scholar 
To Realize the 
Unification Across the 
Strait by “One Country, 
Two Entities”  
The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate Left Proposals 
32 2009-1-16 Ding Liting Column author of 
China Election and 
Governance 
How to Sign the Peace 
Agreement Across the 
Strait 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
33 2009-10-30 Su Lufeng Executive Director 
of Changsha He 
Culture Research 
Association 
Ma Ying-Jeou's 
Political Philosophy 
and the Taiwan Issue 
Independent 
Chinese PEN 
Center 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
34 2010-7-2 Chu Zhaogen Independent 
Scholar 
The Grand Strategy of 
Cross Strait Peaceful 
Reunification 
Personal 
Blog 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
35 2010-10-13 Wu Zuolai Researcher at 
China Academy of 
Art 
What Is Taiwan Wang Pao Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
187 
 
 
36 2011-9-12 Luo Rongbing Independent 
scholar 
One China, One Dream The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
37 2011-10-5 Wu Yong Ping 
& Zheng 
Zhenqing 
 
Professors from 
Tsinghua 
University 
Reconstruct the 
Constitutional 
Framework of “One 
China” 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
38 2012-3-28 Wu Zuolai Researcher at 
China Academy of 
Art 
To Be Tolerant of the 
Political Test in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan with 
Great Political Mind 
Ifeng.com Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
39 2012-7-9 Qi Duojun Professor at 
Zhongan 
University 
The Enlightenment of 
Taiwan Democracy 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
40 2013-1-08 Chang Xiuze Economist and 
Distinguished 
Professor 
Construct the Great 
Roof Across the Strait 
by Uniting and 
Reviving Chinese   
China 
Reviews 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
188 
 
 
41 2013-3-18 Qiu Zhiping Independent 
scholar 
Mainland should 
Acknowledge to 
Reunify China under 
the Three People's 
Principles 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
42 2013-5-2 Wang Zhenfeng Independent 
scholar 
Enhance Mutual Trust 
is the Corner Stone of 
the “New Era” Across 
the Strait   
China Review Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
43 2013-12-10 Wang Peng PhD Candidate at 
Bristol University 
What is the Best United 
Front to Taiwan 
Financial 
Times 
Chinese 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
44 2013-12-17 Xu Chuan Research Assistant 
at FuJian Normal 
Universit 
Three Pillars to 
Maintain the Peaceful 
Development Across 
the Strait 
China 
Reviews 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
45 2014-5-12 Wang Chongyu Independent 
scholar 
Why Not to Start the 
Reunification from 
Cultural Media 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
189 
 
 
46 2014-6-4 Yang Haifeng Independent 
scholar 
To Replace 1992 
Consensus with 
Chinese Consensus 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
47 2014-6-23 Yang Haifeng Independent 
scholar 
To Show Greater 
Political Courage to 
Taiwan 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
48 2014-8-21 Liu Chunze Independent 
scholar 
The Impression of 
Taipei 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
49  2014-9-2 Yang Haifeng Independent 
scholar 
The Imagination of 
Realizing the Meeting 
Between Xi Jinping and 
Ma Ying Jeou 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
50 2014-12-19 Yang Haifeng Independent 
scholar 
To Promote KMT-CCP 
Forum to Strait Forum 
The 
Consensus 
Website 
 
Moderate 
Right 
Proposals 
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51 2012-1-14 Xie Baofu Professor at 
Beijing University 
of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics  
New Thoughts on 
Political Integration 
Between Mainland 
China and Taiwan  
The 
Consensus 
Website 
Radical Right Proposals 
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